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What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have 
been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and 
embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, 
canonical, and binding.
Nietzsche
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ABSTRACT
THE EVOLUTIONARY DIMENSION WITHIN ECONOMIC THOUGHT
by
James Julius Neidhart 
University of New Hampshire 
September, 1996
This dissertation integrates the concepts of circular causality, emergence, and 
hierarchical organization through an investigation of the evolutionary dimension 
within economic thought. The different sections of this dissertation represent 
complementary perspectives on this theme.
The first chapter introduces the concept of circular causality and the technique 
of causal diagramming. These tools are used in the second and third chapters to 
highlight the evolutionary dimension within the history of economic thought. The 
particular theorists and groups of articles discussed include Adam Smith, Alfred 
Marshall, the Increasing Returns debates of the 1920’s, Gunnar Myrdal, and Nicholas 
Kaldor. The significance of the Increasing Returns debates is that it represents a 
bifurcation within economic theory: a point at which a choice needed to be made 
between what appeared to be mutually exclusive methods of analysis (i.e., the 
equilibrium and evolutionary perspective). The implicit decision was to further
xiii
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develop equilibrium theorizing. As a result, both Myrdal and Kaldor were, by 
necessity, outspoken critics of this equilibrium based methodology. These criticisms 
are highly significant due to their detailed analysis of what evolutionary theory is not.
Hierarchical nesting and the defining characteristics thereof emerge quite 
naturally within the theories of these above mentioned evolutionary economists. This 
manifested for some of the later theorists as an implicit, and frequently explicit, 
refusal to use a general equilibrium framework in their models of the economy (i.e., 
an aggregation of the parts to form the whole). Such a methodology would have been 
in direct conflict with their intuitions regarding the economic process. The different 
layers of the economy that they did identify are found to be amenable to 
conceptualization as self-reinforcing processes.
In the fourth chapter, this hierarchical nesting of concepts is developed more 
generally, and grounded more firmly, as a residual of mental conception and dualistic 
thought. It is hoped that these latter ideas might serve as a future foundation, 
however rough, from which a truly evolutionary perspective can emerge: one which is 
applicable to the whole range of human experience.
xiv
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the historical and philosophical
foundations from which a truly progressive theory of socio-economic change might
emerge. I have chosen to characterize this theory as evolutionary. Webster’s (1979)
detines evolution as:
An unfolding, opening out, or working out; process of development, as from a 
simple to a complex form, of gradual, progressive change, as in a social and 
economic structure.
This distinctly English word, developed during the 17* century, possesses a sense of 
emergence which I attempt to be true to, while concurrently recognizing that such a facet 
may be quite beyond the grasp of the intellect.
A distinguishing feature of the following dissertation is that it does not contain a 
wealth of mathematical formalism. While it does not seem that mathematics is a 
necessary condition for valid theory, it still remains a very powerful language which can 
help to clarify one’s thinking and thus must not be dismissed wholesale. However, a 
more serious error would be to assume that the structure of mathematics is homologous 
to the structure of reality. The trick is to determine the role that mathematics, and 
arithromorphic concepts in general, can play. It will be contended that the answer to this 
question is intimately connected with the concept of emergence. Although the following 
dissertation draws from the field of economics in particular, it is meant to be applicable 
to the social sciences in general.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
This dissertation is divided into four major chapters. The first chapter establishes 
a language with which to discuss the concept of circular causality. This includes a 
general introduction to causal loop diagramming and the division between co-dependent 
and stabilizing circularities. This framework is used extensively within the following 
chapters.
The second and third chapters highlight self-reinforcing circular relations within the 
history of economic thought: in particular, the division-of-laborand extent-of-the-market 
hypothesis and variations thereof. This dimension is analyzed in isolation from the 
equilibrium dimension for the sake of clarity, but if the two were combined one would 
have a non-linear system. Starting from the writings of Adam Smith, the second chapter 
moves on to Alfred Marshall, and then concludes with the Increasing Returns debates of 
the 1920’s. The third chapter explores Gunnar Myrdal and Nicholas Kaldor’s models 
of socio-economic progress, followed by a discussion of some aspects of the evolutionary 
dimension within contemporary economic thought. The division between the second and 
third chapters is marked by a bifurcation within economic theory which resulted in the 
proliferation of the equilibrium, at the expense of the evolutionary, dimension of 
economic thought. As a consequence, the theorists included in the third chapter have, 
by necessity, been outspoken critics of this myopic methodological emphasis on 
equilibrium processes within economic theory.
The fourth chapter is an attempt to clarify a theory of hierarchical composition, 
originally inspired by the research contained in the second chapter, which can serve as 
the foundations of an evolutionary paradigm. To accomplish this task, it begins with a
2
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general discussion of the relationship which is assumed to exist between sensory 
perception, mental conception, and experience. This is followed by brief discussions of 
sensory perception and mental conception, which are then used, in coordination with 
concepts of circular causality, to develop and motivate a presentation of the conceptual 
hierarchy. This latter theoretical perspective, i.e., a nesting of conceptually discrete 
theoretical relationships which manifest through variations in the spatio-temporal 
dimensions of perception, is proposed as the foundations for future evolutionary thought. 
The fourth chapter closes with the presentation and extension of an existing theory' of 
institutional change which highlights the hierarchical layering within the socio-economic 
process. In summary, this fourth chapter contributes to the investigation of the 
fundamental philosophical issues which underlay self-reinforcing systems in the social 
sciences.
3
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CHAPTER 1
A LANGUAGE FOR SELF-REINFORCING SYSTEMS 
Causal Loop Diagramming
What is the essence of economic change and development, of economic evolution? 
Many contemporary economists recognize the presence of irreversibility, hysteresis, path 
dependency, and multiple equilibria, but do our theories demonstrate such possibilities? 
If a theoretical alternative is necessary, must we start from scratch or can we build one 
from the theoretical designs left by past authors? Ideally, any such framework should 
be able to represent both stable equilibrium and evolutionary relations. One promising 
candidate which meets these criteria is General Systems Theory. However, rather than 
arguing against the theoretical status quo in economics and for this alternative, a task 
done quite eloquently in the past (e.g., Komai 1971), the following dissertation highlights 
the presence of general systems thinking within the history of economic thought. With 
this goal in mind, it is necessary to introduce some new concepts which derive from 
General Systems Theory and the conceptual dichotomy between positive and negative 
circular causal relations.
What is circular causality?1 Let’s begin by considering a simple linear
1 The interested reader is referred to Goodman (1974) for a more detailed discussion on causal loop 
diagramming and the interaction of positive and negative feedback loop relationships within the field of 
System Dynamics (see also, Boulding 1968 and Maruyama 1968). Furthermore, anyone who dismisses
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
cause-*effect relationship between two variables. This definition of linear causality will 
cover situations in which some change in A is associated through time with some change 
in B. "A" and "B" are generic labels which can represent simple magnitudes or n* order 
derivatives.2 Using an arrow to symbolize the elapse of time and to demonstrate the 
direction of causality, this is represented as follows:
Figure 1: Linear Causality
A ------------------- ► B
cause effect
Therefore, the presence of event A is associated with the presence of event B, and 
changes in A are associated with changes in B. But, the presence of B or changes in its 
value will not influence A. The dependence is strictly asymmetric.
Within this framework, there are three possible types of first order relationships. 
First, there is the possibility that an increase in one variable is associated with an 
increase in the other (i.e., AA -* /SAB; /3>0 with AA and AB being some unit of
an operational role for the notions of causality would be referred to Simon (1953). The general thrust of 
the reasoning is that causality has no meaning in a non-hierarchical world. However, in a world of what 
Simon terms "causal ordering," a knowledge of causal relations is an indispensable informant of action. 
My understanding of causality and association involves the recognition of relatively stable interrelations 
between perceptually distinct elements which lead to a recognition of their tendency to covary together 
within the underlying process of reality. It has an epistemological, rather than an ontological meaning.
2 See Appendix B for a brief comparison between qualitative and quantitative methods of investigating 
the dynamic behavior of systems.
5
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change).3 This relationship is characterized as being positive and our causal link is 
qualified with a positive sign.
Figure 2: Positive Linear Relation
A ----------------- ^  B
cause effect
The second type of first order relationship is when an increase in one variable is 
associated with a decline in the other (i.e., AA -* jSAB; /3<0; causal link qualified with 
a negative sign). Lastly, there is the possibility of no perceptible relationship between 
the two variables. However, even if a relationship between variables has not manifested 
in the past, it may remain an inherent possibility. While this possibility is not of much 
importance in strictly linear relationships, it is of considerable importance when thinking 
about the emergence of novelty within circular causal systems.
Circular causality extends the ideas of linear causality by including the dependence 
of A on B. As a result, the clear distinction between cause and effect which exists in 
linear causality becomes blurred. Events A and B appear to occur together: change in 
A causes change in B, causing further change in A, and therefore further change in B. 
Furthermore, while the variables are obviously interdependent, it may also be the case 
that they depend on one another for their very existence (i.e., a mutual sine qua non).
3 It is also possible to talk in terms of partial derivatives. Such formulations are traditionally used to
determine stability, but these quantitative techniques have been forsaken in favor of a qualitative 
presentation since this dissertation is directed primarily at the social sciences as a group and such
mathematical formalism might serve as quicksand for some (present author included). Lastly, the notion 
that valid ideas must be embodied in mathematical rigor is a ridiculous contention reminiscent of past 
claims by the Catholic Church that holy thought can only be expressed in Latin.
6
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For example, there may be an ecosystem consisting of complex interdependent 
interactions of bacteria, insects, plants, and animals which represents a pattern o f stable 
relations which have evolved between the individual organisms over time. Single 
organisms within such complex patterns of interdependence may require the presence of 
other organisms within this pattern in order to survive. However, since circular causal 
relations have the potential to perpetuate inefficiency and the retention of unnecessary 
elements within such patterns, the removal of a single element may not always be 
significant to the dynamics of what appears to be a interdependent pattern (e.g., the 
appendix in the human body).
It is possible to classify circular causal relations into two different types by noting 
the number of negative linear causal links within a complete loop (i.e., from A back to 
A). If this number is even the loop is called a positive loop, and if odd, a negative loop 
(similar to the multiplication of positive and negative numbers). The circularity 
diagrammed in Figure 3 is a positive circular relation and is qualified by the sign in 
parentheses.
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Since causality "flow" in both directions, from A to B and from B to A, a change of any 
variable in this loop will ripple through the other variables and inevitably have 
repercussions on itself.
Looking at the linear composite of this circular relation, if subsequent changes in 
the variables of a positive circular loop are increasing (e.g., AA-*/SAB; AB-*aAA; 
/3a >  1), it will explode or implode depending on the direction of initial change.4 This 
language of explosion/implosion (hereafter, referred to simply as explosive) highlights 
the fact that the quality of the interdependent pattern of variables will not remain the 
same, it will cease to exist as it was. Its growth will be exponential in form. Such a 
relation is referred to as a complementary co-dependence when a > 0  and /3>0. Within 
this classification scheme, two elements which share a mutually negative relationship 
(i.e., /3<0 and a < 0 )  will result in a divergent explosion (e.g., an initial decrease in A 
causes an increase in B, which causes a further decrease in A, and the cycle continues). 
This divergent co-dependence between A and B is diagrammed in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Divergent Co-Dependence
(+)
* The following analysis treats these relationships as difference rather than differential equations. This 
approach provides a clearer qualitative presentation. Those who prefer a quantitative approach can consult, 
e.g., Chiang (1984: Chapter 14).
8
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Since divergent co-dependence represents the rise/decline of two (sets of) variables, the 
continued growth of one is systemically dependent on the decline of the other. If the 
latter variable is unable to decline any further, then the growth of the former must cease. 
For example, the theory of subsistence wages posits a biological minimum below which 
wages cannot fall without destroying the quality of the laborer. Therefore, profit growth 
through wage reductions possesses a ‘natural’ limitation.
The remaining parameter range, 1 > j8a>0, results in dampened growth: an initial 
change in A causes a change in B, which still results in a further change in A. However, 
subsequent changes decline in value and the circularity does not have explosive 
implications (e.g., money supply growth and Keynesian concepts of induced 
consumption)5. This class of circular relations is referred to as complementary and 
divergent dynamic adjustments. While dynamic adjustments will not result in instability 
nor stability, the amplification of perturbations may engender the unfolding of relations 
which do lead to instability.
While these categorical types have been illustrated using only two elements, 
positive loops may contain more than two variables and therefore be composed of 
multiple negative and positive links. In such cases, the individual negative links (recall 
that this is an even number) serve to demarcate the sets of variables which diverge from 
one another as the dynamics of the process unfold; one set will increase, while the other 
decreases. Therefore, one should speak of complementarity and divergence between sets 
or patterns o f variables within a positive circular relation rather than labeling entire loops
5 It is of significant importance to note that these examples represent the two major points of policy 
intervention in the economy: monetary and fiscal.
9
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in this fashion. In addition, since divergence is inherently dichotomous (e.g., a variable 
must become either more or less of what it is), any divergent co-dependence with greater 
than two elements must possess some degree of complementary co-dependence. The 
following diagram demonstrates how the circular relation between three variables, an 
indirect complementarity between A and B, and a divergence between C and [AB], with 
the brackets representing a set of variables, can be presented in different ways.
Figure 5: Complementary/Divergent Co-Dependent Relations
(Abstracting from "C")
Even though the third representation abstracts from C, the complementary process 
between A and B still requires the presence of C for continued existence.6 However, 
a representation which abstracts from C may not appear to be empirically inaccurate until 
the qualitative contribution which element C makes to the process is visibly degraded to 
such an extent that the complementary co-dependence between A and B is effected.
A minor point which needs to be made explicit is that while the individual linear 
relationships between elements (e.g., A -* B) can change from being positive to negative 
by simply redefining one of the variables (A or B), the overall quality of the circular
6 For example, some research in economic development which explores the divergence between
developed and underdeveloped regions posits that the complementarities within geographical regions are 
themselves within a context of divergent co-dependencies between countries (e.g., Gunnar Myrdal 1956,
1957). In contrast, other development theorists discount the importance of this developed/underdeveloped 
divergence in conceiving of economic growth as a predominantly endogenous endeavor within a given
region (e.g., Rostow 1962).
10
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
relationship remains intact after such semantic shifts. This means that the individual 
relations between elements within a positive circular causal loop may be either divergent 
or complementary depending on the meanings and valuations assigned to the individual 
elements. However, while such semantic shifts will change the tone of one’s discussion, 
the underlying relations will be the same. Of course, the causal relation between 
qualitatively identical variables which enter the same process individually (e.g., 
individual income amongst individuals or regional industrial infrastructure between 
regions) are immune from such semantic manipulations. These classificatory distinctions
between different positive circular causal relations are summarized in Table 1.
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The main reason why positive loop relations have not played an explicitly strong 
role in economic theory is that they do not contribute in any way to the quality of 
stability (i.e., the requisite for structural identification). For example, the possibility of 
complementary co-dependence within a set of variables, a relationship which presents no 
impediments to infinite expansion, has led many theorists to reject such relationships 
outright (e.g., see Hont 1983; Sraffa 1926). This underemphasis is perhaps due to the 
fact that some classes of positive loop relations do exist peacefully within the ivory 
towers of economic theory, e.g., instances of complementary dynamic adjustment (e.g., 
monetary stock changes and Keynesian investment) and divergent co-dependence (e.g., 
natural monopoly and technological lock-in). It will be suggested in this dissertation that 
complementary co-dependencies, the one type excluded, represent the conceptual 
counterpart to the historical process of evolutionary development.
Regardless of this mainstream tendency to disregard complementary co­
dependencies within contemporary economic theory, such relations are found at the 
historical foundations of economic thought: Adam Smith’s analysis of the division-of- 
labor.7 This is diagrammed in Figure 6.
7 Josiah Tucker and James Oswald seem to have been the first to postulate the possibility for
complementary co-dependence within the division of labor (Hont 1983; Elmslie 1995). However, this 
proposition was rejected by David Hume since such relations could hypothetically progress indefinitely. 
The uniqueness of Adam Smith’s approach was that he proposed exogenous constraints on the system which
is perhaps the reason why Smith’s ideas were more acceptable to Hume than Tucker’s. However, it should 
be noted that Smith’s constraints were founded on his conservative opinion that science had progressed as
far as possible and would soon be engaged in the mere retention of a static body of knowledge (Elmslie
1994a).
12
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Figure 6: The Division-of-Labor
Division-of-Labor
Extent-of-the-Market
The division-of-labor is limited by the amount of goods that can actually be sold, i.e., 
the extent-of-the-market. Since the extent-of-the-market is determined by the cost/price 
of production, which is influenced by the division-of-labor, a potential complementary 
circularity is established. Every economist should be familiar with this relationship even 
though it remains a marginal concept along the fringes of economic theory (Liejonhufvud 
1986).
While Smith’s discussion of this circularity supports the conclusion that he viewed 
it as displaying some degree of co-dependence, this does not lead to infinite growth since 
Smith imposed limits on the growth of the variables themselves. Therefore, the economy 
may emerge through a co-dependent unfolding (a/3 > 1) and then manifest only a steady 
state existence. For Smith, the upper constraint on economic development results from 
the ‘natural’ limits inherent to scientific knowledge which place an upper bound on the 
division of labor. This shifting of dynamic relations represents changes occurring 
between both the variables of the pattern and the pattern within its environment. Such 
is the case with most organisms or cultures which seem to unfold into some peak state 
and then decline or demonstrate oscillatory behavior around a steady state.
13
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The exploration of steady state relations involves a distinctively different type of 
circular relation: one in which the causal link between A and B is negative, while that
An increase in A causes a decrease in B (/3 <  0), while this decrease in B causes a 
decrease in A (a >0). The value of j3a will still determine the quality of the interactive 
process (i.e., explosive versus adjustment), but since subsequent changes of a given 
element do not reinforce one another, the dynamic process will be oscillatory: 
| /9a | <1 leads to convergent oscillations which restore a state of balanced relations 
while | |3a | >1  leads to explosive oscillations. This latter parameter range involves 
the amplified variance of the variables under observation which thereby leads to a 
degeneration of the coherence within the pattern (e.g., the San Francisco suspension 
bridge which was destroyed through oscillatory amplification of structural flex during 
heavy winds). The pattern per se seems to disintegrate as it "decouples" into the stable 
configurations of its compositional components. While many stable systems have evolved 
within, and hence been dynamically coupled to, a context of oscillatory relations (e.g., 
plants and climate), it does seem probable that oscillatory amplifications may undermine
between B and A is positive (or vice versa). This negative circular relation is 
diagrammed in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Negative Circular Relation
14
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their continued existence.8 However fruitful a discussion of this latter category may be 
to understanding systemic degeneration, I will limit myself to a discussion of what I call 
stabilizing circularities ( | |8a | <  1).
Stabilizing circularities are characterized as goal-seeking and relation preserving 
since they dampen perturbations within the system and thereby preserve the quantitative 
relations between its structural qualities (i.e., equilibrium). This ecological balance 
within a pattern of variables is determined by the interactive nature of its parts and their 
environment. The conceptual "poles" of attraction around which these stabilizing 
circularities act are taken as given. Table 2 summarizes the aforementioned types of 
negative circular causalities.
* Economic examples include agricultural markets which experience unstable negative circularities 
which result in wildly fluctuating prices due to delays between production and consumption decisions (see 
Goodwin 1990). These price fluctuations lead to the bankruptcy of some farms, and the removal of some 
farms from the heterogeneous set of all farms may result in a transition to more stable relations. These 
ideas can also be used to characterize the Great Depression as a degeneration of economic relations (i.e., 
consumer confidence in banks and the stability of paper wealth) which resulted in a 'slip* of the economy 
back to more primitive interactive relations and structural forms. Policy supports in agriculture and 
legislation within the banking industry attempt to severe such destructive circular relations within the 
current economic environment.
15
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Traditionally, economics has emphasized stabilizing circularities since they preserve 
relations and represent the equilibrating dimension within the flux of reality.9 An 
economic example of such relations is supply and demand analysis, as represented in 
Figure 8.
9 In his discussion of complex phenomena, Hayek (1967d:27) contended that our main interest is in 
those structures in which a "complex pattern has produced properties which make self-maintaining the 
structure showing it."
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Market price (P) determines the quantity of goods that producers offer for sale (QJ and 
the quantity of goods that consumers wish to purchase (Qd). Defining market surplus as 
Q,-Qd, it is assumed that higher prices will elicit an increase in this value through larger 
Q, and smaller Qj. Furthermore, changes in price are negatively related to market 
surplus such that if Q,-Qd> 0  then A P<0, Qi-Qd< 0  then AP>0, and Q,-Qd=0 then 
AP=0 (i.e., market clears at existing price). This last possibility represents a market 
equilibrium in which both buyers and sellers are content with the level of consumption 
and production given the price of goods in the market. Within this dynamic process, any 
perturbation from the market clearing price is dynamically purged from the system.10 
The goal of the market is set by the marginal cost of production (i.e., technology and 
input costs) and the marginal utility of consumption (i.e., preferences and incomes), 
which are both exogenous factors at this level of analysis.
10 The cobweb model is the explosive counterpart to this stable market perspective (e.g.t see Goodwin 
1990).
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One caveat needs to be made at this point: When using circular causal diagrams to 
draw conclusions concerning the dynamic behavior of a system, it is important to 
distinguish between rate-to-level and information or proportional causal relations. A 
rate-to-level relation is a causal link between a variable and its rate of change (e.g., 
population and the number of births per year), while a proportional relation is between 
two different variables (e.g., division-of-labor and extent-of-the-market). With rate-to- 
level relations, a decrease in one variable will not necessarily lead to a decrease in the 
other. For example, a decrease in the number of births per year will not necessarily 
cause a decrease in the population: population may continue to rise, just at a lower rate. 
In order to explicitly account for this, rate-to-level relations are distinguished from 
proportional relations through the use of a dashed line (see Appendix B for illustrations). 
Although this makes a prediction of the particular dynamic behavior of the system more 
complex, it does not significantly alter the qualitative behavior of the causal loop (i.e., 
explosive or stabilizing).
18
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Circular Loops and Endogeneity
Now that the basic concepts of circular causation have been presented, it is possible 
to move on to a more general discussion. When a system changes, it is generally 
assumed that this change is not arbitrary or random, but that it reflects the interdependent 
relations between different variables. Although bpth linear and circular accounts of 
causal relations have been a standard fare of human thought throughout history, Western 
science has tended to overemphasis the former rather than the latter. One example is the 
first mover argument for the existence of God: A being unaffected by and immune to the 
system it creates. A less dramatic example involves the game of billiards: one predicts 
the effect of sending the cue ball in motion as it disturbs a triangular arrangement of 
multicolored balls at the other end of the table. The player who surveys the existing 
arrangement of balls and strikes the cue ball with a pool cue is frequently exogenous to 
this representation. However, the player’s skills can be endogenized in one’s concept 
of the system, e.g., as they view the spatial arrangement of the balls or attempt to disturb 
their opponent’s concentration. Frequently, our explanation of the system begins and 
ends with each individual shot since the mechanics of billiards seems to be uninfluenced 
by one’s concept and perception of the multi-colored pattern of balls.
19
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Even evolutionary theory has been expressed in a linear manner, e.g., the fitting 
of an organism to an external and independent environment to determine species 
survival.11 However, perhaps it is more accurate to endogenize the organism’s influence 
on its environment such that both the organism and its environment are conceived to co- 
evolve in mutual dependence (e.g., Kauffman 1988; Wuketits 1987). For example, the 
co-evolutionary theories of Norgaard (1984, 1985, 1987) concerning the interrelations 
of the economy and environment embody such a perspective. The evolutionary emphasis 
in this dissertation concerns this latter notion of the co-dependent and mutually 
reinforcing changes that occur within and between different patterns of variables. Such 
evolutionary thinking is not a novel insight of current generations, but rather an insight 
in search of formal theoretical embodiment. The following chapters highlight this 
evolutionary dimension within the theories of different economists throughout history. 
In this way, it is hoped that the reader will see the central importance these ideas held 
within past attempts to model the economy and also the promise they hold for future 
theorizing. Since the distinction between co-dependent and adjustment circularities is 
determined by parameter values rather than sign and since these parametric relations are 
not static, one must acknowledge the possibility that a system’s predominant dynamic 
behavior will shift between these two categories.
An important issue in identifying circularities within economic theory involves the 
boundaries which a theorist establishes for the system under observation, i.e., which
11 This perspective is neo-Darwinian and should not be considered the only school of thought in 
evolutionary biology. It is, however, safe to say that it has enjoyed academic dominance in the past and 
continues to be used by many outside biology as an acceptable theory of evolution.
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variables are relevant. In setting these boundaries, one implicitly limits the applicability 
of the theoretical model. For example, the economic status of Afro-Americans in the 
30’s and 40’s is obviously an economic issue. If, however, there are causal determinants 
which fall under the rubric of anthropology or sociology, should they be included in the 
theoretical model? If these variables are important factors in explaining the dynamic 
behavior of the phenomena under observation, of course they should. As Rostow 
(1990:482) stated,
... one should take the problem in all its complexity as the discipline and bring 
to bear around it relevant insights from whatever branch of knowledge that 
appears to have something to offer. There is little to be said for those who -- as 
analysts or teachers — cut the problem down to the size of the method or 
discipline to which they are committed.
Such an interdisciplinary approach was practiced by Gunnar Myrdal. Although Myrdal’s
training was in neoclassical economic theory, his investigation of the economic status of
Afro-Americans led him to conclude that the distinction between relevant and irrelevant
variables could not be done along sectarian lines (i.e., on the basis of a priori
assumptions concerning what "economic" variables are). A complete answer to this
economic question required anthropological, psychological, and sociological variables in
order to fully reflect the circular and cumulative influences that governed race relations
within the U.S. during Myrdal’s lifetime. The major problem with theories constructed
along strict disciplinary tradition rather than causal relatedness is that they allow for the
possibility that fertile circularities are sterilized within our models.
This desire to make the discipline fit the problem rather than vice versa is very 
important from an evolutionary perspective. For example, the economic system has
21
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demonstrated an ability to evolve into greater levels of complexity, yet satisfactory, 
theories of such change have eluded economists. One possible explanation is that by 
concentrating on "economic" variables, our theoretical models exclude important positive 
circularities which would lend a greater degree of endogenous change to our concepts. 
If a theoretical model lacks such relations, change within the system must be introduced 
through external stimuli. It is a distinguishing characteristic of many older models of 
economic growth and development that they require exogenous stimulation (e.g., constant 
population growth, technology transfer, or fiscal injection) in order to display growth. 
Arrow (1962:155) once commented that a "view of economic growth that depends so 
heavily on an exogenous variable ... is hardly intellectually satisfactory."
One can speak of expanding economic theories to include previously excluded
variables and hence capturing previously amputated circular relations. Ulanowicz
(1986:60) has commented on this:
One begins with a field of vision limited to a certain small portion of the 
universe. One then catalogues the behavior of the delimited system, as well as 
all those influences that cross the system boundary in any direction. If it happens 
that the original system contains only a segment of a feedback loop, then the 
behavior of this causal pathway will appear strictly nonautonomous ... However, 
if one enlarges the system boundary so as to include the entire feedback loop ... 
semi-autonomous behavior ‘emerges’ from an increase in scope.
One might even go so far as to augment the methodological criteria of a ‘good’ model
(e.g., ideas such as simplicity, fruitfulness, logical completeness and consistency) to
include the recognition of positive circularities in order to theoretically embody the
possibilities for endogenous change. However, economics was not always so strict about
excluding psychological, sociological, and political variables in the past. The field was
22
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also much more willing to propose theories which possessed strong complementary co­
dependent dimensions. It is to an investigation of these facets within the history of 
economic thought that this dissertation now turns.
23
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CHAPTER 2
AN EVOLUTIONARY DIMENSION WITHIN ECONOMIC THEORY
The first theorist discussed from this evolutionary perspective is Adam Smith. This 
is an obvious place to begin due to Smith’s role in the establishment of Economics 
(actually, Political Economy in those days) as a field of study. Furthermore, it is very 
easy to distill a vivid mapping of positive circularities within Smith’s theory of economic 
growth. Although the emphasis he placed on the relationship between the division-of- 
labor and extent-of-the-market is widely accepted informally, theoretical embodiments 
of such endogenous change has occurred only recently (e.g., Krugman 1991c). Other 
evolutionary facets of Smith’s theories were de-emphasized since they involve political 
relations. For example, the crumbling of social relations within Medieval Europe and 
the rise of capitalism were seen to be mutually dependent events. By combining Smith’s 
discussions of natural liberty, private property rights, capital stock accumulation, 
division-of-labor and extent-of-the-market, a clear and concise genesis story of the 
modem economy emerges.
Alfred Marshall is the second economist explored. This choice not only 
acknowledges Marshall’s contributions to economic theory, but also his self-proclaimed 
emphasis on biological analogies. For instance, in the preface to the 8th edition of his 
Principles of Economics (1990[1920]:xii), he wrote that the "Mecca of the economist lies 
in economic biology rather than in economic dynamics.” For this reason alone, any
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thorough exposition on the evolutionary dimension within the history of economic thought 
would be hard pressed to not include a discussion of Marshall’s ideas. But more 
importantly, Marshall elaborates on Smith’s theme of the division-of-labor by identifying 
both a differentiating and an integrating dimension. This distinction led Marshall to 
acknowledge the different levels within the economy at which complementary processes 
occur.'
Of course, if the claim is made that evolutionary dimensions are implicit within the 
writings of past theorists, it is necessary to provide some explanation as to why such 
facets have been downplayed within the received wisdom of economic theory. To this 
end, this essay proceeds from Marshall into a series o f articles published between 1922 
and 1930 by a number of different economists within the pages of the Economic Journal. 
This episode and its topic of discussion will be referred to as the Increasing Returns 
debates. While the theories of both perfect competition (Pigou 1927, 1928) and 
imperfect competition (Robinson 1933; Chamberlin 1933) emerged from the debris of 
these debates, this controversy also marks a distinct bifurcation point within economic 
inquiry. It is at this turning point in economic theory that the specifically evolutionary 
dimensions of Smith and Marshall’s thought are exorcised from professional circles. 
Articles which attempted to embody evolutionary insights such as Young’s (1928) 
"Increasing returns and economic progress" are misplaced, only to be rediscovered as 
the urge to understand the evolutionary dimension of the economy has resurfaced.
As a result of the Increasing Returns debates, the role of increasing returns was 
limited to those inherent to a particular system, e.g., those found within a specific firm
25
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(i.e., monopoly) or region. This fact restricted investigations of complementary co­
dependencies to those which were bounded through either a divergent co-dependence or 
environmental parameter which stabilized the system. However, although unbounded 
evolutionary relations per se were not within the realm of acceptable theory, there was 
research published after the 1930’s which worked within this intellectual atmosphere to 
advance the evolutionary perspective. Three main groupings along these lines will be 
explored in the chapter following the present one: (1) Gunnar Myrdal’s models of 
international development, (2) Kaldor’s North-South model, and (3) W. Brian Arthur’s 
concept of technological lock-in.
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Adam Smith: The Wealth of Nations
Division of Labor
Viner (1928:116) commented that one can enter Smith’s model of the economy "at
any point without doing violence to the logic" since it is "a coordinated and mutually
dependent system of cause and effect relationships." The most obvious entry point from
an evolutionary perspective is the division-of-labor concept, which Smith viewed as the
fundamental determinant of the wealth of nations.12 Economists will be familiar with
his famous quote concerning the manufacture of pins: by combining their efforts under
a single roof, Smith argued that workers are able to specialize in a single aspect of the
production process and thereby produce more together than is possible apart. Pin
manufacturing is not only a particular trade itself,
... it is divided into a number of branches, of which the greater part are likewise 
peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts 
it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; to make 
the head requires two or three distinct operations; to put it on, is a peculiar 
business, to whiten the pins is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them 
into the paper ... I have seen a small manufactory of this kind where ten men 
only were employed ... Those ten persons, therefore, could make among them 
upwards of forty-thousand pins in a day. ... But if they had all wrought 
separately and independently ... they certainly could not each of them have made 
twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day. (Smith 1937[1776]:4-5)
12 Leijonhufvud (1986) reminds us that 'Smith’s division of labor - the core of his theory of production 
- slips through modem production theory as a ghostly technological-change coefficient or as an equally ill- 
understood economies-of-scale property of the function* (see also Georgescu-Roegen 1976:Chapter 2; 
Stigler 1976:1209). Stigler (1951) attempted to reintroduce Smith’s ideas as 'the core of a theory of the 
functions of firm and industry,* but his article has been neglected by the profession.
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This division-of-labor or specialization permits an increase of the total product in 
three ways: (1) Specialization on an isolated task allows the worker to establish special 
skills and greater dexterity with respect to the task at hand. In a sense, the basic actions 
become habitual or second nature, require less thought, and allow greater concentration 
on the finer details of the work. (2) There is a savings in labor time since the transition 
between individual steps in the production process is reduced. While this time would 
have been spent idly, it is now spent productively. (3) Lastly, Smith believed that 
workers whose sole focus is on a single task would be so engrossed that they would 
understand it more deeply than someone performing the same task less frequently. As 
the drive to reduce the time spent working bears down upon these "focused" workers, 
they are able to formulate novel ways of performing their specific task which reduces 
their time commitment and material waste.13
Not only did Smith have a notion of the vertical division-of-labor (i.e., the 
separation of one productive process into multiple, specialized steps), but he also 
recognized the horizontal division-of-labor (i.e., the separation of trades). This is 
witnessed, for example, in his separation of peculiar trades within the economy and even 
philosophers (inventors) from the common lot of people (Elmslie 1994b). When one 
considers production as a generic conversion of raw characteristics to refined 
characteristics, it becomes apparent that the distinction between vertical and horizontal
13 Rosenberg (1976:863) included the division of a single responsibility into two distinct ones when the 
task which affords less reward was neglected in favor of a task which gives greater reward. Therefore, 
the separation of two such tasks through specialization leads to greater productivity as a whole. Rosenberg 
develops Smith’s example of the combination of military, legislative, and judicial power in a single 
individual. Once these duties were separated, the distinct tasks were performed better individually than 
they had been as a whole.
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division-of-labor is based on proprietary rights within the economy and serves to identify 
the parties to whom the productivity advantages will accrue. Therefore, while the 
productivity gains from a vertical division-of-labor can be internalized within a single 
firm, productivity gains from a horizontal division-of-labor are internalized within a 
broader sphere (e.g., city, region, or national economy). Although Smith seemed to 
foresee this point in his discussion of the evolution of towns and cities, it was left to 
Alfred Marshall to fully embody this idea in his economic theory.
Returning to Smith’s analysis of the division-of-labor, he believed there were
definite limitations to this method of increasing production. First, there may be an input
to the production process which is only available on a limited basis. For example, he
felt that specialization would be most extensive within the production of manufactured
goods, as opposed to agriculture. The reason for this asymmetry was the dependence of
agriculture on climate.
The nature of agriculture indeed, does not admit of so many subdivisions of 
labour, nor of so complete a separation of one business from another, as 
manufactures. ... The occasions for those different sorts of labour [e.g., 
ploughman, harrower, sower of seed, and reaper of com] returning with the 
different seasons of the year, it is impossible that one man should be constantly 
employed in any one of them. This impossibility of making so complete and 
entire a separation of all the different branches of labour employed in agriculture, 
is perhaps the reason why the improvement of the productive powers of labour 
in this art, does not always keep pace with their improvement in manufactures. 
(Smith 1937[1776]:6)
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Changing seasons serve to limit the extent to which the agricultural process can be 
divided and controlled: all plants are sown in the spring and harvested in the fall. In 
Leijonhufvud’s (1986) words, agriculture faces a timing problem.14
A more significant limiting factor for Smith was the extent-of-the-market. Quite 
simply, it does no good to produce forty thousand pins in a day if  no one is willing to 
trade for them.
As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so 
the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, 
in other words by the extent of the market. (Smith 1937[1776]: 17)
The effective demand must be present in order for the fruits of the division of labor to
be realized. This positive circularity between the division-of-labor and extent-of-the-
market is diagrammed in Figure 9.
Figure 9: The Division-of-Labor and Extent-of-the-Market Circularity
Division-of-LaborC wExtent-of-the-Market +
Elaborating on the first link within this circularity, that between the division-of- 
labor and extent-of-the-market, the productivity advantages of specialization will manifest 
as a decreasing cost of production. As stated previously within Smith’s pin factory 
example, this is simply a matter of organizational improvement since workers are able
14 A more detailed analysis of such limitations is embodied in Georgescu-Roegen’s theoretical 
distinction between funds and stocks (1971:Chapter 9), and will be discussed later in this dissertation.
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to produce more output on average. For example, at one time everyone in a community
engaged in hunting, fishing, cooking, and maintaining a shelter as a daily chore. In
time, individuals began to specialize in only one aspect of this set of chores and the
community became more productive as a whole. This resulted in a lower per unit cost
and allowed communities with an advanced division-of-labor to extend their market to
neighboring areas. The market progressed from being merely domestic, to being
regional, and even foreign in scope. It is in coordination with this expansionary tendency
that the advantages of easy access to water transport (i.e., the natural geographical
advantages of a specific region) allow a market to be extended at a lower cost. This
argument was used by Smith to explain the economic prosperity of England:
England, on account of the natural fertility of the soil, of the great extent of the 
sea-coast in proportion to that of the whole country, and of the many navigable 
rivers which run through it, and afford the conveniency of water carriage to 
some of the most inland parts of it, is perhaps as well fitted by nature as any 
large country in Europe, to be the seat of foreign commerce, and manufactures 
for distant sale, and of all the improvements which these can occasion. (Smith 
1937[1776]:393)
However, for a person to specialize in fishing, they must be able to exchange the surplus
of this activity for other things they need.
... the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of 
his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of 
the produce of other men’s labour as he may have occasion for, encourages 
every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring 
to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species 
of business. (Smith 1937[1776]:15)
Therefore, it is a worker’s ability to acquire the necessities of life which they themselves
do not produce (i.e., the extent-of-the-market or opportunities for trade) which provides
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the conditions which allow for specialization. In this way the causal connection is 
brought back full circle.
This circularity between the extent-of-the-market and division-of-labor finds 
expression in Smith’s recognition that some specialized trades would not be present in 
small markets.
There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be carried 
on no where but in a great town. A porter, for example, can find employment 
and subsistence in no other place. A village is by much too narrow a sphere for 
him; even an ordinary market town is scarce large enough to afford him constant 
occupation. In the lone houses and very small villages which are scattered about 
in so desert a country as the Highlands of Scotland, every farmer must be 
butcher, baker, and brewer for his own family. (Smith 1937[1776]:7)
As the market expands, an individual’s opportunity to specialize is enhanced and the
division-of-labor is extended.
These details of the division-of-labor and extent-of-the-market circularity are
important to develop since they allow a more concise discussion of Smith’s treatment of
money and our species’ propensity to "truck, barter, and exchange." Smith believed that
both of these factors work to augment the opportunities for trade. For example, money
serves as a universal standard of exchange which makes trade easier, and thereby
engenders a higher degree of specialization.
... when the division of labour first began to take place, this power of 
exchanging must frequently have been very much clogged and embarrassed in its 
operations ... every prudent man in every period of society, after the first 
establishment of the division of labor, must naturally have endeavored to manage 
his affairs in such a manner, as to have at all times by him, besides the peculiar 
produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of some one commodity or other, 
such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the 
produce of their industry. (Smith 1937[1776]:23)
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The human propensity to "truck, barter, and exchange" was also seen as a catalyst to 
trade.
As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another 
the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is 
this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of 
labor. (Smith 1937[1776]:15)
This propensity to exchange "originally gives occasion to the division of labor,” because
without it our species would never have begun trading amongst themselves. Smith
believed that this propensity was a unique characteristic of human beings (Smith
1937[1776]:13).
It is interesting to note that this whole exposition takes place in the first four 
chapters of The Wealth of Nations. The next seven chapters are dedicated to stabilizing 
circularities which represent the equilibrating dimensions of the economic system; for 
example, the price of commodities, wages of labor, profits on stock, labor supply, and 
population growth.15 Figure 10 illustrates the positive circularity which has been 
distilled from Smith’s writings so far.
13 These aspects have been explored by Mayr (1971) and Richardson (1984).
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The accumulation of capital, explored in Book El of The Wealth of Nations, is a 
significant factor which influences this division-of-labor and extent-of-the-market 
circularity.16 In fact, Smith viewed the accumulation-of-capital as a necessary precursor 
to the division-of-labor. Going back to the very beginnings of a market oriented 
economy, Smith believed that it was necessary to initially have a surplus of agricultural 
produce.17 Surplus agricultural production allowed the division-of-labor to occur in 
other sectors of the economy by permitting an individual to specialize in producing goods
w This facet has been explored in past literature (e.g., Thweatt 1957, Brewer 1991).
17 Although his emphasis was less than that of the Physiocrats, Smith saw agriculture as a necessary 
and natural first step of economic development. In fact, he believed that economies which did not grow 
initially through agriculture, then manufacturing, and finally through foreign trade had progressed in an 
’unnatural and retrograde order* (Smith 1937[1776]:360).
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other than food. But even then, the individual still needed to accumulate a stock of such
necessities before they could apply themselves fully to a narrow trade. In discussing the
acquisition of subsistence goods by a specialized worker, Smith comments:
... this purchase cannot be made till such times as the produce of his own labor 
has not only been completed, but sold. A stock of goods of different kinds, 
therefore, must be stored up somewhere sufficient to maintain him, and to supply 
him with the materials and tools of his work, till such time, at least, as both of 
these events can be brought about. (Smith 1937[1776]:259)
Not only is the division-of-labor dependent on the accumulation of a stock of 
goods, but the accumulation of this stock is not necessary before the division-of-labor 
unfolds.
In that rude state of society in which there is no division of labor, in which 
exchanges are seldom made, and in which every man provides every thing for 
himself, it is not necessary that any stock should be accumulated or stored up 
beforehand, in order to carry on the business of society. (Smith 1937[1776]:259)
Therefore, the accumulation of stock and the division-of-labor share a complementary
relationship; neither was present in the absence of the other and the presence of one
implied the presence of the other. Smith explicitly recognizes this circularity in a later
comment,
As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the 
division of labor, so labour can be more and more subdivided in proportion only 
as stock is previously more and more accumulated ... The quantity of industry, 
therefore, not only increases in every country with the increase of the stock 
which employs it, but, in consequence of that increase, the same quantity of 
industry produces a much greater quantity of work. (Smith 1937[1776]:260)
Within this accumulated stock of capital, Smith distinguished between productive 
and unproductive use as an exogenous determinant of the self-reinforced rate of 
accumulation. This categorization hinges on the notion that the value of unproductive
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
uses of accumulated stock perishes the moment it is used and often leaves no trace of 
value behind. In contrast, productive uses physically manifest this added value such that 
it can be used to "put into motion a quantity of labour equal to that which had originally 
produced it" (Smith 1937[1776]:314-315). The use of funds for either re-investment or 
"idleness" thereby influences the extent of the division-of-labor and ultimately determines 
the annual produce of the land and labour of the country. In this way, Smith declared 
that "every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and every frugal man a public 
benefactor" (Smith 1937(1776]:324). Figure 11 augments the previous circularity to 
include these relations.
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
























Political and Legal Context of the Economy
The fact that this accumulation-of-capital and division-of-labor complementarity is 
emphasized in most research discussing Smith’s theories is not surprising when one 
considers that the accumulation-of-capital, through the choice to invest, seems to be the 
only external factor (besides money) to an otherwise endogenous system. However, this 
complementary pattern of circular relations is constrained by formidable relations within
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the social structure of society. In particular, Smith discussed the influence of the power 
structure within the then current class divisions (i.e., nobility, merchants, and peasants) 
on an individual’s Natural Liberty or "right to freely pursue one’s interest" (Reid 
1989:25). It was changes within the status quo class structure of society (i.e., the 
dominance of the nobility over other classes through the exercise of physical power and 
hereditary right) which permitted the full emergence of the economic circularities 
previously discussed.
Not until the power of the nobility started to decline were individuals given an 
incentive to accumulate capital, improve the productivity of their land, and hence provide 
the surpluses that permitted extensive specialization to occur.18 As Brewer (1991:4) 
noted, savings become dependent on the social and legal framework, which thus becomes 
"the ultimate determining factor in economic growth." This view, however, seems a bit 
extreme since the socio-political relations were reflections of economic relations and both 
were co-dependent on one another. For example, although towns were formed in 
response to the need for a centralized market for trade, they soon found themselves in 
the very center of these evolving socio-political relations. Once trade between the town 
and its immediate surroundings was established, trade between more remote regions 
began to occur. Merchants who had previously conducted trade between countries began 
to develop local trade routes to take advantage of productivity and specialization 
differences between towns and regions. This coupling of previously independent towns
l( The connection between the rights of one person and liberty of another is also found in J.R. 
Commons* Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924). Like Smith, Commons noted the complementary 
relation between England’s common law and the evolution of market economies.
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expanded the markets available for both buying and selling goods, increased the division-
of-labor, and allowed for a growing level of capital accumulation. This unfolding
economic pattern contributed to the process by which towns became independent political
entities. All the inhabitants of the town became,
... jointly and severely answerable for the whole rent [due to the king]; but in 
return being allowed to collect it in their own way, and to pay it into the king’s 
exchequer by the hands of their own bailiff. (Smith 1937[1776]:375).
In this manner, towns became functionally synonymous in the king’s eyes to the nobility
with their hereditary land holdings and indentured serfs. Towns became the seats of
"order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security of individuals"
(Smith 1937[1776]:379, emphasis added). Smith noted that the nobility "despised the
burghers [towns], whom they considered not only as a different order, but as a parcel of
emancipated slaves, almost of a different species from themselves" (Smith
1937[1776]:376).
As the merchant class rose in power by feeding and being fed by the growth of
cities, this ascendence was coupled with a decline in the nobility’s power and a rise in
what Smith called Natural Liberty. For example, an individual peasant could escape
from the traditional economic and socio-political dependence exerted by their dominant
lord by entering into the evolving market economies within the cities. Such possibilities
were quite novel at this point in history.
If in the hands of a poor cultivator, oppressed with the servitude of villanage, 
some little stock should accumulate, he would naturally conceal it with great care 
from his master, to whom it would otherwise have belonged, and take the first 
opportunity of running away to a town. The law was at that time so indulgent 
to the inhabitants of towns, and so desirous of diminishing the authority of the 
lords over those of the country, that if he could conceal himself there from the
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pursuit of his lord for a year, he was free forever. Whatever stock, therefore, 
accumulated in the hands of the industrious part of the inhabitants of the country, 
naturally took refuge in cities, as the only sanctuaries in which it could be secure 
to the person that acquired it. (Smith 1937[1776]:379)
When the nobility was stronger, they had the right to take the possessions of an
individual under their protection. Under such circumstances, there was no such thing as
personal property, and therefore the division-of-labor was restricted. Society was unable
to develop a full network of markets since specialization required the accumulation of
stock.
Furthermore, Smith believed the nobility fueled their own destruction since they 
frequently used the surplus extracted from their dependents to buy consumption goods 
on the evolving market rather than investing it in their productive land holdings (i.e., an 
unproductive use of accumulated stocks). By trading their surplus for "trinkets and 
baubles, fitter to be the play-things of children than the serious pursuits of men, they 
became as insignificant as any substantial burgher or tradesman in a city" (Smith 
1937[1776]:391). In addition, these purchasing decisions fed the expanding web of 
interrelations which were destroying the very social structure upon which their world was 
built.
This discussion highlights Smith’s clear recognition of the importance of social 
relations within society. The economy would not have unfolded to its full potential 
without initial changes in the social relations of society. However, as these socio­
political changes fed into changing economic relations, these latter changes served as the 
basis from which deeper social change occurred. As Reisman (1976:14) commented, for 
Smith, "the institutional and normative framework of society cannot be simply dismissed
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with a ceteris paribus assumption: economic activity itself is alone enough to prevent 
ceteris from remaining paribus." This rich conception of the complementary circularities 
found within Smith’s socio-economic theory are diagrammed in Figure 12.
Figure 12: The Complementary Dimension of Smith’s Socio-F.conomic Evolution
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Having explored Smith’s self-reinforcing process of economic prosperity, one will 
naturally ask if Smith foresaw any limits to this progressive spiral. While it was the lack
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of definite constraints on this spiral of growth which caused Hume to reject Josiah. 
Tucker’s ideas on the unlimited potential for growth, the presence of such constraints in 
Smith’s theory were more to Hume’s liking (Hont 1983; Elmslie 1995). What were 
these constraints? Smith did foresee the possibility that this ever increasing prosperity 
could be stalled by errors in a country’s economic policy (e.g., his well known critique 
of Mercantilist doctrine). However, these errors are not a necessary constraint within 
a well managed economy and therefore not a satisfactory constraint by themselves.
There were two endogenous limits that Smith identified within his model of the
economic process. The first is local, the second global. First, Smith envisioned
economic growth as expanding into the natural advantages of a country. The idea was
that a country would acquire "that full complement of riches which the nature of its soil
and climate, and its situation with respect to other countries, allowed it to acquire"
(Smith 1937[1776]:94). These limits to one country’s opulence with respect to its
neighbors is stated succinctly in the following quote:
A nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade, is certainly most likely to do 
so when its neighbors are all rich, industrious, and commercial nations. A great 
nation surrounded on all sides by wandering savages and poor barbarians might, 
no doubt, acquire riches by the cultivation of its own lands, and by its own 
interior commerce, but not by foreign trade. (Smith 1937[1776]:462)
This establishes a local maximum to which the self-reinforcing relations of economic
prosperity are held in check, but does not set a global cap on prosperity. For this, we
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need to turn to Smith’s ideas concerning technological change and the advancement of 
knowledge.19
Although Smith undoubtedly believed that an increasingly refined division-of-labor
caused people to mentally and morally degenerate over time (West 1964), this does not
necessarily lead to a decline in the overall state of knowledge. As Rosenberg (1965)
interpreted Smith, although intense specialization leads to the diminished mental capacity
of the workers, it also leads to the increased mental capacity of the philosophers
(specialists in thinking). Therefore, although the,
modal level of understanding is very low, the highest levels of scientific 
attainment permitted by the extensive specialization in the production of 
knowledge are quite remarkable. The collective intelligence of the civilized 
society, then, is very great. (Rosenberg 1965:137, emphasis in original)
The global constraint on economic progress is embedded within Smith’s belief that the
pinnacle of understanding is finite and relatively close on the historical horizon.
Therefore, the philosophers’ ultimate role will be to merely ensure that society’s
knowledge is not lost.20 It has been argued that Smith saw the division-of-labor and
technological knowledge as approaching some finite state, and that he was unable to
envision "the growth of knowledge taking fundamentally new paths" (Elmslie 1994b: 19).
Therefore, the division-of-labor, and hence the economy itself, evolves into a steady state
which has no further possibility for change, nor further novelty.
19 It has sometimes been contended that Smith did not have a concept of technological change (e.g., 
Rashid 1986), but if one views knowledge as an understanding of harmonious arrangement then the division 
of labor itself is a concept of technological change (see also Elmslie 1994a, 1994b; Reid 1987:92).
30 This notion of an economic steady state is, in itself, a significant change from the popular ideas of 
Montesquieu which posited an inescapable natural decline of a country’s success (Hont 1983).
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From Smith to Marshall
In the past, Smith has frequently been seen solely through the filters of self- 
interested behavior and equilibrating, mechanical models (e.g., Hodgson 1993b). Such 
a perspective however, does not do justice to the richness of his economic insight. The 
interpretation presented here serves to broaden these narrow impressions of Smith’s 
economic theories by emphasizing their evolutionary, in contrast to their equilibrating, 
dimension. Reid (1989:xi,) presented a qualitatively similar argument by emphasizing 
that Smith "thought in terms of process rather than equilibrium." He interpreted Smith 
as having theoretical stages of economic growth whereby the conversion from feudalism 
to mercantilism and mercantilism to industrialism involves "converting a state of stable 
but undesirable equilibrium into one of unstable but desirable growth" (Reid 1989:9). 
The only difficulty with this approach revolves around its need to sharply differentiate 
between different stages of civilization (i.e., stable equilibrium states) rather than 
allowing it to be a continuously evolving stream of relations.
What was done with Smith’s ideas of complementary processes by the economic 
profession? Not much for many years. However, the complementary circularity 
between the accumulation-of-capital and division-of-labor, in coordination with the 
decision to invest rather than consume, began to be addressed as a single issue in 
economic theory. The individual firm began to embody this self-reinforcing process such 
that declining unit costs were seen to fall as the scale of production increased. However, 
if these circularities (soon to become known as increasing returns) are checked only by
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the extent-of-the-market, then theoretically a market would become completely
monopolized by a single firm.
Some, among whom Cournot himself is to be counted, have before them what 
is in effect the supply schedule of an individual firm; representing that an 
increase in its output gives it command over so great internal economies [an 
internal division-of-labor between labor and capital] as such to diminish its 
expenses of production; and they follow their mathematics boldly, but apparently 
without noticing that their premises lead inevitably to the conclusion that, 
whatever firm gets a good start will obtain a monopoly of the whole business of 
its trade in its district. (Marshall 1990[1920]:380, footnote 1)
Since the economy was not dominated by single firms within each trade, it was clear that
the circularity between the division-of-labor and accumulation-of-capital needed further
refinement. The profession had somehow misplaced the extent-of-the-market variable
and the socio-political context.
Smith (and most other classical economists) presented the division-of-labor as a 
general empirically observable characteristic of the economy which provided a broad 
social benefit. However, once Marshall began to address these issues, the field of 
economics was in the process of establishing itself as a science. As a result, the broad 
theoretical brush strokes which classical economists had used to paint a picture of the 
economy were being held accountable to deeper levels of logical scrutiny. Along these 
lines, Marshall believed that the inherited theories of complementary processes were seen 
to lead "inevitably to things which do not exist and have no near relation to reality" 
Getter to A.W. Flux, March 1898, published in Whitaker 1975:51). As a result, 
Marshall engaged in a "Wandeijahre among factories" in order to discover the finer 
details of these relations. The theory of industrial organization in his Principles of 
Economics (1990[1920], 8“* Edition) attempted to make finer theoretical distinctions
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within the division-of-labor argument which would alleviate, to some extent, these 
problems. In exploring this path, he was the first economic theorist to implicitly analyze 
the nested layers of complementary circularities that exist within the economic system. 
Although these layers existed between individuals, towns, and regions in Smith’s 
economic theory, Marshall’s investigation refined them more fully. As a result, 
Marshall’s theory stretched the assumptions of his philosophical framework to such an 
extent that these assumptions should have fallen under scrutiny. The fact that they did 
not caused a noticeable tension to arise within his writings. It is with this in mind that 
we proceed to Alfred Marshall’s ideas.
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Alfred Marshall
The first point to address when discussing the evolutionary dimension in Alfred 
Marshall’s economic theory is his explicit acknowledgement of the biological quality of 
economic interaction in contrast to the fact that the majority of his theory was mechanical 
in form. It is important to note that he used the term biology in an organismic sense. 
In other words, he was appealing to a philosophy of organism: one which focuses on 
different levels of order (colloquially referred to as organic wholes) rather than merely 
the biological substructure of socio-economic phenomena. In order to see this, the 
distinction which Marshall made between biological (i.e., evolutionary) and mechanical 
(i.e., equilibrating) analysis will need to be explored. This can be done through the use 
of causal diagraming techniques (i.e., co-dependent and stabilizing circularities): 
theoretical concepts which would emerge later within the field of biology (e.g., von 
Bertalanffy 1968).
The evolutionary dimension of Marshall’s economic theory begins with his 
distinction between different economic manifestations of the generic division-of-labor and 
accumulation-of-capital circularity based on the recognition of a differentiating and 
integrating dimension. This refinement informed Marshall’s biological vision and led 
him to a developmental or ecological perspective on change which implicitly involved a 
hierarchy of organic wholes within the economic system. In support of this 
interpretation, three distinct levels of complementary circularities can be identified in
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Marshall’s economic theory, these being the internal and external economies found in 
industrial organization and the quality of labor. While such a perspective provides many 
insights into Marshall’s work, it needs to be made explicit that I am not contending that 
Marshall used such notions consciously. Rather, I believe that Marshall’s implicit use 
of these ideas reflects his sensitivity to the evolutionary dimension of economic systems 
and his explicit preference for biological models. Since a hierarchical nesting of 
circularities is a biological/ecological concept and since Marshall explicitly espoused the 
biological paradigm, the fact that Marshall’s theory can be interpreted through such 
theoretical filters should not be surprising.
The coordination of these two facets of Marshall’s thought (i.e., the distinction 
between differentiation and integration in coordination with the desire to develop a 
biological concept of economic interaction) created a tangible theoretical tension that 
exists within Marshall’s major work, The Principles of Economics (hereinafter 
Principles). He unconsciously utilized a conceptual hierarchy for economic organization 
while explicitly maintaining the notion of a single level of theoretical analysis.21 
Marshall’s belief that "Natura non facit saltum" (Nature takes no leaps) was in direct 
conflict with the conceptual discontinuities found in the translation of his perceptions of 
the socio-economic process into theory. This inherent tension will be the last point 
explored within Marshall’s theories.
21 A detailed discussion of the discontinuities inherent to hierarchical concepts is contained in the last 
chapter of this dissertation.
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Biological Metaphor: Real or Rhetorical?
To begin with, a quick look at Marshall’s work from a neoclassical perspective is 
interesting. These writers seem to be of the opinion that Marshall was vague, had a 
blurred vision, and that he derailed the progress of economic theory. The following list 
of headings from Samuelson’s (1967:109,111,113) essay on monopolistic competition 
convey this attitude towards Marshall’s work: "Exorcizing the Marshallian Incubus," 
"Retrogression in Monopoly Theory," and "Retrogression in Perfect Competition 
Theory." However, since Marshall’s contributions to the field cannot be denied, he 
seems to come off as a heretical founder of neoclassical economics. For the purposes 
of this dissertation, the issue is not whether Marshall is guilty of "delaying the 
understanding of general equilibrium" (Samuelson 1967:113), but whether it was his 
intention to further such an biologically antithetical concept?
It is questionable whether there is an effective biological dimension within 
Marshall’s economic theory. While the Principles grew out of the analytical foundations 
contained in Book III, "On Wants and their Satisfaction," and Book V, "General 
Relations of Demand, Supply, and Value" (Whitaker 1975:84), the only section which 
really used biological analysis was his discussion of industrial organization (Brinley 1991; 
Hodgson 1993a, 1993b). In fact, Brinley (1991:8,11) concluded that Marshall was "for 
the most part indulging in analogies or figures of speech" rather than providing biological 
analysis, and that "economic biology remained promise rather than substance."22 He 
went on to ask why Marshall never delivered the promised second volume to his
22 Currie and Steedman (1990) noted this same point.
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Principles, which was supposed to extend his analysis more fully into the realm of 
economic biology.
Is it not probable that, in giving so much time to those Royal Commissions, the 
revising of his Principles and various professional activities, Marshall was really 
creating for himself a series of alibis? ... Could it have been that there were 
over-riding intellectual reasons why he could not accomplish the big task? 
(Brinley 1991:9)
He concluded that Marshall,
... had come to realize more and more that the study of organic growth 
necessitated a break with his neoclassical system as definite as the break he had 
made with the Ricardo-Mill system ... he would have to work out within him the 
foundations of yet another science - economic biology. (Brinley 1991:11-12, 
emphasis added)
In order to explore this insight fully, it is important to determine what Marshall 
meant by biological and mechanical concepts.23 First of all, the words mechanical and 
equilibrating share similar meanings for him and are frequently used together. For 
example, note the following references to mechanical frameworks within his Principles: 
(1) In his discussion of firms, and as a precursor to his discussion of markets, he used 
the analogy of a "balancing of forces which corresponds rather to the mechanical 
equilibrium of a stone hanging by an elastic string, or a number of balls resting against 
one another in a basin" (Marshall 1990[1920]:269). (2) With respect to the distribution 
of income he used these same two examples (Marshall 1990[1920]:437) and a third 
example of "when two tanks containing fluid are joined by a pipe ... and thus the general 
levels of the tanks will tend to be brought together" (Marshall 1990[1920]:551). Both
a The use of the biological metaphor in Marshall’s Principles has been investigated previously from 
many different perspectives (e.g., Brinley 1991; Foster 1993; Hodgson 1993a, 1993b; Levin 1983; Niman 
1991a, 1991b).
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of these examples correspond to equilibrating processes in which stable interrelations are 
reached.
Marshall’s biological metaphors were different from his mechanical ones in two
distinct ways. First, they involved the growth and decay of a process which is not in
equilibrium, but rather constantly changing. Preceding the first mechanical metaphor
presented above, Marshall spoke of "economic forces as resembling those which make
a young man grow in strength; after which he gradually becomes stiff and inactive, till
at last he sinks to make room for other more vigorous life" (Marshall 1990[1920]:269).
One of his most quoted statements also expresses this idea.
... we may read a lesson from the young trees of the forest as they struggle 
upwards through the benumbing shade of their older rivals. Many succumb on 
the way, and a few only survive; those few become stronger with every year, 
they get a larger share of light and air with every increase of their height, and 
at last in their turn they tower above their neighbors, and seem as though they 
would grow on for ever, and for ever become stronger as they grow. But they 
do not. One tree will last longer in full vigor and attain a greater size than 
another; but sooner or later age tells on them a l l ... And as with the growth of 
trees, so was it with the growth of businesses as a general rule ... (Marshall 
1990[1920]:263)24
This leads into the second distinction between mechanical and biological metaphors, 
the fact that this process of growth and decay was a characteristic of the firm for 
Marshall and that the industry (which is composed of a heterogeneous complement of
24 This quote finishes with ”... before the great recent development of vast joint-stock companies, 
which often stagnate, but do not readily die." This was added in the sixth edition of his Principles (Shove 
1942:321). Although this biological theory of the firm may lose some of its credibility in an environment 
of extensive stock financing (e.g., see Penrose 1952), Marshall’s vision does not stand or fall with this 
single point. Levine (1980) makes the point that a fundamental component of Marshall’s theory of the firm 
involves the concept of time and the fact that change is not instantaneous: the firm is an active element 
within a larger process. This will be investigated later.
51
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
growing and decaying firms) continued on its own evolutionary path independent of, yet
dependent on, the birth and death of these individual firms. For example, he stated,
... the rise and fall of individual firms may be frequent, while a great industry 
is going through one long oscillation, or even moving steadily forwards; as the 
leaves of a tree (to repeat an earlier illustration) grow to maturity, reach 
equilibrium, and decay many times, while the tree is steadily growing upwards 
year by year. (Marshall 1990[1920]:379)
So, not only did he use biological metaphors to characterize the process of growth and
decay, but he also recognized the nesting of such concepts. This led him to implicitly
use a theoretical model of complementary circularities which was applied discretely to
different processes within the economy: therefore, he did not simply aggregate his
conceptual model of the parts (e.g., individual firms) to form his concept of the whole
(e.g., the industry). This point is addressed more thoroughly later on.
In coordination with these two specific characteristics of his biological metaphor,
it is also possible to highlight the philosophical tenor of Marshall’s thought which lent
itself to a biological perspective. For example, he espoused mutual, rather than linear,
notions of causality. He stated,
... it is necessary to face the difficulty of regarding the various elements of an 
economic problem, - not as determining one another in a chain of causation, A 
determining B, B determining C, and so on - but as all mutually determining one 
another. (Marshall 1990[1920]: viii)
Shove (1942:303, emphasis added) noted that the "principle of mutual determination
everywhere supersedes the idea of a single determinant or a one-way chain of causes" in
Marshall’s Principles. From this philosophical emphasis on mutual causality emerges a
more complex perspective on cause and effect which allows for self-reinforced
endogenous change, a point that Marshall noted at times.
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These ideas found expression within Marshall’s theory of industrial organization
through the productivity and capital stock variables (Beach 1982:61) and therefore have
their historical roots in the complementary circular relations between the division-of-labor
and accumulation-of-capital. It is perhaps this insight into endogenous change which led
Marshall to anticipate economics being modelled along biological lines. As he stated in
the preface to the 8th edition of his Principles.
The main concern of economics is thus with human beings who are impelled, for 
good and evil, to change and progress. Fragmentary statical hypotheses are used 
as temporary auxiliaries to dynamical - or rather biological - conceptions: but the 
central idea of economics, even when its foundations alone are under discussion, 
must be that of living force and movement. (Marshall 1990(1920]:xiii)
For Marshall, the distinguishing quality of life is unquestionably the process of growth
and decay.
Therefore, it seems that one can begin to address Brinley’s question as to whether 
Marshall’s theory contained an effective biological facet by asking whether there are any 
theoretical concepts useful in modeling such living/biological processes as described 
above and whether homologous concepts can be found in Marshall’s economic theories? 
The theoretical concept of circular causality fulfills both these requirements. However, 
before turning to these theoretical ideas, it is necessary to explore one more facet of 
Marshall’s biological vision.
As a final feather in his biological cap, one can point to Marshall’s emphasis on 
organizational structure which materialized as a theoretical distinction between the
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differentiating and integrative dimensions of the division-of-labor.25 For Marshall, an 
increasing division-of-labor involves both a subdivision of functions, or "differentiation," 
and a more intimate connection between the specialized parts, or "integration" (Marshall 
1990[1920]:200-201). As examples of differentiation, Marshall cited the development 
of specialized skills, knowledge, and machinery. For integration, he noted the increased 
security of commercial credit, the advances in communication (both physical and mental), 
and ethics/morality. While differentiation is a characteristic of the individual parts of the 
process as distinct from one another, integration is a characteristic of the interrelation of 
these parts as a whole process. These two concepts are linked by the fact that the 
advantages of the differentiation between parts must be realized through their integration 
into a single process.26 In this way, the benefits of integration manifest themselves at 
many different levels of the economy (e.g., firms, industries, and regions). This concept 
of leveling can be used to better understand many difficulties which have been identified 
within Marshall’s theories. Questions such as: What is the representative firm? What 
are the benefits of distinguishing between internal and external economies? And, most
35 This is undoubtedly Spencer’s influence. Spencer saw such a strong theoretical union between 
organisms and society that he openly appropriated biological ideas to talk about the development of society 
as a super-organism. Furthermore, he fought tooth and nail in support of a Lamarckian interpretation of 
evolution, even after such notions had been thoroughly rejected by academic biologists. Lamarck 
contended that the somatic changes of an organism could be passed on to its progeny: the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics. Unlike Lamarck and his followers, Spencer’s focus on society rather than the 
individual allows for the possibility of Lamarckian evolution (e.g., knowledge). The fact that Lamarckian 
inheritance operates at the population rather than the individual level, a point missed by Lamarckian 
theorists, is critical to the integrity of this theory with respect to social phenomena (Bateson, 1979).
36 In Smith’s framework, the level of differentiation possible between markets is limited by the 
integration of these distinct markets into a single process of trading for needed commodities (i.e., the 
economy).
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importantly, why did Marshall fail to develop a truly biological theory of economic 
change?
Three Conceptually Distinct Levels of Complementary Circularities
The following levels of complementary circularities which will be identified within 
Marshall’s Principles represent the different integrative levels in his theory of the 
economy. While the first involves the quality of labor at the level of the individual or 
family, the second and third involve the notion of increasing returns at the level of the 
firm and between firms. More accurately, one could say that this third loop is at a 
higher level in his economic model than the individual firm and represents the integrative 
advantages which occur at the level of the industry, city, or region. As a result, it 
manifests as a constant or external economy from the perspective of the individual firm. 
This is in contrast to those integrative advantages which occur within the individual firm 
and are coined internal economies.27
The Individual or Family.28 The complementary relations active at the individual 
or family level (hereafter referred to simply as the individual) manifest themselves
27 If we look at Marshall’s discussion of wealth we find that he divided non-material goods with a 
homologous classification scheme. The first category consisted of qualities and faculties that lie within a 
consumer and were called internal, while the second consisted of "relations beneficial to him with other 
people," and were called external (Marshall I990[I920]:45). An analysis of his discussion of industrial 
organization supports the contention that these terms continue to carry these connotations latter in his 
Principles.
3 I am not sure which of these two levels is a more appropriate label for Marshall’s thinking and 
therefore present them both.
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through the interaction between the material wealth and productivity of the worker. 
Marshall’s interest in this relationship reflects his concern for issues of economic 
poverty, an issue which gives "to economic studies their chief and their highest interest" 
(Marshall 1990[1920]:3). In coordination with his belief that economic systems could 
be consciously "modified by human efforts," the ultimate goal of all private effort and 
public policy became the improvement of the "well being of the whole people" (Marshall 
1990[1920]:29,39).
While Marshall’s account of general population growth is Malthusian in tone (i.e.,
a balance of countervailing forces), the growth of the individual possessed a
complementary dimension. None would question the notion that an individual’s wealth
is dependent on his or her flow of income, which is dependent on that person’s
productivity. Marshall, however, also saw wealth as the means by which productivity
is cultivated and sustained.
The production of wealth is but a means to the sustenance of man; to the 
satisfaction of his wants; and to the development of his activities, physical, 
mental and moral. But man himself is the chief means of the production of that 
wealth of which he is the ultimate aim. (Marshall 1990[1920]: 144)
Wealth sustains and develops an individual, while this individual himself is the chief
means of production for this holding of wealth. These ideas are restated in a later quote,
... consider the conditions on which depend health and strength, physical, 
mental, and moral. They are the basis of industrial efficiency, on which the 
production of material wealth depends; while conversely the chief importance of 
material wealth lies in-the fact that, when used wisely, it increases the health and 
strength, physical, mental and moral of the human race. (Marshall 
1990[1920]:161)
56
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
There are two points to consider here. First, there is a choice involved in the way that 
material resources are used. Second, that resources used "wisely" lead to increased 
industrial efficiency. This potentially complementary circularity is diagrammed in Figure 
13.
Figure 13: Income and Individual Productivity











It is the ratio and quality of non-developmental to developmental expenditures that 
determines the degree of self-reinforcing growth within this circularity. The distinction- 
between developmental and non-developmental expenditures is defined empirically as 
those which do and don’t increase individual productivity.
Marshall partitioned a worker’s health and strength into three parts: the physical, 
mental, and moral. It is the physical and mental aspects which have been emphasized 
by conventional economics, while the moral aspect or character of the individual has
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been discarded.29 However, this third aspect is significant within Marshall’s economic 
theory since (1) the division-of-labor entails an integration of society and (2) 
ethics/morality is a quality of the individual which determines the atmosphere of human 
interaction. Ethical development corresponds to a deepening of one’s ethical sensitivity, 
and its benefits are not solely limited to the individual who embodies them, but also helps 
to form an atmosphere for social interaction. In contrast, the development of an 
individual’s physical and mental qualities allow for a much greater degree of private 
appropriability and can therefore be consciously withheld from society.
An understanding of this three-fold division of the individual is doubly important 
since Marshall believed that there was the possibility for hysteresis with respect to an 
individual’s character. This postulated path dependency made fluctuations in an 
individual’s income below some threshold level (i.e., the ability to buy adequate food, 
clothing, and shelter) an important consideration. If income falls below this minimum, 
there will be a corresponding decline in an individual’s physical and mental, strength and 
health. However, this effect is fully removed if higher incomes are restored. In other 
words, the effects are not cumulative. In contrast to this, income fluctuations have a 
cumulative impact on the character of a worker. The visible effects of a decline in 
income,
29 What Marshall meant by 'character* is worth note. He commented at one point that 'force of will, 
and strength of character* is 'taken to be the strength of the man, as distinguished from that of his body, 
is moral rather than physical* (Marshall 1990[1920]: 162). He continued, 'this strength of the man himself, 
this resolution, energy and self-mastery, or in short this ‘vigour’ is the source o f all progress: it shows 
itself in great deeds, in great thoughts and in the capacity for true religious feeling* (Marshall 
1990[1920]:62). In a subsequent footnote he cited Leonardo da Vinci and Shakespeare as good 
representatives of strong character and tied his notion of character to Heart in Engel’s three-fold division 
of the individual into Body, Reason, and Heart.
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... end with the evil by which they were caused, [but] are not generally to be 
compared in importance with those that have the indirect effect of lowering the 
character of the workers or of hindering it from becoming stronger. For these 
last cause further weakness and further suffering, which again in their turn cause 
yet further weakness and further suffering, and so on cumulatively. On the other 
hand, high earnings, and a strong character, lead to greater strength and higher 
earnings, which again lead to still greater strength and still higher earnings, and 
so on cumulatively. (Marshall 1990[1920]:466)
The impact of this complementary relation is magnified since the rearing and
educating of a child is done by someone who will receive very little of the price that is
paid for his services in later years. Therefore, it is necessary that parents bridge this gap
of self-interest. However, in the "lower ranks of society" these investments are not made
and children "go to the grave carrying with them undeveloped abilities and faculties"
(Marshall 1990[1920]:467). Most importantly, this social tendency is continually
reinforced since these impoverished workers soon become parents themselves and the
cycle is perpetuated.
... the point on which we have specially to insist now is that this evil is 
cumulative. The worse fed are the children of one generation, the less will they 
earn when they grow up, and the less will be their power of providing adequately 
for the material wants of their children; and so on to following generations. And 
again, the less fully their faculties are developed, the less will they realize the 
importance of developing the best faculties of their children, and the less will be 
their power of doing so. (Marshall 1990[1920]:468)
In contemporary terms, this is a poverty trap which prevents the flowering of human
potential and represents a drag on socio-economic progress. Marshall wrote that "the
distinction of the poor is their poverty," and that "the conditions which surround extreme
poverty, especially in densely crowded places, tend to deaden the higher faculties."
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The Orthogonal Nature of Increasing and Diminishing Returns. Before moving on,
it is important to discuss Marshall’s use of the increasing returns concept:
The law of increasing return may be worded thus: - An increase of labour and 
capital leads generally to improved organization, which increases the efficiency 
of the work of labour and capital. (Marshall 1990[1920]:265)
First, note that Marshall included organization as an explicit factor of production
(Marshall 1990[1920]:115). Second, although most current economists would tend to
think of increasing returns as a phenomenon occurring at the level of the individual firm,
Marshall saw it as a general phenomenon inherent to many levels of the economy. This
could be the aggregation of individuals to form a firm, firms to form a city, or cities to
form a region. In support of this interpretation, Marshall frequently blurred the
distinction between the firm and the factory (a common point of criticism by neoclassical
theorists, e.g., Stigler 1941) and spoke of an industry’s, region’s, and nation’s output as
if all these different levels can display increasing returns (Marshall 1990[1920]]:220).
In doing so, he emphasized the general nature of organizational efficiency. It is his
distinction between increasing returns inherent to the firm versus those which emerge
from its interrelations with other firms that corresponds to a firm’s internal and external
economies. From this perspective, the representative firm is a conceptual bridge serving
to represent individual firms within an industry level analysis (i.e., having average
internal and external economies) and therefore a purely pedagogical device which has no
physically manifest counterpart.
It is also important to note that Marshall did not view diminishing returns as the 
conceptual inverse of increasing returns, but as a distinct facet. For example, the role
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of physical matter (i.e., Nature) shows a tendency to diminishing return, while human
knowledge (i.e., Organization) shows a tendency to increasing returns.30 These are not
two poles of the same continuum, but distinctly different dynamic relations. Marshall
(1990[1920]:266, footnote 1, emphasis added) explicitly stated this belief by quoting one
of his contemporaries:
Increasing Returns are not of the same order as those that make for Diminishing 
Returns: and there are undoubtedly cases in which it is better to emphasis this 
difference by describing causes rather than results, and contrasting Economy of 
Organization with the Inelasticity of Nature’s response to intense cultivation. 
(Bullock 1902, emphasis in original)
The Firm: Internal Economies. Marshall viewed the firm as an amalgamation of 
individual workers and capital which displays integrative qualities which cannot be 
attributed to the individual parts: although the firm is composed of these parts, this 
composition has a quality not reducible to the individual qualities of its components. 
However, since the firm’s resources are generally under the direct control of a single 
owner (or possibly a small group of people), Marshall focused on this specific individual 
when talking about the firm.31 This is an unfortunate, but understandable error. It is 
unfortunate since it tends to give the impression that the business entrepreneur/owner is 
the critical component of the firm, and Marshall’s discussion concerning the rise and fall
30 What I find interesting here is nature’s restrictive influence in contrast to the expansive influence of 
social organization and knowledge on production. In reading the Principles, one cannot conclude that 
Marshall saw nature as being at a higher level than the economy (as many environmental and ecological 
economists, myself included, would contend), but it is equally erroneous to assume that he viewed nature 
as subordinate to the economy (i.e., at a lower level). The conventional economic theory of production 
tends to take this latter perspective.
31 The reader will undoubtedly realize that the appropriation of the benefits of aggregation at this level 
was, and still is, a hotly contested debate in economics.
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of firms reflects his attempt to operationalize this misperception in his theory. As a 
result, he directed an inordinate amount of attention to the historical individual rather 
than the services this individual provides (Levine 1980). This misplaced emphasis was 
fed by the empirical fact that in Marshall’s time, ownership and management were 
synonymous with one another. These errors have been used to discount his theory of the 
firm (Penrose 1952). However, keeping in mind the focus that Marshall should have 
made explicit, we can look at the spirit of his ideas in a new light.
The general notion is that once a Arm has acquired a small stake of capital, this
capital affords it increasing opportunities to increase that stake.
An able man, assisted perhaps by some stroke of good fortune, gets a firm 
footing in the trade, he works hard and lives sparely, his own capital grows fast, 
and the credit that enables him to borrow more capital grows still faster ... 
success brings credit and credit brings success ... The increases in the scale of 
his business increases rapidly the advantages which he has over his competitors, 
and lowers the price at which he can afford to sell. This process may go on as 
long as his energy and enterprise, his inventive and organizing power retain their 
fu ll strength and freshness, and so long as the risks which are inseparable from 
business do not cause him exceptional losses; and if it could endure for a 
hundred years, he and one or two others like him would divide between them the 
whole of that branch of industry in which he is engaged. (Marshall 
1990[1920]:262-263, emphasis added)32
This relationship is diagrammed in Figure 14.
11 See also Marshall (1990[1920]:238).
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Figure 14: The Internal Economies of the Firm
Initial Shock + Size of Capital
(e.g., 'Good Fortune") _ +_, Sca|e of Business
Credit on which to 
Borrow Capital
(+)
Advantages over Competitors 
(e.g., lower prices)
In addition to the more conventional limitations of market size and 
marketing/transportation costs, Marshall introduced the quality of the individual 
managing the business as a limitation to this complementary spiral of success. The 
realization of internal economies is not a passive endeavor in Marshall’s eyes, but an 
active pursuit that requires vigor, enthusiasm, insight, and mental strength. Furthermore, 
Marshall (1990[1920]:248-250) believed that these "leadership qualities" of the business 
owner are sparingly dispersed throughout the population and result from both the 
environment in which an individual is raised and their natural abilities. While such 
business skills are obviously found within the individuals who build a business, it is not 
necessarily these individuals who cause a firm to decay, but rather the people who take
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over the business after these founding fathers have passed away. The individuals who 
inherit the business may lack the vitality and enthusiasm required for continued growth.
Although this theory of the firm has lost some of its credibility with the rise of 
joint-stock companies (i.e., a division-of-labor between owners and management), one 
can still see the importance of the active element of business management. A firm’s 
vigor and enthusiasm within the competitive process is usually a direct reflection of its 
management. This emphasis is similar to Levine’s (1980:271) view that Marshall’s 
reconciliation of increasing returns with competition is, in part, accomplished by his 
recognition that production is a process and all processes require time. It takes time to 
expand markets, acquire capital, and realize the economies of large scale production. 
It is these qualities which determine the rate of expansion and the level of complacency 
within the status quo. Such issues are still important today in the study of firms and 
corporations.
Aggregate Industry: External Economies.33 What Marshall sought to capture in 
his use of the external economies concept was an explicit acknowledgement that the 
organization of cities and broad regional economies may serve to integrate their 
composite parts into a synthetic whole just as an individual firm organizes its valuable 
resources (e.g., skills, materials, and machinery) in different ways to achieve greater
33 Marshall thought of an industry as consisting of all the firms engaged in the production of a final 
consumption good (whether consumer or investment). Therefore, the industry was seen as a 
complementary array of vertically integrated 'individual* parts or the division of labor amongst firms 
engaged in the production of the 'same commodity.*
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productivity.34 However, these economies will be external to an individual firm since 
they involve the integration of parts in which the firm is only one. An individual part 
can only create increased external economies in coordination with complementary 
changes in the other components of the integrated process (Marshall 1990[1920]:264). 
Therefore, one could say that this integration occurs at a level higher than the individual 
firm and thereby creates the environment which the firm acts within (e.g., city, region, 
or nation).
It is unfortunate that Marshall did not clearly articulate the idea that external 
economies include all those which manifest at a higher level of integration than the 
individual firm. As mentioned previously, this ambiguity has caused some (e.g., Stigler 
1941) to conclude that he put forth contradictory definitions. For example, while one 
set of definitions involved those economies experienced due to an increase in the scale 
of production in a specific industry (Marshall 1990[1920]:220, 221, 262), another 
involved the collective economic organization of the district as a whole (Marshall 
1990[1920]:xii, 220, 264, 380). This lack of clarity undoubtedly contributed to the 
subsequent dismissal of external economies from mainstream economics.35
It is possible to identify three different references to the source of a firm’s external 
economies in Marshall’s Principles. The first referred to the pooling of skilled labor 
within a city or region.
34 Prendergast (1994) has contended that Marshallian external economies are best considered within an 
evolutionary framework. See also Scitovsky (1954).
15 Although the fields of regional and urban economics try to address such issues, they do so within 
a constraining philosophical framework (e.g., Hoover 1948; Losch 1939).
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Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a good 
choice of workers with the special skills which they require; while men seeking 
employment naturally go to places where there are many employers who need 
such skill as theirs and where therefore it is likely to find a good market. 
(Marshall 1990[1920]:225)
This tendency was augmented by Marshall’s belief that specialized skills were becoming
grouped together such that differences within these groupings were becoming a less and
less important factor in production. As the "iron fingers and iron arms" of machinery
find their way into the most routine aspects of production, differences in the quality of
labor become less distinct between some industries (Marshall 1990[1920]:217). For
example, the laborers used in a watch factory are,
... not different in general characteristics from those which are used in any other 
of the lighter metal trades ... This is a good illustration of the fact that while 
there is a constantly increasing subdivision of labor, many of the lines of division 
between trades which are nominally distinct are becoming narrower and less 
difficult to be passed. (Marshall 1990[1920]:214-215)
However, these new jobs required "higher faculties than the old system" and "the
person who minds it [machinery] must have an intelligence, and an energetic sense of
responsibility" (Marshall 1990[1920]:214).36 The qualities which make a "great
industrial people" are the abilities to,
... bear in mind many things at one time, to have everything ready when wanted, 
to act promptly and show resources when anything goes wrong, to accommodate 
oneself quickly to changes in detail of work done, to be steady and trustworthy, 
[and] to have always a reserve of force which will come out in emergency ... 
(Marshall 1990[1920]: 172)
None of these qualities reflect specific manual skills, but rather a sense of flexibility.
In Industry and Trade, he referred to a pool of such skilled labor as an "acquired
34 This addresses Smith’s contention that the increased division-of-labor degrades the intellectual and
moral stock of the "unskilled workers" who tend to machines.
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industrial atmosphere," which cannot be moved (1915:284). In addition to the "industrial 
atmosphere" which individual firms create by locating in the same region, the extent to 
which they are diversified allows towns to weather market fluctuations more easily than 
single industry towns. This reduction in the uncertainty of employment serves as an 
added advantage for workers of even finely refined skills. This relationship is 
diagrammed in Figure 15.
Figure 15: Labor Pooling and Industrial Atmosphere












Marshall also believed that there were beneficial effects of labor pooling due to 
positively correlated labor markets. For example, industries that utilize only men are 
required to pay wages that support full families in the absence of other sources of 
income. However, if other industries which employ women and children locate in the 
area, these wages will supplement the family's income and allow the mens’ wages to be
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relatively lower (Marshall 1990[1920]:226). It is interesting to note that these external 
economies are experienced due to the correlation of resources through indivisibilities in 
the social norms and institutional structure.
The second type of external economy contained in Marshall’s Principles was the
notion of "external-internal economies" (Pigou 1928; Robertson 1930). The idea is that
as a given industry which contains firm "A" expands, the industrial use of inputs
expands. This expansion may allow the producer of these inputs, subsidiary
firm/industry "B," to enjoy greater internal economies. These benefits manifest
themselves to firm "A" as an external economy.
... small producers can often buy particular components that have been made for 
open market by aid of larger economies of massive production than are at the 
command of any single business. (Marshall 1915:227)
It is this aspect of external economies which correlates external economies with industry
size and issues of product standardization.37 Figure 16 represents this relationship.
37 The spatial extent of these external economies is dependent on transportation costs.
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Marshall’s third type of external economy involved the broad class of what he 
called advancements in the means of communication. By this he meant both physical 
transportation (e.g., railroads, waterways, etc.) and the interchange of information (e.g., 
the printing press and telegraph). Although these economies are similar to the second 
type mentioned above, they have much farther reaching implications. In fact, they have 
the ability to influence the whole of civilization (e.g., see Harvey 1989:Part II). One 
way of seeing the potential of this third type of external economy is to distinguish 
between the ‘natural’ and human-determined dimensions. While natural facets are fixed 
in space from the very beginning (e.g., extensive river systems), the human-determined 
facet involves some element of individual choice at some point in time (e.g., highways 
or research & development). For example, the size, quality, and placement of public
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infrastructure becomes spatially located based on human choice. Since this decision is 
undoubtedly made on the basis of some initial heterogeneity in the economic environment 
(e.g., existing industrial infrastructure or work force), there is the potential for a 
complementary circularity to emerge within economic development which includes an 
element of human valuation. This relationship could be diagrammed in a manner similar 
to the labor pooling external economies.
A tangible and contemporary example of this type of external economy involves
the flow of information on the Internet.
For External economies are constantly growing in importance relative to Internal 
in all matters of Trade-Knowledge: newspapers, and trade and technical 
publications of all kinds are perpetually scouting for him and bringing him much 
of the knowledge he wants - knowledge which a little while ago would have been 
beyond the reach of anyone who could not afford to have well-paid agents in 
many distant places. (Marshall 1990(1920] :237)
Marshall saw advances such as newspapers and trade associations as benefiting the small
business by creating an environment rich in information. Not only did technical
knowledge become more accessible, but also market information.
Interestingly, Marshall did not comment much in his Principles on this third type 
of external economy. This may have been due to his inability to foresee the significance 
of the various technical and communication advances that would be made in the relatively 
near future (reminiscent of Smith).38 For example, he commented in Industry and 
Trade that it is "assumed that aerial traffic will not supersede that on the surface of the 
earth ... the hold of railways ... seems not to be threatened" (Marshall 1915:770).
“ Although theorists such as Marshall found it difficult to imagine the direction that technological 
advance would take us, some current theorists find it hard to imagine where technology cannot take us 
(e.g., Simon and Kahn 1984; Simon 1992; Simon and Steinman 1992).
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Significance of Time.39 There are many similarities between Marshall’s use of 
complementary circularities (i.e., their leveling within the economy) and a theoretical 
framework of hierarchical composition. One of the distinguishing factors of hierarchical 
compositions is an explicit emphasis on the different temporal rates at which different 
layers of interactive process proceed. Therefore, Marshall’s emphasis on time as the 
"chief difficulty of almost every economic problem" may serve to bolster an attempt to 
associate his thinking with hierarchy theory (Marshall 1990[1920]: vii). As will be 
demonstrated later, such an association leads to a better understanding of the apparent 
ambiguity or lack of cohesion which is frequently said to exist within his theoretical 
models.
Getting back to the role of time, Marshall believed that the problem results from 
the fact that change does not occur at a constant rate. Furthermore, while some causes 
work themselves out rather slowly, others act more rapidly. This temporal distinction 
means that slower causes are frequently interrupted as they ripple through the economy 
by their quicker counterparts (Marshall 1990[1920]:30,275). For Marshall, the problem 
of time was overcome by utilizing ceteris paribus assumptions to analyze the economy 
"one bit at a time" and then to combine these "partial solutions into a more or less 
complete solution of the whole riddle" (Marshall 1990[1920]:304). While this technique 
inevitably led some theorists to develop general equilibrium concepts of the economy, 
Marshall would not have approved of such mechanical aggregations since they are devoid 
of the evolutionary dimension.
19 This section borrows substantially from Currie and Steed man (1990).
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It is interesting to note that Marshall used the ceteris paribus assumption to identify 
four different time periods for analysis in the economy. The market period is an analysis 
of temporary equilibrium during the course of a day, the short period involves a few 
months or a year, the long period involves several years, while the secular period lasts 
for a generation (see Currie and Steedman 1990:21-22). These are not the operational 
definitions of the theoretical short-run and long-run that one finds in current textbooks 
since they involve actual calendar time. The fixed nature of inputs results from the 
shortness of the period under discussion rather than serving to define it. In other words, 
Marshall used the ceteris paribus assumption to isolate his concept of a particular 
economic process from the host of other processes which occur simultaneously but at 
different temporal rates. For example, his long period was intended to be applied to the 
industry as a whole and permitted Marshall to disregard the oscillations which occurred 
from day to day and from year to year. There is also reason to believe that his short 
period was affiliated with individual firms since he connected it to the "cost of producing 
the commodity" (Marshall 1990[1920]:275).
The sheer fact that Marshall made temporal distinctions within his theory on the 
basis of socio-economic processes rather than distinguishing between these processes due 
to theoretical distinctions separates him from many of his contemporaries. To require 
that Marshall should have solved the problem of ‘time’ is an inordinately rigorous 
expectation. Given the importance of the temporal dimension to hierarchical concepts, 
it is significant enough that time was a major concern for Marshall and that he broke it 
down on the basis of different processes.
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Nested Integration of these Levels. The previous three sections have presented the 
individual complementary circularities within Marshall’s economic theory. It is possible 
to combine these into a single compositional diagram in which they appear as nested 
processes of ever greater levels of integration. In other words, the economic process of 
the individual is nested within that of the firm, and the firm’s is contained within that of 
the industry or region. This nesting of processes, which is built up from the composition 
of his biological thoughts, provides a taste of Marshall’s biological vision from a 
hierarchical perspective.
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Figure 17:_A Hierarchical Nesting of Complementary Circularities 
A: Individual (see Figure 13)
B: Firm (see Figure 14)
C: City or Region (see Figure 15-16)
The Tension within Marshall’s Thought
The final topic to be addressed is the fundamental tension which exists between 
Marshall’s biological vision, which was a result of his empirical explorations of
74
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
economic processes, and his desire to make economics a science, which caused him to 
build theories conforming to the rules of classical logic (i.e., identity, difference, and 
excluded middle). Even though Marshall recognized that when the mechanical 
framework (the champion par excellence of logical thinking) is "pushed to its more 
remote and intricate logical consequences, it slips away from the conditions of real life," 
he was unable to overcome this obstacle (Marshall 1990[1920]:461). As a result, a 
tangible intellectual tension was created within his theories.40 In concordance with this 
interpretation, Shackle (1972:286-287) has suggested that "the Principles is a relentless 
effort to bring into one fabric of argument the two incompatibles ... the mutually 
repellent strands of rationality and novelty."
An extremely fertile way to look at this-tension is to see it as a result of Marshall’s 
acceptance of the leveling he observed within the economic process, which would call 
for the use of a conceptual hierarchy within his economic theory (which can 
accommodate the emergence of novelty), while concurrently holding the belief that there 
are no discrete shifts in description. Inversely, one could say that Marshall sought to 
conceive of the economy as a single leveled process while concurrently accepting his 
perception that it was multilayered. This adherence to the notion of a single layered 
reality is reflected in the motto inscribed on the title page of his Principles: "Natura non 
facit saltum" (Nature takes no leaps). Although Marshall is perhaps right to contend that 
nature does not take discrete leaps, he did not realize that the descriptive concepts of the 
human mind do.
40 This tension is also noted by Currie and Steedman (1990:11,21) and Niman (1991), although with 
different explanations.
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A deeper look at how Marshall proposed to do his biological analysis is informative
for this discussion. In the preface to his 8“* edition, he wrote the following:
The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in economic 
dynamics. But biological conceptions are more complex than those of 
mechanics; a volume on Foundations must therefore give a relatively large place 
to mechanical analogies; and frequent use is made of the term ‘equilibrium,’ 
which suggests something of statical analogy ... The forces to be dealt with are 
however so numerous, that it is best to take a few at a time; and to work out a 
number of partial solutions as auxiliaries to our main study ... We reduce to 
inaction all other forces by the phrase "other things being equal": we do not 
suppose that they are inert, but for the time we ignore their activity (Marshall 
1990[1920]:xii-xiii)
This analysis of the parts through the ceteris paribus assumption, which was discussed
earlier, then leads us closer to the whole.
In the second stage more forces are released from the hypothetical slumber that 
had been imposed on them ... and their complex mutual interactions begin to be 
observed. Gradually the area of the dynamical problem becomes larger; the area 
covered by provisional statical assumptions becomes smaller ... (Marshall 
1990[ 1920]: p . xiii)
As the assumptions which provide the statical character of the analysis are dropped, the 
whole becomes more dynamic. But did Marshall mean that we have reached our 
"economic dynamics" and need further work, or has this whole undergone some 
metamorphosis which propels us into the field of "economic biology"? He seemed to 
hold the hope that mechanical models are distinguished from biological models merely 
by the greater complexity of the latter’s interactive processes. But this is simply not the 
case, and perhaps, as Brinley (1991) has suggested, Marshall came to realize just how 
great a theoretical leap the move to "economic biology" would be. Even if Marshall had 
been able to gamer the theoretical implications of his empirical observations of the
76
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
economy, he would have been forced to develop a new methodological approach for such 
an analysis.
The fact that Marshall made no attempt to formally model this economic biology 
with mathematics leads one to conclude that he saw the tools at his disposal as either 
inadequate or inappropriate for the task (Levin 1983; Leijonhufvud 1993:20-21; Colander 
1995).41 Along these lines, Marshall quite succinctly stated that he refused to propose 
a theory which did not fit with the reality he witnessed (Whitaker 1975:51,94). In the 
appendix to his Principles, which is where the majority of his mathematical formula are, 
he stated that,
For many important considerations, especially those connected with the manifold 
influences of the element of time, do not lend themselves easily to mathematical 
expression: they must either be omitted altogether, or clipped and pruned till they 
resemble the conventional birds and animals of decorative arts. (Marshall 
1990[1920]:700)
Marshall’s choice of metaphor suggests that mathematical embodiment reduces the quality 
of our representations to such an extent that they become hollow caricatures of the living 
processes they seek to represent. This drawback to mathematical modeling is augmented 
by the tendency to emphasize those elements of the economic process which lend 
themselves most easily to analytical methods. As a result of these two influences, one 
can easily create a skewed portrait of the relative proportions of driving forces within the 
economy. However, since Marshall was unable to foresee any theoretical alternative, 
he erroneously concluded that avoiding these problems would require the abandonement
41 Remember that Marshall’s mathematical training was excellent for the times, as witnessed by his 
placing second Wrangler on his Mathematical Tripos in Cambridge (Whitaker 1975:4). Of similar, but 
slightly tangential importance in gauging Marshall’s intellectual proclivities is the fact that he pursued 
studies in psychology and philosophy before settling into economics as a career.
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of mathematics, which he believed was the "chief means of scientific progress" (Marshall 
1990[1920]:700).
The alternative that Marshall required was a hierarchical representation of the 
economy which would have been able to embody many of the facets he observed: the 
emergence of novelty, a nesting of economic relations, the process of growth and decay, 
and both an integrating and differentiating dimension within the division-of-labor. 
However, since such an option was not available to him, he attempted to use an informal 
presentation which nested his biological insights within equilibrium concepts through the 
extensive use of organic metaphors. The subtlety of this insight escaped many of his 
contemporaries within economics, and the equilibrium dimension was later highlighted 
and expanded. When the precursor to hierarchical representations (i.e., general systems 
theory) was developed within Western science, it is noteworthy that it emerged within 
the field of biology, not economics (von Bertalanffy 1968).
Seemingly Irreconcilable Perspectives
The use of a hierarchical framework to interpret Marshall’s writings clarifies his 
vision and allows us to see a cleaner structure behind his seemingly fragmented theory. 
From this perspective, Marshall’s ideas should be affiliated with a developmental, 
ecological, and thermodynamic perspective (e.g., Foster 1993) rather than a framework 
of selective pressures between competing entities (e.g., Hodgson 1993a). This is not to
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say that this latter perspective is absent from Marshall’s theory, but merely that the 
former perspective highlights the evolutionary dimension within Marshall.
Marshall’s inability to reconcile the biological and mechanical elements of his 
theories resulted in a tangible tension within his methodology. This tension spread like 
a contagious disease throughout the economics profession and remained asymptomatic 
for some time: some seemed to see the vision of Marshall’s theory while others adhered 
to his mechanical/logical foundations. In the end, these seemingly mutually exclusive 
opinions surfaced within a series of articles published in the Economic Journal during the 
1920’s which will be referred to as the Increasing Returns debate. At this point in time, 
the economics profession faced what appears to be a bifurcation point: a choice between 
two apparently different and mutually exclusive approaches to economic theory. The 
first involved an evolutionary analysis along the lines of Marshall’s biological vision, 
while the second was a more restricted analysis which utilized Marshall’s partial and 
mechanistic methods. Succinctly put, the latter sacrificed the former’s conceptual 
richness for analytic clarity and sharper focus. The failure to realize that discrete 
conceptual shifts, and hence logical inconsistencies, are a characteristic of hierarchical 
concepts created an apparent need to choose between these two approaches rather than 
work to integrate them into a coherent whole. Since it was Marshall’s partial and 
mechanical methods which survived this battle, they served to set the future boundaries 
for acceptable thinking with respect to complementary co-dependent relations within 
economic theory.
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The Increasing Returns Debates of the 1920’s
One possible explanation for why Marshall was unable to reconcile his biological
(i.e., evolutionary) and mechanical (i.e., analytic) perspectives is that he did not
explicitly accept or use concepts of hierarchical nesting. Although the concept of
hierarchically nested processes may seem to be a novel idea to many economists, it has
been an implicit element of theory throughout the history of economic thought (e.g.,
Smith, Marshall, Marx, and Boulding).42 There was even a paper written by S.J.
Chapman (1908) which explicitly used the language of hierarchical structure to
investigate the law of increasing returns.43 He stated,
I propose next by analysis of the actual production of commodities to elicit its 
forms with a view to determining the unitary factors in the several fields wherein 
the laws of increasing and decreasing returns are in operation. In all production 
of commodities the agents (of which there must be more than one, for there must 
always be at least labour and material or land) tend to be united in a hierarchy 
of systems. (Chapman 1908:55)
Chapman believed that this hierarchy consists o f three layers of production: systems o f
the first order are individual businesses, systems o f the second order consist of the many
42 One could even say that the layering of economic processes is implicit within current economic 
theory (i.e., consumer theory, theory of the firm, industrial organization, and macroeconomics). The 
reason why these nested processes are not investigated from an evolutionary perspective has to do with 
philosophical assumptions concerning the structure of reality and nature of cognition.
43 It is important to note that Mr. Chapman (1871-1951) was a well-established member of the 
economic profession. He was a professor of Economics at the University of Manchester (1901-17), 
Secretary of UK Board of Trade (1918-27), and Chief Economic Adviser to the UK Government (1927-32). 
His early career included successful publications and the establishment of a "thriving commerce faculty at 
Manchester" (Blaug 1986).
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businesses of various kinds (systems of the first order) concerned in the production of 
some one commodity, and systems o f the third order are all the industries of the 
community. Chapman also extended his analysis into consumption, but the significance 
of his 1908 article is its explicit recognition of layered economic processes.
The question is, why were these theoretical distinctions not pursued further by the 
profession? The answer is twofold. First, there was a lack of formal modelling tools 
with which to theorize about circular causal relations, endogeneity, and the emergence 
of novelty (e.g., general systems theory). One could say that there were technical 
constraints which needed to be overcome before the theoretical vision could be embodied. 
Second, there existed (and still exists) an anthropocentric belief that the structure of 
human knowledge corresponds to the implicate structure of reality. Since logic is the 
tool par excellence of theoretical formulations and manipulation, and since there is no 
layering inherent to the rules of logic (i.e., Whole= £  Parts), the perception of layers is 
downplayed as an aberrant fact which will undoubtedly yield to the militant advance of 
human knowledge. Therefore, appropriate theories of distinct processes (i.e., different 
layers of conception) are forcibly aggregated into a single layer of conception.44 The 
combination of these two interrelated factors, the absence of appropriate theoretic tools 
and the assumption that reality/concepts are both single layered and equivalently 
structured, provided the technical and philosophical conditions from which the Increasing
44 While a unified science based on the assumption that there is a single layered understanding of 
reality does not appear to be possible, a unification o f science (which consists of a layering of distinct 
theoretical perspectives) based on an understanding of cognition is. An interesting point of note is that the 
possibility of a unified science can never be proved false, since it is a singular concept within a group of 
many. To borrow Popper's terminology, while one can never prove that all swans are white, one can also 
never prove that a black swan does not exist.
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Returns debates emerged. Concepts appropriate to different conceptual layers of the 
economy were placed within a single layer of theory through the indiscriminate 
imposition of logical consistency. This effort resulted in the theories of perfect 
competition (e.g., Pigou 1927, 1928) and imperfect competition (e.g., Robinson 1933; 
Chamberlin 1933). While it is the abandonment of the evolutionary dimension which is 
the subject of this dissertation, it is through an understanding of the emergence of these 
two theories of competition that this decline becomes clear (see also Foss 1994).
The articles of the Increasing Returns debate can be divided into three groups in 
order to identify the three major stages of debate. The first group consists of a 
discussion concerning the practicality of sorting industries into the theoretical boxes of 
diminishing, constant, and increasing returns (Clapham 1922; Pigou 1922; Robertson 
1924). It presents the initial intellectual landscape, the framing of the relevant questions, 
from which the Increasing Returns debates unfold. The second group concerns the 
theoretical reconciliation of increasing/decreasing returns and competitive equilibrium 
(Sraffa 1926,1930; Pigou 1927,1928; Robertson 1930). The conceptual perspective 
which emerged from this second group established the direction and structure of future 
economic theory: one which dismissed the evolutionary dimension of Marshall’s theory 
in favor of theories characterized by stable equilibrium and logical consistency. The last 
group may not really merit being called a group since it consists of a single article 
written by Allyn Young (1928). The significance of this essay is that it extended the 
evolutionary flavor of Marshall’s vision by pursuing a higher level theoretical model of 
the economy, one which made no direct reference to individual firms. Although an
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implicit ally of the Marshallian advocates within the Increasing Returns debate (i.e., 
Robertson 1924, 1930), Young’s analysis shifted the perspective by drawing an explicit 
connection between increasing returns, division of labor, and economic development.
This second group presents what appeared to be two mutually exclusive directions 
for economic theory: the first logical consistency and stable equilibrium, the second 
evolutionary. Although Young’s essay was the clearest and most explicit presentation 
of an evolutionary perspective within the Increasing Returns debates, it was Robertson 
who served as the champion of the Marshallian evolutionary vision since it was 
Robertson who was pitted against Sraffa in the Economic Journal symposium of 1930. 
A bifurcation interpretation of the Increasing Returns debate is interesting since it is not 
too far of a stretch to contend that Sraffa’s 1926 article encouraged the emergence of a 
formal theory of the firm, perfect/imperfect competition, and eventually general 
equilibrium theorizing, by representing a dynamic process with static equilibrium and 
laying the groundwork for a shift from the heuristic representative firm to a reified 
equilibrium firm. Whereas Robertson’s articles represent Marshall’s ideas and thereby 
preserved his ambiguity, Young’s article developed and clarified the spirit of Marshall’s 
work.
Empty Analytical Boxes
Clapham’s 1922 article was the initial spark of the Increasing Returns debates since 
it questioned the practical value of the conceptual distinction between increasing and
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diminishing return industries.45 To embellish his argument, Clapham painted a rather
colorful portrait of all industries being placed in boxes on the "shelves" of our mind
labelled diminishing, constant, or increasing return industries. He then asked whether
the increment of product due to the increase by a unit in the quantity of resources
occupied in producing a good is smaller (decreasing returns) or greater (increasing
returns), the greater is the quantity of resources so employed. Although he conceded that
theoretically sound policy arguments can be made under the assumption that conditions
of diminishing or increasing returns prevail in an industry, he asked that these boxes be
filled by the "Great Analytics" with empirical observations.46
We are building a framework into which we hope facts may in time be fitted.
If those who know the facts cannot do the fitting, we shall regret it. But our 
doctrine will retain its logical - and, may we add, its pedagogic - value. And 
then you know it goes so prettily into graphs and equations. (Clapham 1922:312)
Clapham questioned whether economists can identify specific industries as being either
increasing or decreasing return industries. How is one to conceive of an industry? How
are units of resources to be conceived? Or increment of product? He concluded,
I think a good deal of harm has been done through omission to make it quite 
clear that the Law of Returns have never been attached to specific industries; that 
the boxes are, in fact, empty ... Unless we have a good prospect in the near 
future of filling the boxes reasonably full, there is, I hold, grave danger to an 
essentially practical science such as Economics in the elaboration of hypothetical 
conclusions about, say, human welfare and taxes in relation to industries which 
cannot be specified. (Clapham 1922:312)
45 This article is written in response to Pigou’s Economics of Welfare (1920). This explains why 
Pigou, rather than Marshall, answers the criticism a few months later in the Economic Journal. It is 
notable that the theoretical structure of economic thought was well accepted within the profession and few 
had dared to question its fundamental assumptions in the past (Shackle 1983:5). Things were changing.
46 For example, Pigou talks in his book about the subsidization and taxation of certain industries based 
upon their being either increasing or diminishing returns industries..
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The interest in Clapham’s analysis from our perspective is simply his questioning 
the possibility of translating these theoretical concepts into practical insights which can 
guide policy. He focused less on increasing returns as an evolutionary concept and more 
on policy issues (as noted by Pigou 1922:458-459). In other words, his article was 
concerned with the empirical and practical possibilities of the current theoretical use of 
the law of returns.
Pigou’s reply to this article addressed both methodological and empirical concerns. 
After making a distinction between the "pure" knowledge of implications (e.g., he cited 
mathematics) and a "realistic" knowledge concerned with subject-matter presumed to be 
actual (e.g., he cited physics), he noted that "knowledge of implications is just as much 
knowledge as knowledge of matter of fact" (Pigou 1922:459). Therefore, determining 
the mathematical implications of theoretical assumptions is a source of knowledge. 
However, he added that the ultimate goal of such theories should always be subject- 
matter presumed to be actual, which he calls realism. While realism need not entail the 
presence of practical usefulness for Pigou, he does say that he pursues economic theory 
under the belief that it will provide practical insight at some point in time. Pigou also 
believed that the law of returns was "an organic and inseparable part" of the whole of 
economic theory (Pigou 1922:462). He warned that "to take the categories of increasing 
returns and diminishing returns out of their setting [the established theoretical framework 
of economics] and to speak of them as though they were a thing that could be swept 
away without injury to the whole corpus of economics is a very perverse proceeding" 
(Pigou 1922:461, emphasis in original).
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In addition to these arguments for the organic significance of the law of returns 
within economic theory, Pigou altered the empty boxes metaphor to include a 
measurement of the degree of returns experienced by each industry. The theory is 
thereby expanded into an "intricate collection of little cases" within the larger boxes, 
which Pigou claimed would have greater practical use when filled. Whereas Clapham 
feared that these boxes, and hence Pigou’s little cases, were destined to remain empty, 
Pigou believed that such a conclusion was "premature" (Pigou 1922:464). He believed 
that the economics profession merely needs more people who are equally at home in the 
fields of theoretical and statistical analysis in addition to detailed case studies of 
particular industries. It is interesting to note that Chapman, who was cited earlier for 
his explicit use of hierarchically nested concepts, fits Pigou’s criteria rather well 
according to Blaug’s (1986) biographical description.
Both Clapham and Pigou theorized about a static world and implicitly constrained
the concept of increasing returns to mechanical theories of linear input-output for firms
and industries rather than allowing it to have an evolutionary flavor. Although Pigou
mentioned external economies once, neither man seemed to realize that the symbolism
of empty boxes is an inadequate and possibly misleading metaphor. It implies that
everything is placed on one of three shelves (i.e., increasing, decreasing, or constant
returns). Pigou’s alteration of this metaphor is merely a recognition of the mess that still
remains and an attempt to-straighten up these boxes by arranging them by relative size.
In response to this, Robertson (1924:16) wrote that there exists here,
... a tendency to discover a simplicity of parallelism where none exists, and to 
submit disparate materials to an identical logical process. The boxes, if I may
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make free with the metaphor, are not in my view properly to be loaded upon the 
same cab. It is almost as though one were a hat-box, and the other a monstrous 
compound of a box at the opera and a box growing alongside a garden path.
This "monstrous compound" represents Robertson’s attempt to introduce external
economies into the discussion. While the music of the opera enhances one’s experience
of the garden, the fragrance of the garden’s flowers enhance the ambiance of the opera.
Although neither the opera nor the garden may, in and of itself, be properly called an
increasing returns industry, the two industries may display increasing returns through
their complementary expansion: a higher quality opera and garden are created
simultaneously.
Robertson believed that increasing returns arise for two reasons. The first involves 
the "lumpy and discontinuous" nature of capital (i.e., natural monopoly framework). 
This is merely a surface-volume relationship in which the presence of a prime element 
in production will create episodes of increasing/decreasing returns as the optimal 
technical combinations in production are approached/ surpassed. The second reason is 
implicitly evolutionary since it involves the passage o f time by which "methods of 
technique and of organization are capable of improvement" (Robertson 1924:18). 
Robertson noted that interference in the market of an industry which enjoyed this second 
type of increasing returns (e.g., selective subsidization or taxation) represents an attempt 
to substitute for time, and can only have limited effectiveness.
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It is worth noting that one year later in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, an
article appeared by the well-known Russian economist N.D. Kondratieff (1925).47
Kondratieff made three important points which did not filter into the Increasing Returns
debate, but do shed an illuminating light on the different positions contained within these
three articles: (1) A distinction is drawn between static and dynamic conceptions of the
economy. The former seeks an "understanding of the equilibrium of unchanging
elements and of their inter-relations," while the latter considers "economic phenomena
in the process of changes in their elements and in the inter-relations of the latter." Both
consider change, but one is the mechanical interaction of fixed elements (quantitative
change) while the other concerns compositional/organic/qualitative change. Kondratieff
believed that these two views are not cleanly separable: conclusions reached through
static theory play an auxiliary, but necessary, role in dynamic theory and vice versa. (2)
Kondratieff also believed that only the dynamics of phenomena as a whole exists, and "it
is not the statics and the dynamics of phenomena themselves but the static view as against
the dynamic view of them that should be treated in contrast to each other, as two different
theoretical conceptions." (3) There are two forms of dynamic processes, these being
evolutionary or non-reversible and "wave-like" or fluctuating. He stated,
Regarded as a whole, economic reality represents a non-reversible process, in 
which progress is accomplished by stages. But the individual economic 
elements, while they are thus subject, as parts of the whole, to a non-reversible 
process of variation, in some cases develop, when considered separately, through 
a reversible process. (Kondratieff 1925:582)
47 A few other articles which were important for the Increasing Returns debates proper, but not 
pertinent to this dissertation, appeared in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (e.g., Graham 1923; Knight 
1925).
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In other words, while an economy or industry evolves in a non-reversible fashion, the 
individual elements which compose it may experience repetition, reversion, and cyclical 
behavior.48 As examples of non-reversible dynamics, Kondratieff cited population, 
volume of production and trade, and the amount of capital.
Kondratieff s distinctions can be used to highlight the differences between the 
methodological perspectives of Pigou/Clapham and Robertson’s within the Increasing 
Returns debate: while the former espoused/questioned the use of certain concepts within 
a static equilibrium view of the economy, Robertson advocated a dynamic view and 
thereby presented a distinct alternative to the former perspective. However, this 
distinction between the methodological perspectives inherent to these three articles are 
veiled by the metaphors of hat factories, boxes, and religious folklore. In contrast, 
Kondratieff s essay contained little of this verbal fencing, presented the issues in a clean 
and concise manner, and is an eerie precursor of current distinctions drawn along the 
same lines. It is due to this clarity that he is cited here.
* Since different moments within this ’repetitive* dynamic of the parts will represent different points 
in time and different combinations of economic factors, ’the statement that the process is subject to 
reversion and repetition is not to be applied in an absolute sense, but is to be used only to distinguish this 
class of change from the other [i.e., evolutionary], which admits of no repetition or reversion* (Kondratieff 
1925:582). In other words, the statement that a process is subject to repetition highlights a particular 
aspect of its dynamic change rather than serving to contend that it experiences no evolutionary change 
whatsoever.
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Building Sturdy Shelves and Stronger Boxes
Sraffian Dilemma. The second group of articles begins with one by Piero Sraffa 
(1926) which has been called the Sraffian Manifesto in Shackle’s (1983) The Years of 
High Theory.49 Addressing the "one dark spot" which disturbs the harmony of the 
current theory of value, this being the law of increasing and decreasing returns, Sraffa 
delivered a scathing critique of the conceptual unification of increasing/decreasing returns 
into a single law of non-proportional returns which is used to yield an industry supply 
curve. This supply curve is then used to build a theory of value based on exchange 
within the context of a partial equilibrium analysis and under the assumptions of perfect 
competition.50 My discussion shall focus on Sraffa’s analysis of the logical consistency 
of the assumptions underlying such an analysis and its residual effect on the evolutionary 
dimensions of Marshall’s theories (subsequently defended by Robertson 1930).
To set the historical stage, one must realize that earlier conceptions of perfect 
competition did not possess the clean theoretical structure which contemporary 
economists have come to expect. Instead, it was a more loosely defined set of 
assumptions whereby each individual firm within a collection of firms produces an object 
which is physically and technically indistinguishable from that produced by other firms 
(see Shackle 1983:25-26). Therefore, no potential buyer has the least preference for one 
firm’s product over another’s. Economists therefore reasoned that if the number of firms
49 These years being 1926-1939.
30 This argument had been developed in a previous article by Sraffa (1925) and has been thoroughly 
explored by many historians of economic thought (e.g., Maneschi 1986; Panico and Salvadori 1994; 
Roncaglia 1978; Shackle 1983).
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is so great and their size so small that no practicable change in the output of any one firm 
can noticeably affect the output of this collection of firms as a whole, then the product 
can be called a commodity, the collection of firms an industry, and the price a firm 
receives for its product will be given exogenously by the industry’s market for the 
commodity. This provided a basis for the law of demand. In addition to this, although 
earlier economists had used diminishing returns to discuss distribution and viewed 
increasing returns as a characteristic of economic progress in general, a Law o f Returns 
had come into being which included both diminishing and increasing returns under the 
same heading. Through a "radical transformation,1' these two forces of "profoundly 
diverse nature" were united into a single explanation for the link between an individual 
firm/industry’s scale of output and production costs (Sraffa 1926:537). Within the then 
current interpretations of perfect competition, this Law of Returns was used to yield a 
law of supply, which in coordination with the above mentioned law of demand provided 
a theory of exchange value which permits one to infer output from the knowledge of 
price alone. An equilibrium is achieved in a particular market when the amount of a 
commodity supplied is equal to the amount demanded at a given price.
Sraffa questioned many aspects of this conventional formulation. First, he 
wondered whether the laws of decreasing, constant, and increasing returns could be 
combined into a single law of non-proportional returns and then used to construct a 
supply curve for an industry, given their unique origins. Furthermore, he augmented 
Clapham’s practical concerns by noting that this single law creates difficulties "when it 
is sought to classify the various industries according as they belong to one or the other
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category" (Sraffa 1926:538). From a theoretical perspective, the problem involves 
setting the boundaries which define an industry. If an industry is defined by its use of 
a given factor o f production, it would presumably experience decreasing returns 
(increasing costs). In contrast, if an industry is defined by its commodity o f production, 
with each industry employing only a small amount of the productive inputs, then it would 
presumably experience increasing or constant returns (decreasing or constant costs). 
Therefore, Sraffa reasoned that the classification of industries as experiencing increasing 
or decreasing returns will depend upon the boundaries one uses to define what an 
industry is. In addition, he believed that the element of time presents problems since the 
short-run is associated with decreasing and the long-run with increasing returns.
Sraffa’s talent as a theoretician shined most brightly at this point, for he proceeded 
to demonstrate that the assumptions necessary for the partial equilibrium analysis of a 
single commodity (i.e., perfect competition) are such that only in exceptionally restrictive 
cases can either increasing or decreasing returns be involved. Since non-proportional 
returns are the basis on which the supply curve of the industry is derived, the logical 
inconsistency of increasing and decreasing returns within a partial equilibrium, 
competitive framework was deadly to a theory of value based on exchange. His 
argument questioned the extent to which economic theory can abstract from the 
interdependencies between different markets whose absence is essential within the logic
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of partial equilibrium analysis.51 At issue is the ceteris paribus assumption which Sraffa 
believed was blatantly false.
While the details of Sraffa’s criticism are not fundamental to this discussion, two
important points are his explicit exclusion of external economies and the fact that his
argument is levied against the logical contradictions inherent to the conventional set of
assumptions being used in economic theory. His conclusions are well summarized by
Maneschi (1986:10, emphasis in original),
Sraffa makes conditional statements to the effect that if returns to scale are 
variable, then a partial equilibrium analysis of a particular industry under perfect 
competition is inappropriate; if, on the other hand, returns to scale are constant, 
then such a partial equilibrium analysis is appropriate, but then the Marshallian 
symmetry between demand and supply is destroyed, and one is left with a 
classical theory of prices being determined by cost of production.
This statement reflects Sraffa’s understanding that the assumption of constant costs is
"necessary for logical consistency in a partial equilibrium setting under perfect
competition" (Maneschi 1986:10, footnote 3, emphasis added). This focus on the logical
implications of the assumptions was also noted by Shackle (1983:19),
51 Sraffa’s argument proceeds like this, all internal economies must be removed from consideration 
since a firm experiencing such economies could expand output at a lower cost and would therefore not be 
in equilibrium by definition. He also excludes all external economies except those external to the firm but 
internal to the industry as being outside the scope of partial equilibrium analysis; This one type of external 
economy permitted being dismissed by Sraffa as one which is practically never witnessed in the real world. 
With increasing returns out of the way, he then proceeds to explain how decreasing returns are also 
incompatible with partial equilibrium analysis under the assumption of perfect competition. If one assumes 
that an industry uses a large portion of a fixed productive factor, then increases in output will increase the 
price of this productive input which will influence other commodities prices and therefore, very likely, the 
demand in the original industry. Therefore the independence assumption is highly likely to be broken. 
If one assumes that an industry uses only a very small portion of a fixed productive factor, then an increase 
in output will have no appreciable affect on the input price and the unit cost of production will remain the 
same. One is then left with constant costs. Therefore, an upward and downward sloping relationship 
between unit production cost and output cannot be isolated within a partial equilibrium analysis of perfect 
competition with non-proportional returns. If the assumption of constant returns is made, cost is 
independent of output, it is also independent of demand and the theory of value based on exchange 
collapses to one based on production costs.
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Let us again notice that what this argument concerns is a method of analysis, a 
set of assumptions, namely the ‘particular equilibrium’ analysis of an industry 
operating in competition.
Therefore, it is not increasing returns per se which Sraffa objected to, but the
reconciliation of non-proportional cost curves and the partial equilibrium analysis of
perfect competition.
After skillfully dissecting the body of assumptions underlying conventionally 
accepted economic theory, Sraffa had four theoretical alternatives to chose from (three 
which he noted himself and the last an evolutionary alternative). First, to assume 
generalized constant returns to scale and retain the concept of perfect competition. 
Second, to explicitly acknowledge the interdependencies and pursue a "general economic 
equilibrium" concept. Third, to reject the assumption of perfect competition in favor of 
variations on the monopolistic theme. And, lastly, to reject the necessity of a single 
layered static equilibrium in favor of a hierarchically layered dynamic process which 
possesses an evolutionary dimension.52 Sraffa (1926:542) rejected the second option 
as a "well-known conception, whose complexity, however, prevents it from bearing fruit, 
at least in the present state of our knowledge," and chose to forsake the "path of free 
competition and turn in the opposite direction, namely, towards monopoly." Anyone 
even roughly familiar with this period of time in the history of economic thought will 
know that this decision by Sraffa represents the beginnings of imperfect competition. It 
is important to note that the last alternative was not really an option for Sraffa since the
32 This last perspective has been used to dismiss Sraffa’s (1926, 1930) and Robbins’ (1928) criticisms, 
which were based on equilibrium assumptions, as "irrelevant to the Marshallian system because a 
Marshallian firm is seldom, if ever, in equilibrium" (Beach 1982:60).
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analytical tools for such a complex analysis were not available, and his rejection of the 
second option seems to imply a rejection of the fourth also. However, this technical 
constraint was not great enough to prevent other economists (e.g., Schumpeter 1928 and 
Young 1928) from exploring this route.
Years of High Theory. Sraffa’s Manifesto of 1926 was the first link in a long 
chain of theoretical advances within the economics profession (Shackle 1983). 
Obviously, it led to Robinson (1933) and Chamberlin’s (1933) work on imperfect 
competition, but before these works came Pigou’s (1927, 1928) essays which introduced 
the concept of the equilibrium firm.53 While it is common folklore that imperfect 
competition "filled in the middle ground" between existing theories of perfect competition 
and monopoly, a convincing argument has been made for the creation of the theory of 
perfect competition from monopolistic competition theory. This argument was developed 
by Moss (1984) and is paraphrased below.
Marshall had insisted that the representative firm did not actually exist and Pigou 
had explicitly stated his belief that no actual firm was likely to be an equilibrium firm. 
However, by characterizing the equilibrium firm as having fixed  marginal and average 
cost curves which are not affected by changes in the firm’s activities, Pigou makes the 
firm’s technological production relations exogenous. And it is this formulation which 
allows the firm to be equated to its production function. However, whereas Pigou 
derived his equilibrium firm from the laws of returns experienced within a particular
53 It is notable that Robinson went on to reject this form of analysis she had helped to found.
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industry, Robinson and Chamberlin stood this concept "on its head" by "defining the 
industry on the basis of a population of equilibrium firms" (Moss 1984:314). As a 
result, the industry becomes a population of firms characterized by identical cost curves 
with each firm facing identical demand curves under the assumption that each of n firms 
would meet one-n* of the industry demand.
What does this historical tale of the inversion of definitions have to do with
evolutionary theory? Its significance is that Moss contends that Friedman’s 1953 essay,
and the rise of Positive economics in general, was necessary to "save the [new] theory
of value and distribution as a logically consistent and widely applicable central core of
economic theory and basis for applied economics" (Moss 1984:316). The reason for this
is that the representative and equilibrium firms were not previously believed to actually
exist, but when the industry came to be defined by a population of such firms it becomes
reasonable to survey businessmen and ask whether they behave as they are assumed to
under the new theory. A negative response to such a survey could be interpreted as
evidence that the assumptions of this theory are not realistic, and hence that it provides
spurious predictive value. Moss speculated that since conclusive survey methods and
data are highly unlikely to be accepted by everyone, the methodological status of these
new theoretical foundations could be continually called into question.
[Robinson and Chamberlin’s] contribution was to give the analysis of these issues 
an axiomatic foundation. In so doing, they took from the theory of value and 
distribution a robustness that had previously been unaffected by a methodological 
stance in which the realism of the assumptions of a theory constitute its 
conditions of application. Once the effects of this lack of robustness became 
apparent, it was re-established by the adoption of positive economics. (Moss 
1984:317)
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The positive methodology which Friedman introduced to economics, which was 
accompanied by a host of subsidiary arguments which were antithetical to an evolutionary 
perspective, allowed the realism of theoretical assumptions to be replaced by instrumental 
efficiency as a methodological criterion for ‘good’ theory. Therefore, the new theories 
treated firms as i f  they were identical rather than contending that they actually were 
identical. This can be quite fruitful as long as the heterogeneity between firms is not 
significant and heterogeneity is not de-emphasized simply for the sake of conceptual 
simplicity.
The fact that Moss was even able to make this connection between the Increasing 
Returns debates and the rise of positive economics serves as a witness to the pivotal 
juncture at which economics found itself. The evolutionary overtones in Marshall’s 
vision were lost as the profession turned to the greater analytical clarity afforded from 
this new theoretical vantage. This is not to say that Sraffa intended for economics to go 
in this direction. In fact, his Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities 
(1960), which is believed to be a direct extension of his 1925 and 1926 essays, has no 
trace of imperfect competition, returns to scale, or demand relationships (Maneschi 
1986:11).
Increasing Returns Symposium. Before moving to the third grouping of articles 
in this sequential stroll through the Increasing Returns debates, it is important to note that 
it is not the logical structure of Sraffa’s argument, but rather the absence of the 
evolutionary dimension that is of interest. How was this evolutionary dimension
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expressed within these debates? It was embodied within a parts-to-whole relationship in 
which the quality of the whole is not seen to be reducible to the quantitative sum of its 
parts. And it is in trying to express these thoughts, under the unforgiving onslaught of 
logical consistency, that Robertson (1930) finds himself. However, to the extent that 
such concepts implicitly embody a notion of systemic layering, they will not be 
reconcilable with the theory of perfect competition in a logically consistent manner (as 
per Sraffa). Robertson’s failure to fully understand the philosophical assumptions 
underlying these debates (as compared to , e.g., Kondratieff 1925; Schumpeter 1928; 
Young 1928) and therefore his inability to present his arguments in a concise and clear 
manner resulted in the apparent defeat of the evolutionary dimension within Marshall’s 
theoretical legacy.
Although Robertson was not an explicit exponent of the evolutionary dimension 
within economic theory, the fact that he publicly opposed Sraffa’s 1926 criticisms in the 
Increasing Returns symposium implicitly made him its defender. Robertson had an 
excellent reputation in the profession and was considered a capable theoretician by his 
contemporaries: if his defense of these views failed, then they would lose respect within 
the profession. Although he understood enough about the evolutionary dimension to use 
parts-to-whole metaphors to convey a sense of their inherent layering, he never directly 
challenged Sraffa’s pervasive retreat to logic. As a result, an indiscriminant use of logic 
as a criterion of theoretical validity was never called into question, even though the 
transition from the parts to the whole defies logic. Robertson’s failure to understand 
these facets of the discussion, perhaps due to a lack of genuine interest or philosophical
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finesse, crippled the strategic position of the evolutionary perspective during and 
following these debates. In addition, Robertson’s tendency to adopt a "many-sided 
eclectic approach” which led him to genuinely believe that "there was some element of 
truth in most theories" (Presley 1983:236) did not allow him to take a definitive stance 
in this argument with Sraffa and hence weakened his presentation. The stronger position 
in a debate does not guarantee a win, especially if someone does not fully understand or 
capitalize on the strength of his or her position.
How was the evolutionary perspective represented in these debates? What are the 
various metaphors and similes used by Robertson as illustrations of parts-to-whole 
layering? There were four metaphors used, these being: (1) The well known trees in 
the forest metaphor which was originally used by Marshall. (2) A collection of water 
drops which form a wave. (3) The individual bones and aggregative skeleton of a 
growing baby. (4) The concept of the representative firm which forms a link between 
a dynamic theory of the firm and static theory of industry (Moss 1984:309). With 
respect to this latter symbol, although firms are seen to compose the industry, the 
industry cannot be reduced to these firms. The concept of the representative firm was 
therefore invented to conceptually represent the firm from the perspective of an industry 
and hence appease Marshall’s strong desire for analytic continuity (i.e., the 
characteristics of the industry being used to form a concept of an individual firm).
Why must one use metaphors and similes to communicate nested structures? 
Chipman’s (1965:744) comment that the disturbing aspect of economies which are 
external to the firm but not internal to any other sector (e.g., industry) involves "a
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fallacy, or at least an old paradox, of a whole being greater that the sum of its parts" 
provides an answer. Metaphor is required to transcend logical fallacy (see Polyani 
1975). The use of metaphor helps one to bridge the gap in one’s understanding of a 
process which is not experienced directly, by appealing to relationships which are 
experienced directly. This is what Robertson (1930:87) wished to communicate in his 
statement that metaphors "assist the reader in making a more violent effort of the 
imagination."
The evolutionary flavor of Robertson’s arguments was not missed by Sraffa, who
does us the favor of explicitly restating the argument in less flowery, but none the less
evolutionary, terms.
Suppose that a change in the environment produces a change in the colour of an 
animal species, say from brown to white, through the operation of natural 
selection. We may say that "the representative individual" has changed his 
colour, although not a single individual has changed colour during his lifetime. 
(Sraffa 1930:91)
It is significant that Sraffa’s comments frame the discussion in terms of a natural
selection process which involves stabilizing circularities and engenders an equilibrium
between an entity and its environment.54 This alteration is only a slight compromise
on Sraffa’s part, and he correctly believed that such a reframing of the question does
little to reconcile the contradiction.
If the new firms can turn out a larger output at a lower cost than the old firms, 
why didn’t they come into existence before? Why in the new, and not in the old 
position of equilibrium. (Sraffa 1930:92)
54 See Bateson (1988:44) for a discussion of Darwin and Wallace’s theory of evolution along these 
lines.
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It should be obvious that these two men were speaking past one another as they
used similar language but expressed differing perspectives. Although Robertson did not
explicitly emphasize time as a factor, and hence establish an explicit plea for an
evolutionary perspective on these grounds, he did seem to allude to the temporal in his
response to Sraffa. He stated,
... it does not require a sense of poetry, but only of human nature and of history, 
to refrain from asking - as in effect Mr. Sraffa asks in this section - why slavery 
was not abolished or the Channel Tunnel built at the earliest moment at which 
the world would have been better for the change. (Robertson 1930:93)
To which Sraffa responded,
We seem to be agreed that the theory [competitive equilibrium and increasing 
returns] cannot be interpreted in a way which makes it logically self-consistent 
and, at the same time, reconciles it with the facts it sets out to explain. Mr. 
Robertson’s remedy is to discard mathematics, and he suggests that my remedy 
is to discard the facts; perhaps I ought to have explained that, in the 
circumstances, I think it is Marshall’s theory that should be discarded. (Sraffa 
1930:93, emphasis added)
This is a clear statement of the belief that Robertson was unable to deal theoretically with
the facts he perceived and therefore chose to fudge the theory, while Sraffa’s alternative
proposal was to discard the theory and begin anew (i.e., Sraffa 1960).
Allvn Young’s Alternative Blueprint
Although Robertson failed to recognize that Sraffa’s implicit rules for the 
Increasing Returns debate were restricting the concept of increasing returns to the arena 
of equilibrium analysis, Allyn Young’s 1928 article ("Increasing returns and economic 
progress") argued within an explicitly different context, the process of economic growth
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as a whole, and was thereby able to develop the Marshallian vision further.55 While 
it is common to note the ancestral link from Smith to Young, there is little recognition 
of the affiliation between Young and Marshall. However, the fact that Young’s article 
was listed as being within the Increasing Returns debate (Increasing Returns symposium, 
Economic Journal 1930), which resulted in part from the tension between the analytic and 
organic perspective within Marshall, lends support to this connection. It is not that 
Young explicitly aligned himself with the evolutionary perspective, in which the whole 
is greater than the sum of the parts. Rather, his interest in a general understanding of 
increasing returns places him on the same side of the theoretical watershed as Marshall 
(via Robertson) in these debates. Both men share an emphasis on the importance of 
time, the endogeneity of economic change, and the impossibility of reconciling the 
richness of increasing returns with a single leveled theoretical concept of the economy. 
In this way, both theorists limit the degree to which they are willing to abstract from 
their experiences of economic reality. In other words, Smith and Young could be said 
to be united vertically, Marshall and Young are united horizontally by a common 
approach and vision, or using a genealogical simile, as brothers rather than father and 
son.
33 This article is a reproduction of his Presidential Address before Section F (Economic Science and 
Statistics) of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. While it is unlikely that many 
economists will be familiar with Young’s work, Schumpeter (1959:875) once referred to him as a "great 
economist and brilliant theorist ... in danger of being forgotten." A prophesy that has come true. His 
professional reputation in his own times was adequate enough to land him a position as one of the economic 
advisors to President Wilson at the Paris Peace talks (1918-1919), a similar role to that which Keynes 
served for the British government. Although Blitch credited Young with having an impressive publications 
record, it consisted largely of sources other than professional journals. It is also worth noting that Young’s 
"main focus in university work was graduate teaching" (Bitch 1983:1). As witness to this, he chaired the 
dissertations of Edward H. Chamberlin (1933) and Frank H. Knight (1921), both of whom made significant 
contributions to the field.
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Choice of Approach. Although Young agreed with Sraffa’s conclusion that partial 
equilibrium analysis is not an appropriate framework for discussions of increasing 
returns, he chose to forsake equilibrium theorizing in favor of a dynamic process 
perspective. While Sraffa chose in 1926 (and 1925) to simply abandon the assumption 
of perfect competition, Young (1928:527) believed that a theoretical framework of 
industry/firm equilibrium stood in the way of a "clear view of the more general or 
elementary aspects of the phenomena of increasing returns.” Young focused on the 
inappropriate use of equilibrium methodology rather than the logical inconsistency 
between the various conceptual components of a firm level equilibrium analysis. He 
emphasized, in the graduate economics course he taught at the London School of 
Economics between 1927 and 1929, that partial equilibrium analysis and increasing 
returns would never be fully reconcilable phenomena since "supply and demand analysis 
does not see things in their togetherness” (Blitch 1990:451). The alterations of increasing 
returns, which were made with a view towards the development of a coherent theory of 
exchange value, are quite different from their classical ancestors. Young believed that 
the classical economists used increasing returns as a general "characteristic of 
manufacturing industry taken as a whole," which was thought to be a "natural 
phenomena, like the precession of the equinoxes" (Young 1928:528-529). It is this 
classical concept of increasing returns, which possesses a dynamic flavor, from which 
Young chose to build his understanding of economic progress.
In particular, Young went back to a "simpler and more inclusive view" of 
increasing returns that is based on the division-of-labor. In doing this, he implicitly
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expands the level of structural detail beyond that of individual firms. What were, from 
an individual firm’s perspective, properly considered external economies become the 
internal economies of particular productive processes collaboratively engaged in the 
economic process as a whole. This analysis singled out a distinct level of structural 
detail from Smith’s general division-of-labor and extent-of-the-market relationship by 
differentiating within the industrial infrastructure which had evolved since Smith and 
thereby shared a theoretical perspective with Marshall. As Blitch (1990:451) has noted, 
although Young realized that this circular relationship between the division-of-labor and 
extent-of-the-market is active at many levels of the economy, the particular perspective 
which he chose to take focused on the final products.
Methodological Foundations of Young’s Perspective. Young used Marshall’s 
distinction between internal and external economies to explain his objections to strict 
equilibrium theorizing.56 It is not that an equilibrium framework lacks heuristic value, 
but that it will always be a partial view which has limited use when investigating the 
phenomenon of increasing returns in its full richness. It is at this point that we get the 
first comments by Young associated with a conceptual hierarchy of parts and wholes: 
The contention that all external economies cannot be accounted for by summing the 
internal economies of all the separate firms and his recognition of the stability of these
56 A little known article written anonymously by Young in 1929, "Big Business: How the Economic 
System Grows and Evolves Like a Living Organism, * and published in The Book of Popular Science, is 
an explicit investigation of the internal and external economies of a firm, industry, and the economy. It 
has been reprinted in the Journal of Economic Studies (Young 1990).
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internal economies relative to external economies. It is worth quoting his description of
internal and external economies at length.
When we look at the internal economies of a particular firm we envisage a 
condition of comparative stability. Year after year the firm, like its competitors, 
is manufacturing a particular product or group of products, or is confining itself 
to certain definite stages in the work of forwarding the products towards their 
final form. Its operations change in the sense that they are progressively adapted 
to an increasing output, but they are kept within definitely circumscribed bounds. 
(Young 1928:528, emphasis added)
In other words, the internal economies of a firm pertain to the relative efficiency of a
diversity of productive techniques available to make a specific product, whether
intermediate or final. One could say that the firm’s internal economies result from its
successful/unsuccessful adaptation to a particular niche within the economic process.
Young continued,
Out beyond, in that obscurer field from which it derives its external economies, 
changes of another order are occurring. New products are appearing, firms are 
assuming new tasks, and new industries are coming into being. In short, change in 
this external field  is qualitative as well as quantitative. No analysis of the forces 
making for economic equilibrium, forces which we might say are tangential at any 
moment of time, will serve to illumine this field, for movements away from 
equilibrium, departures from previous trends, are characteristic of it. Not much is 
to be gained by probing into it to see how increasing returns show themselves in the 
costs of individual firms and in the prices at which they offer their products. (Young 
1928:528, emphasis added)
One could say that external economies represent the environment, and therefore
determine the niche in which individual firms find themselves. However, Young seemed
to imply that this environment experiences dynamic qualitative change due to the
emergence of new niches and new products which change the nature (i.e., quality) o f
existing niches.
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Although Young recognized that "one who likes to conceive of all economic
processes in terms of tendencies towards equilibrium" may wish to imagine that the
realization of increasing returns are spread through time so as to secure an equilibrium
of costs and advantages, he believed that,
This would amount to saying that no real economic progress could come through 
the operation of forces engendered within the economic system - a conclusion 
repugnant to common sense. (Young 1928:535)
The appropriate concept, he believed, is one of moving equilibrium since the declining
costs of increasing returns are not those which can be figured into a static equilibrium
of costs and advantages. This can be interpreted to mean that the individual
firm/industry finds itself within a context of relative stability which allows for some
degree of equilibrium corresponding to firm level qualities. However, the forces which
contribute to systemic stability at the level of the firm are dwarfed by the external
economies that act on the firm’s environmental context. These slower, but more
powerful contextual forces determine the underlying trend of an individual firm’s moving
equilibrium.
In trying to reconcile these ideas within a partial equilibrium analysis, the 
representative firm concept is used as an expository device which caters to the discrete 
nature of human concepts and is not a ‘real’ entity. As the economy develops and the 
division-of-labor expands, what were the internal economies of the representative firm 
dissolve into the "internal and external economies of the more highly specialized 
undertakings which are its successors," but these economies are also "supplemented by 
new economies" (Young 1928:538). Like Robertson (1930), Young (1928:538)
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contended that the representative firm "loses its identity" as the division-of-labor expands 
within the economy. From this perspective, he expressed the belief to his graduate 
students at the London School of Economics that Robbins’ (1928) article, which 
lambasted the representative firm concept, was overcritical and "hardly worth wasting 
an article on in the Economic Journal" (Blitch 1990:451).
In his 1928 analysis, Young focused on the division-of-labor among and within the 
complementary patterns of firms which contribute to the production of a final consumer 
good. For example, the production of books involves the production of wood pulp, 
different kinds of paper, printing blocks, printing presses, different inks, et cetera. As 
each of these particular steps becomes its own specialized industry, the division-of-labor 
is expanded. The economy experiences simultaneously a differentiation of tasks along 
with a greater level of integration between these component parts. Although this 
increased differentiation will obviously reap the advantages gained through using 
capitalistic methods of production (i.e., the factory system), which is the conventional 
explanation for economies of production, it will also take advantage of new economies. 
Young cited three examples of these new economies: (1) A higher degree of 
specialization in management services. (2) A more efficient geographical distribution of 
industrial operations, i.e., a more efficient combination of productive advantages can be 
realized with a smaller element of compromise.57 (3) A greater access to the economies 
of indirect or roundabout methods of production whereby previously produced capital
37 The advantages which Young cited were nearness to raw materials, accessible and inexpensive power 
sources, proximity to other industries and/or cheap transportation, and access to a large center of 
population and/or inexpensive marketing channels.
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goods are used to produce consumer goods through specialized processes. For example, 
the use of hammers, saws, and lathes in the production of furniture and buildings 
represents an indirect method of production.
Of these three, Young (1928:531,539) believed that indirect or roundabout methods 
of production make the greatest contribution to the productivity of the economy as a 
whole.58 As the division-of-labor unfolds, new industries emerge to take advantage of 
indirect methods of production which were not economical when the aggregate output of 
the whole industry was smaller. There is a slight problem here since the concept of an 
industry is used ambiguously, due to the symbiotic linguistic relation between the 
concepts of an industry and the goods market.59 Young’s emphasis, when referring to 
the whole industry, was un the market for the final product and therefore on all the firms 
engaged in the process of producing a particular consumer product from beginning to 
end, rather than merely markets in general.60 Although it has become more difficult 
to empirically disentangle the interconnections between industries in the economy using 
this criterion, by viewing the productive process in its entirety Young implicitly 
internalized the individual firm and dissolved the logical inconsistencies that occupied 
Sraffa and were dispelled through ancillary assumptions by Pigou. While Robertson’s 
failure to recognize the logical paradoxes inherent to the parts-whole perspective caused 
him to argue with futility within the logical arena established by Sraffa, Young preserved
58 These ideas find analytical expression in Georgescu-Roegen’s (1971: Chapter 9) conception of the 
production process even though Georgescu-Roegen fails to mention Young’s work.
59 This linguistic difficulty is directly related to the circularity between the DOL and EofM.
® This perspective was also taken by Chapman (1908) with respect to his systems of the second order.
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the evolutionary dimension of the increasing returns concept by explicitly shifting the 
perspective.
Endogeneity of Economic Progress. What is wrong with exploring increasing
returns solely from the perspective of an individual firm? Young felt that the use of
increasing returns as an explanation of a firm’s ability to achieve significant economies,
rather than as a quality of the economic process as a whole, is "in a way" true, but also
"misleading." He commented that one should not,
... try to make of large-scale production (in the sense of production by large 
firms or large industries), as contrasted with large production, any more than an 
incident in the general process by which increasing returns are secured. (Young 
1928:531, emphasis in original)
He elaborated on this in relation to the extent-of-the-market.
The scale of their operations (which is only incidentally or under special 
conditions a matter of the size of the individual firm) merely reflects the size of 
the market for the final products of the industry or industries to whose operations 
their own are ancillary. (Young 1928:539)
This interdependence between the realization of economies and the extent-of-the-
market, which was a central theme of Smith’s economic theory, needed to be emphasized
in contemporary expositions since,
the economies of large-scale operations and of ‘mass-production’ are often 
referred to as though they could be had for the taking, by means of a ’rational’ 
reorganization of industry. (Young 1928:531)
This comment addressed the belief that if increasing returns exist in potential, they will
be appropriated by the individual firm. Conversely, if they are not appropriated there
exists a logical contradiction within the conditions of the situation, as if a ball was
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suspended three feet above the floor without falling and without support. It was the 
reinstatement of the extent-of-the-market constraint, the recognition of the prevalence of 
indirect and roundabout methods as the primary manifestation of increasing returns, and 
the shift from individual firms to the industrial process as a whole which alleviates this 
apparent contradiction.61 Economic progress involves the unfolding of an existing web 
of relations through time, which does not preclude conscious participation as an active 
element (e.g., rational re-organization), but nor does it make this element primary. 
Although Young did concede that rational reorganization might be necessary to break 
through the procrustean layers of routine and inertia within industrial operations, he 
believed that one should not expect too much from such reforms (Young 1928:531). In 
contrast to Young’s beliefs, an extreme notion of rational reorganization implies a 
conscious ability to simply re-arrange the parts, pretty much disregarding the 
complementary relations of the existing web of relations and the necessity of time, in 
order to reach greater efficiency.
As empirical support for his ideas, Young cited the productivity differences 
between British and American industry. After accounting for a country’s economic 
endowments, he believed that the most important single factor in determining the 
effectiveness of its industry is the extent-of-the-market as manifest through its effect on 
the feasibility of indirect methods of production. Therefore, the high productivity in 
America is largely due to the size of its domestic market rather than any entrepreneurial
61 It is perhaps a recognition of these facts which led subsequent literature to abstract away from 
external economies in analyses at the level of the firm (e.g., Sraffa 1930; Harrod 1931).
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advantages per se. There are productive techniques which are profitable in American
industry but would not be in other countries. He stated,
But just what constitutes a large market? Not area or population alone, but 
buying power. This trite observation, however, at once suggests another equally 
trite, namely, that capacity to buy depends upon capacity to produce. In an 
inclusive view, considering the market not as an outlet for the products of a 
particular industry, and therefore external to that industry, but as the outlet for 
goods in general, the size of the market is determined and defined by the volume 
of production. (Young 1928:533)
Young believed that this division-of-laborand extent-of-the-market relationship has
greater implications for economic theorizing than was commonly believed.
Adam Smith’s dictum amounts to the theorem that the division of labor depends 
in large part upon the division of labor. This is more than mere tautology. It 
means, if I read its significance rightly, that the counter forces which are 
continually defeating the forces which make fo r economic equilibrium are more 
pervasive and more deeply rooted in the constitution o f the modem economic 
system than we commonly realize. Not only are new adventitious elements, 
coming in from the outside, but elements which are permanent characteristics of 
the ways in which goods are produced make continuously for change. Every 
important advance in the organization of production, regardless of whether it is 
based upon anything which, in a narrow or technical sense, would be called a 
new ‘invention,’ or involves a fresh application of the fruits of scientific progress 
to industry, alters the conditions of industrial activity and initiates responses 
elsewhere in the industrial structure which in turn have a further unsettling 
effect. Thus change becomes progressive and propagates itself in a cumulative 
way. (Young 1928:533, emphasis added)
The economic process contains "pervasive and deeply rooted" complementary co­
dependent relations which cause changes to cascade through the entire system: 
endogenous structural change is established as a fundamental characteristic of Young’s 
theoretical conception of the economic system.
There are only two qualifications which Young made to this cumulative process of 
change. The first involved the idea that "different productive activities must be
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proportioned one to another" within this aggregate volume of production. This seems 
to be a direct reference to the fundamental co-evolution between the productive and 
consumptive dimensions of human civilization. The interaction between consumption 
needs/wants and technological abilities will determine the degree (i.e., horizontal 
dimension) and depth (i.e., vertical dimension) of specialization in particular production 
processes and hence the resultant size of the industrial infrastructure.
Second, Young explicitly noted the importance of recognizing the temporal
character of this expansive process.
If, under these hypothetical conditions, progress were unimpeded and frictionless, 
if it were not dependent in part upon a process of trial and error, if the 
organization of industry were always such as, in relation to the immediate 
situation, is most economical, the realizing of increasing returns might be 
progressive and continuous, although for technical reasons, it could not always 
proceed at an even rate. But it would remain a process requiring time. (Young 
1928:534, emphasis added)
He continued these thoughts by stating two reasons why an "industrial dictator, with
foresight and knowledge ... could not achieve an Aladdin-like transformation of a
country’s industry" (Young 1928:534). The first is institutional since the human element
is not perfectly malleable with respect to the geographical distribution of population and
its cultural traditions. This rationale is obviously similar to ideas within the American
Institutionalist school of economic theory.62 The second involves the accumulation of
productive capital which plays a fundamental role in the realization of indirect methods
of production. Not only does the investment process take time, but Young also felt that
62 Young's early academic affiliations included many connections to Institutionalist theory (see Blitch 
1983). He received his doctorate from the University of Wisconsin (1902) and had academic relationships 
with Richard T. Ely, Wesley Clair Mitchell, and Hiorstein Veblen (during his tenure at Stanford from 
1906-1910).
112
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the realization of significant improvements will not happen until "a certain quantum of 
prospective advantages has accumulated" (Young 1928:535). This is interesting since 
it posits discrete change resulting from thresholds within the economic system. Due to 
these two reasons, attempts to accelerate the rate at which increasing returns are realized 
face increasing costs of both a psychological and technical character which may be 
discrete rather than continuous.
Young did cite four factors which aid in the economy’s realization of increasing 
returns. These consist of the discovery of new natural resources, new uses for known 
resources, the advancement of science in general, and the growth in population. These 
influences are commonly accepted and conventionally assumed to be exogenous factors 
of economic growth. While recent theoretical models have endogenized knowledge and 
discovery as the dynamic of growth (e.g., Romer 1986, 1990), Young made no such 
move in his theoretical model. One might conclude that knowledge, as a singular gauge 
for dynamic economic development, lacked the heterogeneity that Young sought to 
include in proposing a complementary pattern of economic processes.
Speaking the Native Tongue of the Econ. Although Young believed that supply 
and demand analysis diverts attention towards "incidental or partial aspects of a process 
which ought to be seen as a whole", he did attempt to express his ideas within such a 
framework (Young 1928:533). He reasoned that if a good is produced competitively 
under conditions of increasing returns and demand is elastic, in the special sense that a
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small increase in its supply results in an increase in the amount o f other commodities
which can be had in exchange for it, then,63
Under these conditions, an increase in the supply of one commodity is an 
increase in the demand for other commodities, and it must be supposed that 
every increase in demand will evoke an increase in supply. The rate at which 
any one industry grows is conditioned by the rate at which other industries grow, 
but since the elasticities of demand and of supply will differ for different 
products, some industries will grow faster than others. Even with a stationary 
population and in the absence of new discoveries in pure or applied science there 
are no limits to the process of expansion except the limits beyond which demand 
is not elastic and returns do not increase. (Young 1928:534, emphasis in original)
This process of expansion for a particular product continues until the conditions of
demand elasticity and/or the possibility of increasing returns in production change.
Economic expansion as a whole is seen to depend on the complementary and competitive
interplay between individual production processes, as conditioned by their individual
possibilities.
In order to get a clearer picture of what Young proposed, one must recognize that 
human valuation knows no thermodynamic limitations (i.e., obeys no laws of 
conservation). Therefore, whereas one could contend that the increasing production of 
one good (e.g., X) must draw productive resources from another good (e.g., Y), the 
demand for additional X may possess the same degree of valuation as previous units 
without necessarily reducing the value of any other units of consumption.64 Demand
43 Note that he was not directly interested in the profit margins and costs of individual firms, but with 
a flow of goods within the economy as a whole.
64 If one allows imperfect information to exist, additional X may even find itself in markets which 
possess a higher degree of valuation than previously tapped consumer demand. Furthermore, economies 
of scale resulting from indirect methods of production associated with marketing and transportation may 
open markets with high consumer valuations.
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and supply analysis is a particular formulation of this insight that aggregate patterns of 
individual consumption needs/wants are in a dynamic interplay with the technological 
productive pattern of the economy in such a way that each exerts a force to pull the other 
in alignment with itself. An expansion in the production patterns of the economy are 
conventionally assumed to be brought into alignment with consumption through a 
conservative re-alignment of spending patterns as mediated through the price system. 
However, the alternative possibility which Young appealed to was that the other 
productive endeavors in the economy are expanded to create the means by which the 
desire for the initial good can be met. Young’s criteria that demand is elastic and 
production experiences increasing returns represents the conditions under which the 
expansive forces latent within these two convolving patterns of the economic system 
possess mutually re-inforcing tendencies through which a complementary expansion can 
theoretically continue indefinitely.
The key to understanding this argument rests in Young’s theory of money, his main 
research interest from 1920 to his death in 1929, since it is money rather than price 
which functions as the mediator between the complementary patterns of production and 
consumption. He believed that money, through the flow of bank credits, provided 
"precision and determinateness" to the economy (Mehrling 1994:5). Young attempted 
to formalize this belief by building a new monetary theory from the theory of banking, 
the manuscripts of which have unfortunately been lost. As a result, one must not fall 
prey to the temptation to complete Young’s theoretical model of the economic process 
by imposing one’s own monetary bias, especially when such components possess a
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distinctively different philosophical perspective (e.g., a Keynesian model based on 
national income accounts which lack the heterogeneity of a monetary theory based on the 
dynamic interplay of individual banking operations).
One can summarize the contributions of Young’s article with three main points. 
The first involves his choice of analytic perspective, in that the individual firms and 
industries which compose the economic process need to be seen as an interrelated whole 
for an integral understanding of increasing returns. Within this division-of-labor for the 
economy as a whole, indirect methods of production are the foremost manifestation of 
increasing returns. Second, the complementary co-dependence between the division-of- 
labor and extent-of-the-market is re-instated as the fundamental constraint on the 
progressive evolution of the economic system. Last, through such circular relationships, 
the possibility that economic progress can occur endogenously in the absence of novel 
productive methods, new resources, or population growth is put forward as a viable 
theoretical possibility.
A Bifurcation Point in the History of Economic Thought
Is it appropriate to call the Increasing Returns debates a bifurcation point in 
economic theory? To the extent that the two methods of approaching economic analysis 
which dueled within the Increasing Returns debates were both viable alternatives which 
appeared to be mutually exclusive, perhaps it is. This apparent exclusiveness can be 
established in two different ways when coupled with a philosophical assumption
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concerning the ability to reduce all phenomena to their constituent parts without doing 
damage to a concept of the whole (the host of ideas which accompanied the methodology 
of positive economics). First, these two methods analyze the system at different levels. 
Whereas the work that stemmed from Sraffa’s 1926 piece concentrated on the level of 
the firm, Young was concerned with the economy as a whole. Second, these two groups 
proposed different concepts of change. The first group utilized an equilibrium analysis, 
while Young and Robertson used a process analysis. Although Kondratieff contended 
that static and dynamic concepts are complementary but not reducible to one another, this 
irreducibility was not appreciated and frequently explicitly denied.
While neither Young nor Sraffa openly criticized the other’s perspective, they both 
recognized the problems associated with restricting the increasing returns notion to the 
level of the firm. Sraffa fought this tendency on its own terms by contending that there 
exist interdependencies which make partial analysis flawed while Young chose to reject 
the appropriateness of this perspective outright. Young did not believe that increasing 
returns are completely absent from the level of the firm, but contended that their most 
important aspects are not amenable to this level of analysis. However, the emergence 
of imperfect competition allayed Sraffa’s criticisms by reconciling increasing returns with 
some sense of competition. In doing this, he appeared to solve the dilemma and thereby 
legitimated a tendency to focus on the firm, a focus which was further buttressed by a 
more rigorous theory of perfect competition. Robertson’s attempt to keep a process- 
oriented approach alive at the level of the firm was doomed since he failed to see the 
need for a hierarchical nesting of concepts which provide the ground for such
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evolutionary arguments within an arena of logical consistency. By trying to work within 
a single level, he crippled his own theoretical position.
Why was Young’s work ignored by the profession? There are a few obvious 
historical reasons. First of all, Young died from pneumonia within a year of writing his 
1928 article. He was therefore not able to bolster, refine, or extend his argument. If 
one notes that the ideas he proposed were "not understood even by professional 
economists of the day" (Blitch 1990:453), this fact takes on real significance. Another 
factor is simply the theoretical success of the other lines of economic inquiry. Robinson 
and Chamberlin’s work set off a flurry of activity. To the extent that advances are made 
in proportion to the amount of attention given to a specific field, a positive circularity 
is established and advances lead to progress which, in turn, leads to greater attention.
Whereas delusions concerning physical reality are checked as soon as one attempts 
to fly off a bridge, delusions concerning social reality are more easily self-perpetuated 
and less quickly rebutted (present author included). This theoretical expansion was 
therefore self-reinforcing until critical junctures surface, either theoretical snags or 
empirical discrepancies, which impede the continued unfolding. The third and perhaps 
most notable event is the Great Depression. Professional attention was drawn towards 
explaining this problem and Keynes’ General Theory was released in 1936. In the wake 
of the Keynesian Revolution, there arose a split in economics between the fields of macro 
and microeconomics. Therefore, Young’s analysis could be simply dismissed as a 
contribution to this former field, rather than one having much broader and explicitly 
distinct implications. For example, the explicit focus on failures of effective demand
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within the macroeconomy abstracted away from the heterogeneous process of endogenous 
growth and decay also found within Young’s ideas. It is not until Nicholas Kaldor 
brought some of Young’s ideas into a Keynesian framework that they received significant 
attention.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TRANSITION TO CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THEORY
Following the debates of the 1920’s, not only were Marshall’s evolutionary and 
biological proclivities dismissed, but even the very possibility of increasing returns was 
removed from certain topics of mainstream economics (e.g., general equilibrium theoiy). 
Hahn and Matthews (1964:833) speculated that it was the inability to logically reconcile 
increasing returns with a theory of value based on exchange, in the wake of Sraffa’s 1926 
criticisms, that explains why the concept of increasing returns received so little attention 
within economic literature during the 40’s and SO’s. And due to this historical neglect 
by the field as a whole, most economists were able to shy away from exploring the full 
implications of such a concept with a clean conscience.
However, if the economy does have such an evolutionary dimension and if 
economists were actually searching for an accurate representation of the economy, it 
would make sense that this element would continually creep back into economic 
theory.65 Although the evolutionary paradigm apparently disappeared from mainstream 
economics, one could argue that it merely remained dormant within the Keynesian system 
through the multiplier-accelerator relationship which represents the first formal 
embodiment of a complementary circularity in economic theory. However, while
45 From such a perspective, attempts to eradicate the evolutionary dimension are equivalent to trying 
to empty the sea of its water by transferring buckets of water into mountain streams.
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Keynes’ savings-investment multiplier received the most attention, the foreign trade
multiplier which sits at the core of many cumulative causation models of economic
development (originally developed by Hicks 1950, and extended by Kaldor 1955, 1957,
1967, 1968), was given relatively little attention by mainstream economics. These two
multipliers were used to explain different economic phenomena: stagnation and
prosperity. Kaldor (1975:354) commented that,
... it may have been unfortunate that the very success of Keynes’s ideas in 
explaining underemployment in a depression—essentially a short-period analysis- 
diverted attention from the ‘foreign trade multiplier,’ which over longer periods 
is a far more important principle for explaining the growth and rhythm of 
industrial development.
The circularity between the division-of-labor and extent-of-the-market which had been
passed down from Smith to Young can be seen as the general phenomena to which this
language of multipliers is applied. The similarity of these theoretical currents pose
several fundamental questions for economic theory. Are economic stagnation and
prosperity merely theoretical inversions of one another? Or is it that the principles of
growth and decay share similar structural relationships?
The next three sections present different threads of economic theory which shared 
a common ancestry in evolutionary theorizing characterized by their attempts to 
understand both stagnation and prosperity from an evolutionary perspective. These 
theoretical models frequently extended the realm of variables in order to include 
complementary circularities which were not included in conventional economic theory. 
Of additional interest is the fact that the Increasing Returns debates empowered a 
dominant equilibrium methodology which was antithetical to evolutionary theoretic
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approaches. As a result, all of the theorists presented in the following sections have felt 
the need to actively criticize this equilibrium theoretic bias. Even though the 
evolutionary perspective may not have been extremely well formulated in their minds, 
these theorists knew what they did not believe. Their criticisms may even attest to the 
bifurcation in economic theory hypothesized earlier in this dissertation.
The first critic discussed here is Gunnar Myrdal. Not only did Myrdal explicitly 
use concepts of "circular and cumulative causation" to address the problems of economic 
development and race relations, he also has a sincere appreciation of the methodological 
dilemmas intrinsic to socio-economic theorizing. As a result, he embedded his theories 
of complementary co-dependent relations within divergent co-dependent relations that 
possessed a tangible psycho-social dimension.
The second section presents the ideas of Lord Nicholas Kaldor on economic growth 
and uneven development. His work used Young’s 1928 essay, Myrdal’s "circular and 
cumulative causation" concept, and Keynesian theories of investment to model the 
economy as a "continually evolving system whose path cannot be predicted any more 
than the evolution of an ecological system in biology" (Kaldor 1985:12). His models are 
some of the most complete within the theoretical lineage of evolutionary thinking laid out 
by this dissertation. A significant feature of Kaldor’s writings is his initial attempts to 
formalize his thoughts through mathematics and then his subsequent retreat to a literary 
presentations in his later works.
The last section of this chapter presents the accepted notion of what evolutionary 
economics is and the incorporation of an explicitly hierarchical perspective. This is
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augmented by some formal mathematical models of increasing returns phenomena (Arthur 
1989) which highlight the unique characteristics of such systemic relations relative to 
systems which embody the conventional equilibrium assumptions. Not only does this last 
section stand as a testament to the growing awareness and attention being directed 
towards the evolutionary paradigm, it also demonstrates a growing ability to formally 
embody such ideas by employing contemporary mathematical models.
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Gunnar Mvrdal
Gunnar Myrdal’s credentials are not as well established in economics as the 
theorists presented previously in this dissertation. In fact, Myrdal is considered by many 
economists to have done the work of a sociologist even though he shared the 1974 Nobel 
Prize for economics with F.A. Hayek and was honored as one of ten "pioneers" in 
economic development by the World Bank. Part of the reason for this lack of 
professional standing is his emphasis on institutions, attitudes, and political atmosphere 
in conjunction with his explicit rejection of equilibrium assumptions. As a result, his 
theories have exerted only a minimal influence on mainstream economic thought. In 
contrast, Myrdal’s ideas are highly respected in the other social sciences. For example, 
he was cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in the historic Brown vs. Board of Education 
case of 1954 as a "modem authority" on race relations (Southern 1981), and was 
awarded the 1975 Bronislaw Malinowski award in Applied Anthropology.
With respect to real world experience, Myrdal was politically active in his home 
country of Sweden and served as the executive secretary of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) from 1947-1957. His theories of economic development 
were formulated during this time at the U.N. (Myrdal 1956, 1957) and founded on an 
intimate acquaintance with developing regions and their problems. As the executive 
secretary of the ECE, Myrdal was given the opportunity to travel frequently to South 
Asia and was in frequent contact with other U.N. Commissions for Asia and Latin
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America. His two major case studies, the analysis of race relations in the United States 
(Myrdal 1944a, 1944b) and economic development in South Asia (Myrdal 1968), embody 
a clear methodological position which he continually refined and applied throughout his 
career.
Although Myrdal started out as a neoclassical theorist, he soon came to the 
conclusion that the tools of conventional theory were inadequate for the study of social 
phenomena. He therefore chose to develop alternative tools while concurrently holding 
to the belief that his ideas were an extrapolation of the spirit of his conventional training. 
Two main facets of Gunnar Myrdal’s writings will be explored in this section. The first 
involves his commitment to making values explicit in economic analysis. His work along 
these lines is very similar to contemporary- work in the sociology of knowledge and 
postmodern philosophy, although he demonstrates modernist leanings with respect to his 
expectations concerning the power of human reason. The second theme is Myrdal’s 
notion of circular and cumulative causation. These ideas first appeared in a footnote to 
Monetary Equilibrium (1939), but were not developed fully until he wrote An American 
Dilemma (1944a, 1944b). Kapp (1976:217) held Myrdal’s concept of circular and 
cumulative causation in such high esteem that he placed it at the "core of Institutional 
economics" and claimed that although similar ideas were implicit in the works of 
Malthus, Thunen, Marx, Veblen, and Wicksell, it was Myrdal who developed them in 
a systematic way.
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Embedded Theoretical Perspectives66
Myrdal believed that answers to problems should never be limited to using only the 
variables within established disciplinary boundaries. Rather, the problem itself should 
dictate which factors are relevant and which ones irrelevant to one’s understanding. He 
stated,
... in reality there are no economic, sociological, or psychological problems, but 
just problems, and they are all mixed and composite. Our separate disciplines 
in the social sciences had come into existence only to serve the convenience of 
specializations in research and teaching. They had no logical justification, only 
a practical one ... In dealing with a problem, it could never be a legitimate 
excuse that certain facts or causal relations between facts lay outside one’s own 
field of knowledge. (Myrdal 1975:327)
Many of the problems that Myrdal was concerned with, e.g. economic development and
race relations, required the inclusion of variables which were normally shunned by
economic theory. When addressing problems such as these, he believed that the
empirical boundaries for economic theory should be the "total cultural situation" which
includes "practically all human relations" (Myrdal 1975:327-328).67 Along these lines,
his criticism of mainstream economic theory was not a critique of abstraction, but that
irrelevant variables are selected and relevant ones ignored (Streeten 1992).
One reason why it is important to fit the discipline to the problem rather than vice
versa involves endogenous change. Although the economic process has evolved into
“  The information in the following three sections of this chapter have been repeatedly stated by Myrdal 
(1956, 1964, 1969, 1973). In addition, a wealth of insight from Dykema (1986), which is based on his 
1984 dissertation entitled 'Methodology and Scope in Gunnar Myrdal’s Economics," has been liberally 
drawn from.
47 The one exception to this rule was the imposed exogeneity of government policy, which was 
consciously done to 'preserve a freedom for development planning* (Myrdal 1975:328).
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greater levels of complexity, theories of such change have eluded us. For example, 
formal theories of economic development must frequently appeal to changes in exogenous 
variable (e.g., technology or population growth) to simulate development within the 
model. One possible explanation for this lack of endogenous change within economic 
models is that important circularities have been amputated due to a sectarian proclivity 
to include only economic variables. When non-economic variables which complete a 
circularity are included, progressive or degenerative change may emerge within the 
theoretical model. For example, Myrdal believed that democracy and political freedom 
along with education are key components to economic development in this sense. If one 
is interested in evolutionary change, then the inclusion of previously excluded variables 
which serve to complete a causal loop and thereby endogenize change becomes a 
methodological criteria for ‘good’ evolutionary theory.
Myrdal believed that conventional economists work with narrowly closed models 
that limit their analysis to too few conditions. By restricting this list of variables even 
further to those that can be quantified, it becomes possible to use impressive 
mathematical models. Although this "sharp restriction of vision" should require a clear 
statement of abstractive assumptions made, such a disclaimer is usually not forthcoming 
and frequently "not even consciously perceived" as being necessary (Myrdal 1982:314). 
As a result, these theoretical models become more and more removed from the empirical 
reality they are attempting to understand. It is not that Myrdal is hostile to models and 
theories, but that he wants:
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the models and theories - regularly conceived by us as systems of questions that 
are logically integrated to the empirical reality around us - to be more adequate 
to this reality. (Myrdal 1982:315)
This lack of concordance with reality led Myrdal to predict that Institutional economics
was "destined to gain ground at the expense of conventional economics" in order to deal
effectively with practical and political problems. Furthermore, he believed that much of
"present establishment economics, and in particular those very abstract theoretical
constructs that up till now have enjoyed highest prestige among economists," will be "left
by the wayside as irrelevant and uninteresting" (Myrdal 1982:315-316).
While Myrdal believed that theoretical modelling should explicitly include cultural
variables in order to accurately represent the economic process, he also held the more
radical belief that the cultural conditioning of the theorist lays hidden within the
theoretical model itself.69 This cultural conditioning manifests itself in an individual’s
values and ideals which form the foundation of their particular theoretical viewpoint.
And, it is the theoretical viewpoint (e.g., the equilibrium bias) which not only directs the
questions asked, but also determines which questions are deemed legitimate.69 In this
way, an initial structure for the answers is provided. This co-dependence between theory
and revealed fact is captured in the following quote:
Scientific knowledge never emerges by itself, so to speak, from empirical 
research in the raw, but only as solutions to problems raised ... Theory,
68 He commented, ‘Biases in research are much deeper seated than in the formulation of avowedly 
practical conclusions. They are not valuations attached to research but rather they permeate research* 
(Myrdal 1962:1043, emphasis in original).
69 A wonderful discussion of the values implicit within the equilibrium viewpoint can be found in 
‘Appendix 2: A Methodological note on facts and valuations in social science’ of Myrdal’s American 
Dilemma.
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therefore, must always be a priori to the empirical observations of the facts. 
Facts come to mean something only as ascertained and organized in the frame 
of a theory. Indeed, facts have no existence as part of scientific knowledge 
outside such a frame. Questions must be asked before answers can be obtained 
and, in order to make sense, the questions must be part of a logically co­
ordinated attempt to understand social reality as a whole. (Myrdal 1957:164)70
The importance of values/ideals is that they provide this a priori theoretical viewpoint 
from which the perceptual unfolding of reality proceeds. In summary, our perceptions 
are flavored by our theories, as our theories are flavored by our values.
Focusing on the interaction between theory and revealed fact, it is this co­
dependent relationship that forms the logical crux of science, since science,
assumes in all its endeavors an a priori but its ambitions must constantly be to 
find an empirical basis for this a priori. (Myrdal 1957:167)
Streeten (1958:xi) has characterized Myrdal’s beliefs in an evolutionary sense as,
the continual encounter - sometimes constructive, sometimes destructive - 
between the a priori and the a posteriori, between vision and experience, in 
which each, in the process of shaping the other, is itself shaped by it.71
The fact that this continual encounter can be either constructive or destructive recognizes
the fact that this co-dependence between fact and theory is not a complete symbiosis.
Myrdal believed that although theory is a priori, facts are sovereign. Theory is merely
a hypothesis whose criterion for truth is its effectiveness in bringing our observations of
facts into a meaningful and noncontradictory system of knowledge (Myrdal 1957:165).
79 It has been contended by Dykema (1986) that Myrdal literally meant that there is nothing to ‘see’ 
in the absence of a priori conceptual structures used to make sense out of chaos. For example, Myrdal 
(1944b: 1057) commented that 'scientific facts do not exist per se, waiting for scientists to discover them," 
but that they are a "construction, abstracted out of a complex and interwoven reality." Furthermore, 
Myrdal (1953:240) was fond of quoting a friend's comment that, "without valuations we have no interest, 
no sense of relevance or of significance and, consequently, no object..."
71 See also Myrdal (1967:36).
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
How do facts exercise this sovereignty? If a theory is composed of "inadequate 
categories," Myrdal believed that the facts will "kick” and that scientists will thereby 
know that their theories are somehow misspecified. In this manner, there is a self- 
healing capacity within scientific research (Myrdal 1973:146). It should be noted that 
Myrdal differed significantly from the contemporary sociology and psychology of 
knowledge schools of his day. Although these details cannot be explored in detail here, 
suffice it to say that Myrdal emphasized the conscious choice o f viewpoint rather than a 
difference due to observer’s being "children of different times and place," and that he 
had confidence that "every researcher is fully rational ... if only he wants to be" (see 
Dykema 1986:148). This inherent potential for scientific rationality, in coordination with 
sovereign facts, is then used to uncover the unconscious biases which have become 
lodged within our inherited viewpoints. In opposition to these ideas, Myrdal believed 
that people were frequently guilty of being opportunistically ignorant.
Myrdal qualified this circularity between fact and theory by making a clear 
distinction between the natural and social sciences. For example, while theoretical 
conflicts between competing theories within the natural sciences usually result in one 
theory being refuted (e.g., the Copemican concept of the universe, Newtonian physics, 
or the phlogiston theory in chemistry), the same cannot be said of the social sciences. 
Conflicting theories may actually co-exist in the social sciences, and the advance of social 
research does not usually result in new and more commonly accepted knowledge. 
Myrdal’s explanation for this persistent lack of theoretical clarity and progress within the 
social sciences has two facets: (1) Social research is more dependent upon value premises
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than the natural sciences. (2) Social scientists have ignored this fact and attempted to 
present their findings as factual and independent of valuations.
In order to address these two points, it is important to note that Myrdal
(1944b: 1047) distinguished between beliefs and valuations.
A person’s beliefs, that is, his knowledge, can be objectively judged to be true 
or false and more or less complete. His valuations - that a social situation or 
relation is, or was, "just," "right," "fair," "desirable," or the opposite, in some 
degree or intensity or other - cannot be judged by such objective standards as 
science provides.
While there are close similarities between these thoughts and the conventional 
positive/normative distinction, there is also a distinct difference. Whereas Myrdal used 
this dichotomous classification to highlight a dialectic truth, conventional economics has 
reified these two poles and privileged value-free over value-laden theory. Once Myrdal 
realized that such a clean positive/normative separation was a naive and impossible 
dream, he began to express the belief that value premises should be explicitly declared. 
He came to realize that all scientific work, and more generally any viewpoint adopted 
or question raised, involves valuations. When valuations are not made explicit, they do 
not cease to be active but rather are merely concealed. In this manner they constitute "a 
fraud, even though an unconscious one" (Myrdal 1956:337). For example, Myrdal 
(1978:777) believed that contemporary welfare theory sought to "conceal and forget" that 
its foundations are founded on a "now obsolete moral philosophy and an even equally 
obsolete hedonistic psychology." Such selective amnesia allows welfare economics to 
appear to be outside the domain of morality and values.
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Whereas the valuations in the field of natural phenomena are "simple, evident, and 
so mostly a priori," valuations in the social sciences are "immensely diversified and 
anything but self-evident" (Myrdal 1973:147). What does it mean to say that values are 
more a priori in one field than in another? Myrdal would contend that the ends or 
objectives of the natural sciences are more easily identified and defined within the 
scientific process than the ends of the social sciences. For example, medical science may 
aim at the prolongation of life through the proactive prevention or the reactive response 
to disease. Although the choice between the different means to achieving the 
prolongation of life may involve a more explicit valuational dimension, the objective 
itself is definitive. In contrast, the ends embodied within the social sciences involve a 
less explicit valuation dimension from the very beginning. For example, the Gross 
National Product (i.e., GNP), which is used to model and index economic growth and 
development, involves implicit valuations concerning the meaning and quality of life 
(Myrdal 1973:Chapter 10). Should one factor in leisure time, household production, 
police protection, natural and biological resources, literacy rates, infant mortality, or 
income distribution, one might ask?
Myrdal’s emphasis on the primacy of value-laden perspectives within the social 
sciences, a term coined by Dykema, has caused at least one economist (Bauer 1959) to 
contend that Myrdal’s methodological position inevitably leads to the destruction of 
economics as a systematic-discipline. This erroneous conclusion is based on the implicit 
assumption that there are an infinite diversity of correct values and hence an infinite
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number of possible co-dependent factual-theoretical composition.72 However, Myrdal 
was definitely not contending that all values and all theories are equally valid. Nor was 
he expressing the view that there is no common ground between individuals from which 
shared values and theories can emerge. Instead, his comments are a pointed rejection 
of the entrenched opinion that theories can be independent of values. Although Myrdal 
had made qualifications to the extent that all values were not equally valid, conclusions 
such as Bauer’s may have been what led him to make an explicit list of criteria for 
acceptable value premises in the social sciences (Myrdal 1967: Chapter 13 and 14). 
First, they should be explicitly stated, specific and concrete in terms of factual 
knowledge, and purposefully selected.73 In addition, value premises must be founded 
on actual experience and it is this requirement of "realism" within a subjective world 
which Myrdal felt was "the main reason for difficulties." Furthermore, it should be 
consciously recognized that the particular set of values chosen have been given a 
strategically favorable position within one’s research (Myrdal 1962:1063,1967:71). And 
lastly, once a set of values has been accepted, they should remain hypothetical and 
subject to revision.
The actual choice of perspective emerges from a theorist’s personal ideals for 
human existence and from an examination of what other people actually desire. 
However, since peoples’ desires are "to some extent regularly founded on erroneous
12 This argument aligns Myrdal with a radical postmodern stance. However, it is evident from his 
work (e.g., Myrdal 1967:Chapter IS) that his ideas have a greater affinity with those of Thomas Kuhn and 
the sociology of knowledge or even Habermas (see Dykema 1986; Peltier 1992).
73 This last quality introduces a volitional element to research.
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beliefs about facts and causal relations," the correct value premises which reflect what
people "would desire if their knowledge about the world around them were more perfect"
is relevant for Myrdal (1956:336). While this belief obviously reflects Myrdal’s
exposure to racism, it introduces an obvious difficulty. Who is to play Philosopher King
and dictate the "more perfect" knowledge of the world from which values can be judged?
Myrdal escapes this snare by positing a hierarchy of human valuation in which the
‘higher’ values are by definition in greater concordance with reality (i.e., informed by
a full and accurate knowledge of the facts). As Dykema (1986:153) stated, for Myrdal:
The common man is caught up in the environmental web, but MAN, epitomized 
by Western, Enlightened, social scientist MAN, is the agent that stands outside 
of the underdeveloped environment and can thus function as its savior.
It is from this angle that Myrdal has been openly criticized for imputing Western values
to developing countries (e.g., South Asia) and for assuming that the rational foundations
of Enlightenment reasoning are the singular basis for a human ideal of rationality (e.g.,
Goonatillake 1978).
However, Myrdal’s ideas are more refined than they might appear to be after a 
quick glance due to his emphasis on the conscious act of choosing a viewpoint and the 
necessity of neutralizing the unconscious biases embedded within this perspectives. He 
demonstrated a touch of Rousseau in his belief that biased viewpoints are not inherent 
to human understanding, but are due to "social institutions and to opportunistic ignorance 
when living in them" (Myrdal 1957:301). His confidence in the power of human 
rationality and the belief that every researcher is "fully rational and in control at all 
times" allowed Myrdal to avoid many sticky philosophical issues by preserving the
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possibility for scientific consensus (Dykema 1986:148). This modernist leaning becomes
much more pronounced from this point forward in Myrdal’s methodology.
Once an ideal has been chosen, it becomes possible to prescribe policy since the
ideal establishes a criterion by which different means to achieve this ideal can be judged.
Reality is always studied from the viewpoint of the ideal. The practical problem 
is how - by what policy changes - reality can be made to approach the ideal. It 
is recognized that reality is very far from the ideal. In this situation a move 
towards the ideal is assumed to be desirable, while a move away from the ideal 
is undesirable. (Myrdal 1956:12)
For example, the recognition that the price mechanism serves to reflect society’s values
and influence socio-economic behavior, coupled with an explicit declaration of society’s
ideals and scientific insight (e.g., with respect to environmentally sustainable
development), would allow an economist to judge the appropriateness of this incentive
structure for achieving our stated ideals. Without the clear declaration of what one
wishes to achieve, it is impossible to say whether progress is ever being made. The lack
of an explicit ideal does not mean that society will not change, but merely that it will
lack vision and purpose as a whole.
Equality of Opportunity as an Ideal
Based on this discussion, it is obviously important to identify Myrdal’s ideals which 
are based on a "more perfect" knowledge of the world. Lalonde (1992) epitomized these
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ideals using the motto of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity.74 The 
two terms that Myrdal himself used were "economic integration" and "democracy." 
What is economic integration? It is not merely the connection of different economic 
processes but also their synthesis through "the realization of the old Western Ideal of 
equality of opportunity" (Myrdal 1956:11-12). Myrdal defined equality of opportunity 
as,
the loosening of social rigidities which prevent individuals from choosing freely 
the conditions of their work and life. The economy is not integrated unless all 
avenues are open to everybody and the remunerations paid for productive 
services are equal, regardless of racial, social, and cultural differences. (Myrdal 
1956:11)
However, it is not only the freedom to make such choices but also the power to exercise
such choice that Myrdal is concerned with. The power to exercise choice emerges from
the co-evolution of economic prosperity and political democracy.
... only under democratic rule will people’s innermost strivings be protected and 
a basis laid for attaining the distant goal of a ‘free world’ of liberty, equality, 
and brotherhood, and, therefore, peace. (Myrdal 1956:176)
Although Myrdal believed that economic prosperity and political democracy are
intimately related by logical necessity, the realization of social reform and democratic
ideals emerged "almost as a incidental by-product of the rising levels of productivity and
income" which were experienced by Western countries during their development (Myrdal
1956:20). While democracy had historically emerged in these countries via the
individual’s quest for personal expression (which Myrdal coined a "one man, one gun"
14 It is tangential, but very interesting, to note that this motto, which is proudly displayed on French
coins, was changed during the German occupation of France during World War II. It was changed to
travail, famille, patrie (i.e., work, family, and fatherland). This change represents a shift in meaning from
an expansive to an introverted view and provides a vivid contrast for Myrdal's ideals.
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mentality), recent advances in both warfare and mass communication technologies have 
destroyed the simplicity of this possibility (Myrdal 1956:325). As a result, undeveloped 
countries face distinctly different challenges than the currently developed countries faced, 
and theoretical models of the latter’s development will shed only limited light on the 
former’s.75
Since these ideals that Myrdal aspired to are so far ahead of world realities, he
acknowledged that it is a faith  In democracy and equality of opportunity which is the
ultimate source of his inspiration.
Only when all these underprivileged nations, with their great multitudes of 
peoples with different facial features, color of skin, religions, folklores, and 
cultural heritages, have risen to equality of opportunity will the world become 
integrated. Faith in this principle is the real content of our value premise. 
(Myrdal 1956:320)
The recognition that faith is the ultimate basis on which his ideals rest is a heroic 
confession for a scientist to make: it is heroic because it is both a conscious acceptance 
of uncertainty and ignorance in addition to being an explicit statement concerning how 
he sees the world. However, Myrdal does not seem to believe that this faith is a blind 
faith, untethered to reality, but one based on a rational extrapolation of his own 
experiences.
73 Myrdal did not believe that the free play of market forces, in isolation, would be able to achieve any 
significant improvement in the equality of opportunity. Instead, he believed that it is necessary to institute 
policies which 'cut right across market forces* (Myrdal 1956:13). In support of this view, he noted that 
the United State made positive steps towards achieving greater equality among its citizens not through the
'unhampered operation of an automatic price mechanism and abstention from discriminatory interventions 
on the part of the state and other collective units of the community,” but through a conscious 'political and 
social process aimed at organizing, controlling, and changing the conditions for the functioning of the price 
mechanism ... determined largely by the ideal... of achieving an ever-greater equality of opportunity for 
all their citizens* (Myrdal 1956:119).
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The importance of ideals is that they guide action. The belief that "history is man- 
made and never a blind destiny, determined in advance" gave Myrdal the strength to 
continue with his work even when he found it "impossible to end with any other 
conclusion than that, short of a number of near-miracles, few underdeveloped countries 
will succeed in attaining their [Myrdal’s] essential goals" (Myrdal 1956:314). This 
already pessimistic outlook darkened as Myrdal came to realize the social inertia existing 
within underdeveloped countries and the widespread corruption in many of their 
governments (Myrdal 1984). Social institutions may reproduce inherent social values 
which complement a limited ideal (e.g., caste or national allegiance) and thereby preserve 
the status quo institutional context and limit the realization of ‘higher’ ideals (e.g., 
equality of opportunity or peace). In this way, these institutions will engender the 
preservation of the socio-economic status quo rather than its transcendence. However, 
this self-reinforced stagnation can be converted into a process of progressive development 
if society shifts from limited to more expansive social ideals (e.g., away from caste 
relations and towards equality of opportunity). Figure 18 represents this relation in a- 
causal diagram.









Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Myrdal believed that small changes in the socio-economic process hold much greater 
potential than commonly realized due to these endogenous relations which can create a 
self-reinforcing spiral of social progress. It is towards these ideas on circular causality 
that this dissertation now turns.
Circular and Cumulative Causality
The genesis of Myrdal’s circular and cumulative causation ideas began with his 
rejection of the conventional assumption that social systems reside in a state of stable 
equilibrium and that shifts in this position are simply the impact of exogenous shocks. 
Instead, he chose to accept the possibility of both stable and unstable states of balance. 
For example, a pencil can theoretically be placed on its tip, eraser up in the air, and 
balanced in a state of equilibrium. However, any perturbation to this state of balance 
will cause the pencil to fall. It was Myrdal’s belief that there exists an interrelatedness 
within the socio-economic process which engenders instability. The idea of cumulative 
effects refers to the fact that change within this interrelated pattern of complementary 
elements will reinforce itself: an initial change in a single facet of the social pattern can 
thereby have ramifications on the whole social process which appear to be quite out of 
proportion to the magnitude of the initial change. These ideas challenged (1) the 
common acceptance of equilibrium as the ’natural’ state of things and (2) the belief that 
small changes have small effects while large changes have large effect.76
76 The latter idea has recently fallen prey to research into the dynamic behavior of chaotic and path 
dependent systems while the former has been a topic of discussion albeit without any formal resolutions.
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In fact, the social process was seen to be in constant flux, with "no equilibrium in 
sight" (Myrdal 1978:774). As witnessed by his repeated and varied appeal to circular 
and cumulative causation, Myrdal believed that it was a pervasive and predominant 
characteristic of social processes in general. Although his expression of these concepts 
would remain verbal throughout his career, he did identify three characteristics which 
could be used to identify circular and cumulative relations (Myrdal 1974, 1975). First, 
he explicitly stated that they are those relationships in which an initial change in one 
condition results in the secondary changes of other conditions which proceed in the same 
direction. Although this rules out equilibrium relations from consideration, it includes 
both complementary and divergent relations of the co-dependent and adjustment 
variety.77 Second, whether a change of one condition is going upwards or downwards 
must be determined from the point of view of whether it contributes to a movement 
towards or away from our ideal (e.g., economic integration and democracy). This serves 
to definitively sign the circular relations and highlights the role of values in providing the 
poles of judgement. Last, even though the positive or negative signs of the causal 
interrelations between the elements of these socio-economic circularities may be known, 
the actual coefficients are not known with certainty and our knowledge of them will 
remain "utterly imprecise."78
77 This was not initially appreciated by Myrdal, and formed the basis of Swan’s (1962) criticism of his 
concept of circular and cumulative causation.
78 My initial attempts to formulate a formal simulation model of Myrdal’s theories fell prey to this 
point. However, with the proper computer simulation software and hardware, it is possible to ‘fit’ the 
dynamic behavior of a simulation model to socio-economic time series data. Towards this end, Clark, 
Perez-Trejo, and Allen (199S: 123) distinguish between two types of simulation variables: (1) Substantive 
Variables for which actual data are available (e.g., initial conditions) and (2) Intermediary Variables that 
represent the simulation models internal logic rather than actual empirical quantities. Within this
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While obvious similarities exist between Myrdal’s concept of circular and 
cumulative causation and General Systems Theory, it does not appear that he was aware 
of the latter’s existence. In addition, Swan (1962) criticized Myrdal on the grounds that 
his ideas were not refined enough and therefore gave an oversimplified account of the 
endogenous relations within social relations. One is led to wonder why Myrdal did not 
refine the methodology of his conceptual framework further or search out similar 
approaches? Although I can offer no explanation for the latter part of this question, there 
are two possible answers to the first. First, Myrdal (1984) expressed the feeling that he 
merely repeated his arguments over and over again with little alterations. The ideas he 
did propose, however simple they may be, were not listened to by the vast majority of 
the economic profession anyway. Why complicate a story that no one listens to? 
Second, if no one acknowledges your theoretical ideas, you spend your time collecting 
data which you believe "fits" into this framework. Even though you may lack the tools 
required to bridge this gap between fact and theory, a time may come in the future when 
these case studies will be invaluable to researchers (e.g., Myrdal 1944a, 1944b, 1968). 
One thereby builds up a storehouse of revealed facts from a distinctly non-neoclassical 
perspective.79
These case studies would consist of generalizations since precise information was 
seldom, if ever, available for the "coefficients of interrelation." Myrdal (1978:775) 
commented that,
framework for analysis, Myrdal’s caveat remains untarnished.
79 It is significant that Marshall’s Industry and Trade represented a similar turn towards case studies 
and away from theoretical speculation.
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our analysis of development problems often must end in tentative generalizations 
and mere plausible hypotheses, built upon limited observations, discernment, and 
conjectural judgements ... the widening of the perspective, implied in this 
institutional approach, will regularly destroy the neat simplicity of both analysis 
and conclusions in conventional economics.
Kapp (1976) shared Myrdal’s viewpoint but expanded this general pessimism to explicitly
include the inability to capture such complex causal relations within a manageable
mathematical formulation. Although I would tend to agree that the precise coefficients
of interrelation may eternally evade our grasp, a system’s dynamic behavior does not
defy our current technical ability to embody such theories within a formal computer
simulation model. The continuing rise of affordable and powerful computers has made
simulation a viable option, something not as readily feasible in the SO’s, 60’s, and 70’s
(e.g., Costanza and Maxwell 1991). Computer simulation models have already been
proposed as a technique for socio-economic modeling along Institutional lines (Radzicki
1988, 1993; Carrier 1992).80 However, the current chapter is concerned with the actual
embodiment of these circular and cumulative causation ideas within Myrdal’s thought and
therefore turns to the manifestation of these relations within his socio-economic research.
Self-Reinforcing Prejudice. A simplified version of the argument in An American 
Dilemma (1944a, 1944b) will serve as a nice example of Myrdal’s theory of circular and 
cumulative causation.
n A caveat is in order since computer simulation techniques will need to make substantial advances 
with respect to bridging the gap between playful simulation programs that are easily accessible to users and 
the calibration and arraying tools necessary for serious social science use. The juxtaposition of straight­
forward theoretical models and complex formal techniques is demonstrated in Clark, Perez-Trejo, and Allen 
(1995) and Costanza, et. al. (1991).
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In its simplest form the explanatory model can be reduced to two factors: ‘white 
prejudice, ’ causing discrimination against the Negroes in various respects, and 
the ‘low plane of living’ of the Negro population. These two factors are mutually 
interrelated: the Negroes’ low plane of living is kept down by discrimination 
from the whites while, on the other side, the Negroes’ poverty, ignorance, 
superstition, slum dwellings, health deficiencies, dirty appearance, bad odor, 
disorderly conduct, unstable family relations and criminality stimulate and feed 
the antipathy of the whites for Negroes ... White prejudice and low Negro 
standards thus mutually cause each other. (Myrdal 1957:16-17)
Myrdal viewed this set of positively related characteristics, i.e. health, education, family
relations, etc., to form some sort of plane o f living matrix. It was recognized that there
may be temporal delays, inertia, and therefore possibly no immediate response within the
changing interrelations between these variables, but he believed that they generally move
together. This plane of living matrix finds itself in a divergent relationship with white
prejudice. One could postulate a causal diagram as follows:
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This concept of a plane of living index which is negatively related to a psycho-social 
variable within a positive loop is used repeatedly in Myrdal’s development work and 
represents a nesting of the individual characteristics of human existence within a socio­
economic context which is similar to the relations Marshall highlighted. The importance 
of these ideas is that they establish a positively related social matrix which impinges upon 
the economy whether explicitly modeled or not, and appear to be used by Myrdal as a 
proxy for equality in the sense that low levels give limited opportunities for economic 
advance. Remember that it is not only the right to economic opportunities, but also the 
ability to exercise this right that Myrdal was concerned with.81
Self-Reinforcing Economic Inequalities. Myrdal spent most of his later years 
writing on the subject of uneven development (1956, 1957, 1960, 1968, 1970, 1973). 
There are two homologous levels of analysis pursued here, one at the national or regional 
level and the other at the international level. Although he frequently limited his analysis 
to national issues, this emphasis served as a stepping stone to international issues and the 
self-proclaimed arena for his thought was humanity as a whole. The method which 
Myrdal used to transition between these levels was to build up the circular causal links
81 See Smith and Welch (1989) for an empirical exploration of the economic progress of African- 
Americans from 1940 through 1980. Based on their data, which are average incomes for racial groups 
categorized by age, it is questionable whether Myrdal’s theories are supported by the data. For example, 
they found that income equality was beginning to occur before both the publication of Myrdal’s 1944 study 
and the passing of Civil Rights laws. One important question is whether this statistical grouping which 
Smith and Welch employed is appropriate for the assessment of Myrdal’s ideas, or whether a more detailed 
geographical categorization (e.g., by neighborhood or city) should have been used.
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of the regional system first and then apply this framework to national and international 
relations through the addition of international trade considerations and currency flows.
The following section shall unfold Myrdal’s theoretical model in a similar manner: 
from a regional/national to a international perspective. The system’s flows are taken as 
trade (products and services), capital (investment), and migration Gabor). Although 
natural resources were included in his writings as primary products which are traded, the 
environment was not given an explicitly distinct role in Myrdal’s model.®2 These factor 
flows represent the throughput from which the cumulative process of economic progress 
feeds. Between interrelated socio-economic regions, it is the relative attraction of the 
developing region in comparison to an underdeveloped region which influences these 
flows. A divergent co-dependent relation was thereby posited to exist between the 
developed and underdeveloped regions, leading to greater development of the former 
region coupled with stagnation or decline in the latter. This endogenous widening of the 
development gap then fuels further development of the developed region. All three of 
the above mentioned flows will continue to favor the region which developed itself first 
through manufacturing, commerce, et cetera.
However, the foundation of Myrdal’s development theory is built around the 
postulate that the social and public infrastructure of a region (i.e., a return to his plane 
o f living concept) are positively related to the process of economic development. For
R The fact that natural resources are not considered as a separate flow is due to Myrdal’s focus on 
development issues. To fully incorporate this fourth flow into his model would have unnecessarily 
expanded his research and hence deflected the thrust of his argument by including the interface of the 
economy with the environment. The stabilizing circularity between the economy and the environment 
would have complicated Myrdal’s conclusions on global development.
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example, a prosperous region is able to invest in public infrastructure such as 
transportation and communication systems. Higher regional income and wealth is also 
assumed to result in more medical care and superior education. In contradistinction to 
developed regions which have moved to more instrumentally based systems of belief, the 
indigenous populations of underdeveloped regions are seen to be, on average, "believers 
in the more primitive variants of religion, sanctioning traditional mores by taboos and 
functional magic, and they would be more superstitious and less rational generally" 
(Myrdal 1957:30). For that matter, the system of valuation in less developed regions 
take on an air of poverty and backwardness to such an extent that they become "less 
susceptible to the experimental and ambitious aspirations of a developing society" 
(Myrdal 1957:30). These variables are believed to be the main influence within the 
complementary co-dependent process of change since they are completely endogenous 
to the system and self-reinforcing.
Figure 20: The Socio-Economic Matrix of Endogenous Co-Dependence
Regional Income
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Like Smith, Myrdal’s initial conditions for development are geographical 
advantages such as natural ports or rivers favoring commerce and the location of coal and 
iron favoring heavy industry. The choice between equally attractive geographical 
locations is viewed as the result of historical accident (Myrdal 1957:27). These initial 
advantages establish the conditions from which the circular and cumulative process of 
increasing internal and external economies provide the continuing drive for economic 
expansion. Within this expansion, there are two simultaneous effects experienced 
between regions. The first Myrdal coined the "backwash effect," and the second, the 
"spread effect" (see Myrdal 1957:26-33). The former are divergent and the latter 
complementary co-dependent relations between regions.
The backwash effect refers to the adverse changes experienced by one region as 
a result of the economic expansion of another spatially proximate region. For example, 
capital will flow into a developing region in response to the greater profitability resulting 
from an increasing demand via larger regional income. Since Myrdal believed that one 
of the reasons for increasing regional incomes is the productivity increases due to an 
expanding production infrastructure, the causal loop becomes circular. The decline of 
the proximate region is conditioned by his belief that investment in the developing region 
may exceed endogenous savings and that the difference could be drawn from other 
regions based on the relative profitability of investment opportunities within the unfolding 
economic process as a whole. The divergent character of this relationship is due to the 
fact that the flow of capital into one country represents its flow from another. The
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following diagram seeks to represent these endogenous relationships within a given 
region.




-  -  * Investment: Private Capital 
Infrastructure





Another backwash effect is worker migration to the developing region which is 
driven by better employment opportunities (see Myrdal 1956: Chapter 7). Since the 
immigrants responding to these economic differentials tend to be working adults, this 
migratory pattern alters the population distributions between regions.83 The relative- 
ratio of working to non-working people in the population (e.g., young children, the 
elderly, and the sick or disabled) therefore decreases where emigration occurs and 
increases where immigration occurs. Since the per capita public infrastructure necessary 
to support this increasing proportion of non-working individuals within the socio­
economic system has increased due to emigration, there will exist a heavier per capita 
public expenditures burden on an underdeveloped country’s government. The alternative,
°  Even 'political" immigrants may show a tendency to be young and relatively healthy adults since the 
elderly and ill may not be able to make the trip frequently required under such conditions.
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of course, is a decline in the per capita level of public infrastructure which would feed 
further socio-economic decline. The following diagram augments the previous diagram 
to reflect these additional causal links.
A third backwash effect involves the terms of trade between regions (See Myrdal 
1956:Chapter 13). Although Myrdal does not appear to propose a concise theoretical 
explanation for the unsatisfactory terms of trade which underdeveloped countries 
experienced, a task left to Kaldor, he considered it an empirical fact that the terms of 
trade favored developed countries. In support of this belief, he cited the findings of a 
United Nations study by Prebisch (1950) that found a downward trend in the prices of 
primary goods which underdeveloped countries export relative to the prices of the 
manufactured goods that they import. Although this could be attributed to low 
productivity and productivity growth rates in underdeveloped regions, Myrdal believed 
that productivity is an endogenous characteristic of the socio-economic system.
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Furthermore, Myrdal was immune to the hypnotic appeal of theoretical rationales for 
free-trade since he believed that developed regions tended to appropriate both the entire 
benefits of their own productivity increases which manifest interregionally through a 
changing terms of trade in addition to the scant productivity increases experienced by the 
underdeveloped regions (Myrdal 1956:232). This ability to appropriate the advantages 
of a changing terms of trade is attributed to population pressures and the existence of 
surplus labor in underdeveloped countries, characteristics which are not shared by 
developed regions. Within the larger pattern of socio-economic relations, these 
advantages fuel economic development by widening their markets through lower costs 
(i.e., primary goods prices relative to, e.g., manufactured consumer electronics) and 
therefore further improvements in the terms of trade. The following diagram shows 
these postulated causal linkages.
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Figure 23: Terms of Trade
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These last four diagrams can be combined into a single diagram (Figure 24 which 
is located on the following page) which represents the complementary socio-economic 
relations within a given region. The one facet that is noticeably absent from this diagram 
is Myrdal’s emphasis on the cultural and traditional beliefs of the region. These 
variables would influence the strength of the circularities which loop through the 
regional-social-infrastructure variable with respect to its overall impact on economic 
development: a more limited social ideal would inhibit these links while a more 
expansive ideal would allow them to feed into the expansion of the economy.
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Figure 24: The Complementary Dimension of Mvrdal’s Socio-Economic Model
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The spread effects represent a centrifugal expansionary momentum, which becomes 
manifest due to the expansion of nearby agricultural and more distant primary product 
markets which feed the process of economic growth in the developing region. These 
expanding subsidiary markets have the potential to set in motion complementary forces 
within their respective regions. The spread effect can therefore be viewed as a sort of 
diffusion effect which is a function of geographic and economic proximity (i.e., direct
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trade relationships). Myrdal also associated spread effects with the general enhancement 
of the various social infrastructure variables influencing human well-being (e.g health, 
education, values, and beliefs) which he believed would naturally spread across regional 
boundaries. Along these lines, Myrdal appears to believe that the allocation of the gains 
from trade are more readily shared intra-nationally as opposed to inter-nationally (due 
to, e.g., a strong bias along ethnic and religious lines). Of special note is the fact that 
the strength of the spread effect increases as a function of increasing development 
(Myrdal 1957:34).84 This allows the backwash effects to be more easily overcome in 
the proximate regions of highly developed areas, thereby resulting in higher development 
rates in these regions. Although spread and backwash effects are generic to all regions, 
the actual coefficients of interrelation may be different between regions due to specific 
historical, cultural, or geographical differences.
Myrdal also mentions a few intra-regional forces, as distinct from the 
aforementioned interregional backwash and spread effects, which can inhibit this 
self-reinforcing development cycle he foresaw. For example, increasing population and 
industry concentrations, inflated and non-competitive prices for productive inputs, the 
existence of large and technically defunct capital stocks, and a tempering of the 
entrepreneurial spirit will all have a negative influence on development (Myrdal 1957:35- 
37). Likewise, there are forces which counteract decline and thereby set a minimum 
level to which socio-economic integration can fall, e.g. the inability of the wage rate to 
fall below subsistence levels of living without triggering a Malthusian population decline.
u This complementary relation between a magnitude (i.e., level of development) and a 1“ order 
derivative (i.e., the strength of the spread effect) represents a higher order functional relationship.
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Expectations, Myrdal believed, play an ambiguous role since they can be either
supportive or countervailing depending upon the situation. He concluded a discussion
of these counteracting forces with the qualification:
Nevertheless, I believe that when main trends over somewhat longer periods are 
under consideration the changes will in the main support each other, and thus 
tend to be cumulative in their net effects. (Myrdal 1957:37)
Myrdal’s analysis of the international economic process is very similar to his 
regional and national analysis up to this point. One addition that he does make is to note 
that migration can be safely ignored as a factor of importance at the international level 
(Myrdal 1957:54). This was based on his belief that while immigration to an 
underdeveloped country does not occur due to internal population pressures, emigration 
from such countries into more developed regions is not freely allowed by the latter. 
National restrictions which inhibit such immigration flows have the potential to aggravate 
the loss of skilled/educated labor in a more pronounced fashion since such labor is more 
likely to slip through the restrictions.
While immigration restrictions are an overt manifestation of a bias towards and 
against certain groups of people, such biases may also lay hidden in a more discrete 
fashion within the public infrastructure of a socio-economic system. After a certain level 
of development is attained, a progressive political dimension (i.e., the pursuit of 
egalitarian state policy) is believed to amplify the spread effects in a region by actively 
expanding the public infrastructure.85 Such policies would include national welfare
“  Recent empirical work has found a statistical correlation between both democracy and economic 
growth (see Sirowy and Inkeles 1990) and civil/political liberty and economic growth (Scully 1988; Barro 
1989).
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systems (e.g., income and medical) and the provision of minimal levels of certain 
services to all regions (e.g., telecommunications, utilities, education, and postal service). 
Support for such egalitarian policies emerges from a sense of solidarity and kinship 
between countrymen. Myrdal believed that the degree to which people are willing to 
support egalitarian policy, which requires a redistribution of income/wealth between 
individuals and from the individual to the group, is directly related to the amount of 
economic "elbow room" these individuals perceive they have. Therefore, a rising level 
of income is more conducive to such policy maneuvers while decline and stagnation are 
not. Along these lines, an underdeveloped region’s citizens are not materially 
comfortable enough or generally willing to support such egalitarian aid within their own 
regions. Any redistribution that does occur will mitigate the backwash effects by 
de-emphasizing the causal link between regional income and regional social 
infrastructure. Social infrastructure becomes linked to the national income, rather than 
regional income. In a similar manner, an expanding sense of solidarity within humanity 
as a whole would further decouple these causal interconnections regionally and nationally 
in the hopes that they will re-emerge at the global level. These relations are summarized 
in Figure 25. Note that two of the variables are psycho-social.
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Figure 25: Egalitarian Policy and Economic Development










Income and Productivity 
Levels
The absence of egalitarian policy at the international level was a notable facet of 
international economic analysis for Myrdal. Although individuals may not perceive 
themselves as having sufficient economic "elbow room" to afford global egalitarian 
policy, there also usually exists more distinct personal differences between nations than 
between regions (e.g., cultural and physical attributes).86 In contrast to this, one could 
add that the world was a large place before the age of advanced transportation and 
communication technology. As a result, underdeveloped countries may have laid outside 
the realm of the world as perceived by the citizens of developed nations. For whatever 
reason, there has not been much of a push by the developed countries to acknowledge 
the common goal (e.g., happiness) or ancestry of the human race. These cultural 
differences are really at the heart of what alienates groups of people from one another
“  One should note that political boundaries imposed on the world by the Western mindset have 
frequently been insensitive to cultural differences (e.g., Western Africa) and that egalitarian ideas have 
frequently been imposed through legislation and military force. This mind-induced delineation of 
boundaries and imposition of human ideals which deny the actual dynamics of the socio-economic system 
(e.g., the individuals it is composed of and their beliefs) is therefore doomed to failure.
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and thereby hinders the spread effects which might otherwise occur through international 
channels.
The Significance of Mvrdal*s Theory
Although Myrdal did not speak in evolutionary terms, except to the extent that he 
was quite consciously affiliated with the Institutionalist tradition, he was nevertheless 
deeply sympathetic to the evolutionary paradigm. As a result, his work made significant 
contributions to the clarification of what an evolutionary concept of the socio-economic 
process might entail. There are three major points which can be drawn from this last 
section. First, Myrdal explicitly emphasized the role of institutional variables (i.e., 
psycho-social and political) within the process of economic development. This 
interdisciplinary methodology preceded a growing contemporary trend. Second, he did 
not limit the impact of the aforementioned variables to the socio-economic process, but 
believed that they play an active role in social science itself. This stance highlights the 
importance of explicit human ideals to evolutionary theory and annexes the ivory towers 
of theory to consciously serve, rather than unconsciously dictate, society’s goals. Last, 
Myrdal brings to our attention the socio-economic relations which exist between sets of 
complementary relations. To the extent that these divergent relations possess a conscious 
dimension in the shape of attitudes towards others, we are forced to concede that there 
is a volitional element to socio-economic progress.
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Nicholas Kaldor: A Keynesian Injection
There are two lines of Kaldor’s thought that I would like to explore. First, his well 
constructed criticism of general equilibrium theorizing (1972, 1975, 1979, and 
1985:Chapter III). Second, the complementary economic relations which form the 
backbone of his formal and informal models of economic growth and development (1957, 
1962, 1967, 1968, 1970, 1981, 1985).
The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics87
The crux of Kaldor’s criticism centers around his belief that the prevailing theory 
of value, which he calls "equilibrium economics," has become an intellectual exercise 
that does not constitute a scientific hypothesis (Kaldor 1979:277). By "equilibrium 
economics," he is referring to the general equilibrium model originally devised by 
Walras, expressed in von Neumann’s 1945 paper, and subsequently developed by the 
mathematical economists of "our own generation" (e.g., Debreu and Arrow). And by 
"science," he means a theoretical model which is based on assumptions that are 
empirically derived from observations and which produces hypotheses that are capable
17 This is the title of Kaldor’s 1972 essay published in The Economic Journal.
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of verification with respect to both the assumptions and predictions.88 The reason for 
the failure of equilibrium economics to provide a valid scientific hypothesis is that its 
basic assumptions are "axiomatic and not empirical, and no specific methods have been 
put forward by which the validity or relevance of its results could be tested" (Kaldor 
1979:277). In fact, its fundamental assumptions have not been empirically observed 
within the economy, but chosen in order to develop a "logically watertight system," or 
mathematically pure "crystal." As a result, such models give a "misleading impression 
of the nature and the manner of operation of economic forces" (Kaldor 1975:347).
A common rebuttal of this line of criticism has been that equilibrium models of the 
economy are merely the starting point (albeit frequently thought of as the only valid one) 
from which a truly comprehensive model will spring. However, the necessary process 
of removing the scaffolding which such a justification implies, i.e. the relaxing the 
unrealistic assumptions, had not yet begun in Kaldor’s eyes. In fact, he even went so 
far as to contend that it would be truer to say that the fascination with the equilibrium 
model has caused some economist’s views o f reality to become increasingly distorted, "so 
as to come closer to the theoretical image rather than the other way around" (Kaldor 
1985:60-61).
Where had economic theory gone astray?89 In his first three papers which 
explicitly addressed this question, Lord Kaldor (1972, 1975, 1979) stated the belief that
0 "In other words, contrary to the prevailing trend, one should subordinate deductions to induction, 
and discover the empirical regularities first" (Kaldor 1985:8).
0 Some researchers trace Kaldor’s thoughts on this matter back to his 1934 papers on static equilibrium 
concepts and the emerging theory of the firm (e.g., Harris 1991). I shall restrict myself to his more 
explicit explorations which occurred later in his career.
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this misdirection began with the rise to prominence of the theory of value and the idea 
that the essence of economic activity is an allocation problem (e.g., Robbins 1937). In 
his 1972 essay, this was rather tersely identified as an emphasis on the allocative function 
of the market as opposed to its creative function. These insights were later refined by 
Kaldor as he began to see the root of the problem as the elevation of the principle o f  
substitution to THE central principle from which both the price system and production 
are explained. He felt that this approach glossed over the essential complementarity that 
exists between different factors of production and different types of economic activities. 
For example, labor and capital do substitute for one another, but they also complement 
one another in the production process. In addition, the different sectors of the economy 
(i.e., agriculture, industry, and services) also complement one another. These facets of 
complementarity are "far more important" for understanding the process of economic 
growth and development than their allocative counterparts, and it is their de-emphasis in 
equilibrium models of the economy which make these models "so lifeless" (Kaldor 
1975:348).
One of the fallacies of the allocation perspective that Kaldor emphasized is the idea 
that industries compete with one another for identical capital and labor resources. Even 
when industries do use identical resources, these resources are not in any meaningful 
sense allocated between them, argued Kaldor. Instead, he believed that each "sector 
generates its own capital [i.e., the ability to purchase capital] in the course of its own 
expansion" (Kaldor 1979:279). In other words, the growth of output and the growth of 
capital are "merely two different facets of the same process; neither is prior to the other
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nor a precondition of the other" (Kaldor 1979:279). Following this line of thought, 
Kaldor believed that different capital accumulation rates between different sectors of the 
economy are not primarily the result of an allocative flow of capital between sectors, but 
rather the result of a complementary relationship which exists between the rate of capital 
accumulation and the rate of return enjoyed by different sectors. Sectors experiencing 
higher rates of return will expand production faster than other sectors through an 
endogenous process of capital accumulation rather than by being allocated from some 
great aggregate pool of savings.90
Continuing with this evolutionary theme of endogenous sectoral growth and 
explicitly borrowing from Young, Kaldor noted that the expansion of any one sector will 
tend to stimulate the expansion of others. In-this way, change becomes a chain reaction 
which, under suitable conditions, harbors the possibilities for self-sustained growth 
between complementary sectors. This expansion was not ad hoc in Kaldor’s eyes since 
the profile of different sectors’ rates of expansion tended to approach a "structurally 
determined pattern," determined by the technical relationships within each sector and the 
income elasticities of consumer demand for that sector’s produce.91 Under such 
circumstances, the use of an equilibrium concept is inappropriate since every change 
creates fresh opportunities for further change and the distinction between changes in the
90 As early as 1955, Kaldor was expressing these ideas through his contention that theories of economic 
growth which account for uneven rates of development based on thriftiness or the occurrence of important 
inventions are "quite inadequate. ’ He believed that these factors are endogenous manifestations of the 
process of economic development rather than its underlying cause (Kaldor 1955:718-719).
91 This complementarity between the patterns of technical and consumer relations within the economy 
is a promising field of study which has been empirically explored by Boyer and Petit (1991) and Boyer 
(1988).
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quantity and quality of resources can easily become blurred (Kaldor 1975:355).
Therefore, the market should not be thought of as an instrument for allocating resources,
but rather as one for "transmitting impulses to change." It would be more accurate to
say that the market mechanism creates and generates resources than that it allocates them
(Kaldor 1975:280).92 However, in addition to these criticisms, Kaldor believed that
there is a basic truth which equilibrium theoretic models attempt to capture. The crux
of the problem is whether or not,
... the manifestly absurd or unreal assumptions of equilibrium theory can be 
abandoned while still preserving the ‘core’ of the theory - which I take to be the 
proposition that the movement of relative prices of commodities and labor 
enables us to have enough fresh bread baked every morning, that people enter 
the profession in such relative numbers as are necessary to ensure that there is 
no penury of dentists nor plethora of doctors or a superfluity of lawyers, and the 
same is true of street cleaners, sewage workers, motor car mechanics, and so on. 
(Kaldor 1985:21)
Although Kaldor’s 1985 essay also dealt with these issues, it did not share the 
previous essays’ explicit emphasis on allocation. Rather, he suggested that in order to 
exit the present impasse of the equilibrium theoretical bias, economists must construct 
models which recognize time as being a continuous and irreversible process. In addition, 
he stated a belief that it is impossible to assume the constancy of anything over time and 
that the forces which create economic change are endogenous rather than exogenous to 
the system. The only truly exogenous factor is whatever exists at a given moment of 
time as "the heritage of the past" (Kaldor 1985:61). This is perhaps one of the most 
radical statements concerning the presence of interdependence within the economy ever
92 This idea has also been explored by DeGregori (1987).
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made by a prominent economist. Furthermore, Kaldor goes on to couple this statement
with one concerning the fundamental indeterminacy which exists within the economy:
The heritage of the past is the one truly exogenous factor, and its influence will 
determine future events to an extent that varies inversely with the distance of the 
future period from the present. Thus our ability to predict what can happen or 
what is likely to happen becomes progressively less as we consider the more
distant future as against the nearer future. (Kaldor 1985:62, emphasis in
original)
What is significant about this passage is that it expresses a belief in endogenous change 
which seems to evade our ability to predict in both a quantitative and qualitative fashion 
and is thereby reminiscent of the earlier theoretical positions of Smith and Tucker in the 
1700’s.
In contrast to his own beliefs, Kaldor contended that equilibrium theory assumes 
a context for economic activity determined by a set of exogenous variables which remain 
stable over time. This assumption allows one to identify unique equilibriums to which 
the theoretical system will gravitate. The problem is not that some variables are taken 
to be stable, but that a broadly conceived set of such stable environmental variables is
utilized to create an economic theory which is practically independent of historical
heritage (e.g., exogenous technological, psychological, and sociological facets). In other 
words, the set of relevant variables has been misspecified. These criticisms reflect an 
appreciation for path-dependent processes and lead naturally into Kaldor’s second 
criticism of equilibrium economics: the conscious exclusion of increasing returns.
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Increasing Returns
It is his emphasis on increasing returns which explicitly aligns Kaldor with the 
complement of economists explored previously in this dissertation. Just like these earlier 
theorists, Kaldor believed that increasing returns are an empirically observable fact. In 
support of this, he cited the Verdoom Law (following Beckerman 1965) which identified 
a positive statistical relationship between productivity growth and output growth (Kaldor 
1967:15).93 This "stylized fact," a term coined by Kaldor to signify broad historical 
tendencies which avoid a great deal of individual detail and statistical fuss, was one of 
six proposed as characteristics of economic change and development in capitalist 
societies. A full list of these stylized facts is as follows (Kaldor 1968:178-179):*4
(1) The steady growth of output and labor productivity with no recorded tendency
for falling productivity growth rates (i.e., the Verdoom Law).
(2) A continued increase in the capital/labor ratio.
(3) A steady rate of profit on capital.
(4) Steady capital/output ratios.
(5) A high correlation between the share of profits in income and the share of
investment in output (i.e., investment coefficient).
93 Conway and Darity (1991:747) note that Verdoom (1949) identified a strong positive statistical 
association between the rate of growth of GDP and that in manufacturing output while Kaldor (1967) 
contended that there is a close positive relationship between the rate of growth of productivity (and 
employment) in manufacturing and that in manufacturing output: the difference being one of a strictly 
correlative versus causal connotation. See McCombie (1983) and Bairam (1987) for a review of the 
literature concerning this statistical ‘law’ and the arguments that have been advanced in support of and 
against Kaldor’s theoretical explanations (e.g., Thirlwall 1983; Rowthom 1975, respectively).
M Wulwick (1992:36) noted that some of these generalizations have been called into question by recent 
empirical research, but stated that the "consensus of opinion is that Kaldor’s stylized facts are accurate 
broad generalizations."
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(6) A noticeable difference and absence of convergence in the growth rates of 
labor productivity and total output between different capitalistic societies. This 
is associated with differences in the investment coefficient and the share of 
profits in income, however, capital/output and the rate of profit on capital are 
remain steady between different countries.
The cornerstone of Kaldor’s theoretical explanation of these stylized facts is an 
expanding market (i.e., increasing demand) which allows for large-scale production and 
thereby a production process which utilizes more specialized techniques. These 
techniques, by assumption, increase labor productivity through the utilization of more 
specialized capital per worker than previous techniques (i.e., both quantitative and 
qualitative changes). In attempting to achieve lower costs per unit of production (i.e., 
higher labor productivity), entrepreneurs employ an ever increasing amount of specialized 
capital which is made profitable through larger markets. Therefore, the resulting 
capital/labor ratio involved in production is not primarily due to the relative scarcities 
or relative prices of labor versus capital and has "nothing" to do with the marginal 
productivities or marginal rate of substitution concepts of a constant cost framework 
(Kaldor 1985:67). Rather, it is a matter of using the cheapest production method relative 
to the size o f the market.
These increasing returns consist not only of economies of scale experienced by an 
individual firm, but also include Marshallian external economies which are realized by 
a region as a whole. For example, opportunities for the development of skill and know­
how, easy communication of ideas and experience, increasing differentiation of 
production processes, and specialization in human activities are all regional externalities 
that Kaldor cited (1970:340). Due to these regional external economies, industries will
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tend to develop near one another. As with Myrdal before him, Kaldor (1979:284) used
this relationship to explain the polarization of rich and poor countries with respect to
economic development,
The country which became rich and attained higher incomes per head was a 
country which became "well endowed" with capital and in which therefore the 
capital/labor ratio became very high. But this capital was largely accumulated 
out of reinvested profits in consequence of increasing demand, and the ability to 
use so much capital in relation to labor is very largely a reflection of the scale 
of activities and not of the relative price of capital and of labor.
As empirical support for this theoretical relationship, Kaldor repeatedly noted the 
stylized fact that while the capital/labor ratio increases dramatically during economic 
progress and differs between rich and poor countries (30:1 or 50:1 ratio), this difference 
is not correlated with a difference between the capital/output ratios which are ffequendy 
very similar between rich and poor countries (Kaldor 1979:285, 1985:67). While the 
acceptance of increasing returns provides a "simple" explanation for these empirical 
observations concerning the capital/labor and capital/output ratios, the simultaneous 
association of rising labor productivity and capital productivity is not compatible with a 
constant cost, allocative perspective.95 As a result, a theoretical explanation attempted 
via neoclassical value theory "clearly goes out of the window" (Kaldor 1979:286).
95 The attempt to introduce the concept of neutral exogenous technological change whereby 
technological change is represented by the residual shift in output growth after factor input changes have 
been accounted for is incapable of being independently measured and was therefore judged "untestable and 
vacuous" by Kaldor (1979:285).
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A Model of the Macroeconomy
The framework that Kaldor chose for the analysis of economic development is a 
simple model of a closed world economy with two sectors: one being agriculture/mining 
and the other industry (i.e., primary and secondary sectors). More complex situations 
involving economic relationships between non-self-sufficient regions with open borders 
(e.g., regional, national, and international economic development) can then be explored 
from this starting point. This two-sector model is sometimes referred to as a North- 
South model due to the archetypal polarization that occurred after the economic 
unification of the Northern and Southern halves of Italy. At the time of unification, 
Northern manufacturing was sufficiently advanced relative to Southern manufacturing 
(20-25% higher industrial productivity) that free trade resulted in accelerated industrial 
growth in the North while concurrently inhibiting such development in the South (Kaldor 
1981:597).
Before presenting a causal representation of this model, it is important to note that 
Kaldor was constantly revising, refining, and deepening his ideas to correspond with 
what he perceived to be empirical observations. For example, Kaldor’s thinking 
concerning the operation of monetary forces underwent significant revisions over the 
years (see Lavoie 1991). Likewise, Kaldor’s theoretical explanations of economic 
development were also revised and expanded over the years (beginning in the 1950’s and 
continuing through the 1980’s). In a 1986 lecture in honor of Sir John Hicks, Kaldor 
noted approvingly that Hicks never felt constrained by his past utterances. This was
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accompanied by a quote from Hicks’ Capital and Time which reflects on the different
research themes Hicks had pursued:
... it is just as if one were making pictures of a building; though it is the same 
building, it looks quite different from different angles. As I now realize, I have 
been walking round my subject, taking different views on it.
Kaldor respected this quality and it was expressed in his own research. However,
whereas Hicks employed a spatial metaphor, it is more appropriate to use a temporal
metaphor for Kaldor. In other words, Kaldor’s models attempted to capture the operative
relations responsible for the dynamic evolution of the economy while concurrently taking
account of the shifting dominance of various cultural and economic forces.
Although Kaldor’s earlier essays (1955, 1957, 1962, 1968) presented formal
mathematical models of economic development, his later essays (1970, 1972, 1981,
1985) focused on the more significant theoretical themes without his feeling a need to
embody them in formal models.96 Perhaps Kaldor came to recognize the difficulties
inherent to mathematically modeling path-dependent processes and chose to invest his
time in forging the significant theoretical cogs rather than fiddling with teeth size, gear
ratios, and lubricant grade.
The following presentation abstracts from much of Kaldor’s thought and leaves 
some facets (e.g., the monetary system) noticeably absent in order to continue our focus 
on the general phenomena of increasing returns in production. Only the facets assumed 
critical to this issue are included in the following discussion and diagrams. There are
96 Hahn (1989:47) commented that Kaldor found precise models "too constricting and settled for a more 
literary and narrative style." Kaldor himself (1986:187-188) commented that he "never had the patience 
to learn mathematics."
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three main structural themes that compose the complementary dimension of the Kaldorian 
model: (1) The presence of increasing returns in manufacturing coupled with its absence 
in agriculture. (2) An asymmetry between the agricultural and industrial sectors of the 
economy due to the flex-price and fix-price nature of their respective markets which 
manifests in their terms of trade. (3) The endogenous nature of capital accumulation and 
induced consumption.
Technological Progress and The Productivity of Labor. Kaldor did not believe that 
one could devise a satisfactory measure for capital as distinct from technology. Rather, 
it is the assumed stability of money within some index of prices which gives the 
appearance of income or capital as being a real magnitude. He believed that 
technological change is embodied in capital equipment and that this creates a serious 
problem in any attempt to distinguish between the quantity and quality of an ever 
changing stream of capital investments. For example, it is a relatively arbitrary process 
to compare two different points of time on a production curve and isolate that portion of 
the change due to shifts along the curve (i.e., quantity change due to capital productivity) 
and shifts in the curve (i.e., quality change due to technological change) since the 
differentiation will be determined completely by one’s definition and measurement of 
capital stocks. And this capital stock variable is conceptually elusive and difficult to 
measure. Insensitive to this caveat, technological change is sometimes defined as the 
residual of the change in measured output not associated with quantitative changes in 
measured factor inputs (e.g., Solow 1957).
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Due to these difficulties, Kaldor completely rejected the theoretical use of 
production functions and production frontiers. Instead, he attempted to develop a 
Technical Progress Function (Kaldor 1957:595-598, 1962, 1968). This formulation was 
one in which the rate of growth of output/laborer was posited to be a declining function 
of the rate of growth of capital/laborer, under the assumption that there exists a constant 
flow of new ideas over time. In his 1962 essay this formulation was simplified, and the 
growth of output was posited to be a function of the value of gross investment which 
increased labor productivity through the introduction of innovative capital equipment. 
While these formalizations attempt to capture dynamic increasing returns, it is not 
altogether clear that they accomplish their task or that they represent a clear break from 
conventional production functions (Hahn 1989).'97
If technology is embodied in capital, then there are two factors which determine 
the productivity growth in a given sector. First, the level of possible technology relative 
to the technology actually embodied within the existing capital infrastructure. For 
example, one can copy existing factor relations to increase output, but as output increases 
the opportunity for novel factor relations may also present itself. At a given level of 
output, the introduction of innovative production relations may preserve/increase output 
at lower/equal cost than the maintenance of previously existing capital.98 The second 
factor is the sector’s ability relative to its willingness to close this gap through the
97 Arrow’s (1962) essay which attempts to endogenize technological change through "learning by doing" 
and Georgescu-Roegen’s (1971) theoretical model of production appear to be alternatives.
* It is important to note that Kaldor’s tendencies to endogenize technological change led him to 
conclude that the "production frontier’ will shift as one moves towards it. This differentiates him from 
the technological gap literature which presupposes a static ideal to which the economy converges.
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accumulation of innovative capital. Kaldor believed that a sector’s ability to accumulate
capital was endogenously determined by its level of output.99 However, it is the
entrepreneur’s willingness to invest in innovative capital processes which determines
which investments will actually occur. This entrepreneurial willingness has both a
psycho-social and economic (e.g., expected profits) dimension. While the latter is
readily accepted by economists, Kaldor (1968:207) supported the former by noting that,
The more ‘dynamic’ are the people in control of production, the keener they are 
in search of improvements, and the readier they are to adapt new ideas and to 
introduce new ways of doing things, the faster production (per man) will rise, 
and the higher is the rate of accumulation of capital that can be profitably 
maintained.100
Therefore, given a gap between possible and actual technology, it is a region’s capacity 
to accumulate capital relative to its willingness to innovate and infuse innovations into 
the economic system which will determine the rate of growth of output. These 
relationships are embodied in Figure 26. Although this particular diagram does not 
present a circular relation, this characteristic will emerge as we build up Kaldor’s 
concept of the economy as a whole.
99 If one were to graph output as a function of capital, the "rate of shift of the curve will itself depend 
on the speed o f movement along the curve’ (Kaldor 1968:207). This is a higher order relationship.
Ia0 This dynamic quality which Kaldor attributes to the ’people in control of production* is an 
institutional variable similar to the property rights component of Adam Smith’s framework, Marshall’s 
emphasis on the enthusiasm and character of a business’s owners, and Gunnar Myrdal’s inclusion of civil 
liberties. See also Hodgson (1989).
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Terms of Trade: Flex-Price versus Fix-Price. Kaldor believed that the price of 
industrial goods is essentially fixed while that of agricultural goods is flexible. This is 
based on the idea that there is a minimum and relatively fixed real industrial wage rate 
in terms of agricultural products which displays resistance to downward movements. 
This minimum is not merely biological, although such a lower bound undoubtedly exists, 
and may be determined by custom or convention to such an extent that it bears "no 
recognizable relationship to subsistence in some biological sense" (Kaldor 1979:352, see 
also 1975:352). Due to this constraint, the markup price in the industrial process will 
face the constraint that the value added above primary material costs must be equal to
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or exceed this labor cost, or else no industrial production will be forthcoming. As a 
result, the industrial labor market may not clear in the conventional sense since labor 
supply will exceed demand. This surplus labor will be absorbed by low-eamings 
subsistence sectors which allow laborers to earn subsistence wages without effectively 
contributing to output, a phenomenon which Kaldor called disguised unemployment. 
Therefore, the employed industrial labor force is endogenously determined by consumer 
demand rather than exogenously by population growth.
The sector which harbors this surplus labor force is agriculture (and services in his 
later models). Agricultural production is usually constrained by the productivity of the 
soil (i.e., productive agricultural infrastructure), rather than the productivity of labor. 
Kaldor believed that however essential labor is to agricultural activities, there is usually 
more labor than can be effectively employed on any given area of land. This excess 
labor is due to a Malthusian relationship whereby population density is a function of 
agricultural productivity (i.e., surplus over subsistence).101 While agricultural output 
could theoretically be limited by labor supply, Kaldor believed that only one production 
constraint would "bite" at any given time (i.e., soil or labor), and assumed that 
agricultural infrastructure is the predominant limiting factor for development purposes 
in the majority of rural areas of developing countries. Figure 27 represents these 
interrelations in a causal diagram.
101 This assumes that subsistence is the dominant factor in procreation and that the population is always 
pushed back to subsistence conditions. However, many developing countries have experienced a decline 
in population growth as per capita incomes grow above subsistence (see Meadows 1973). Kaldor did not 
explore the implications of this demographic transition.
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Kaldor noted that industrialists might find it in their best interest to increase industrial 
wages above subsistence in order to increase labor productivity (e.g., through education 
and health care). However, this possibility has been suppressed in the above diagram 
for simplicity.
In the face of this unlimited supply of labor to industry and assuming a constant 
profit margin, the actual labor employed is determined by the technical relations of the
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particular production process (i.e., the productivity of labor), the level of market 
demand, and the conventional minimum wage required by workers. Kaldor believed that 
since contractual costs form an "important independent element" in the determination of 
prices within industrial markets, sellers are more likely to set price and accept quantity, 
and therefore competition will by necessity be imperfect (Kaldor 1970:341). Practically 
speaking, quantity signals provide entrepreneurs with more information than price signals 
since they give some indication of how much a producer’s market has expanded through 
sales and inventory figures (Scitovsky 1991:117). If producers respond to quantity 
signals rather than price signals, they are assumed to be willing to supply more at the 
prevailing price in response to any increased demand. Therefore, changes in industrial 
demand are assumed to cause shifts in the level of production rather than shifts in price.
This fix-price situation divorces the price of industrial goods in terms of
agricultural goods from the supply/demand situation in agriculture. Whereas in
agriculture markets the relative price of agricultural commodities will closely conform
to changing supply/demand conditions as predicted by the accepted market adjustment
process, industrial markets respond to different signals. For example, if the demand for
tomatoes exceeds their supply in a given local market, prices will rise and thereby induce
the importation of tomatoes from an adjacent region. However, the supply of industrial
products within this region is flexible and an increased demand will elicit increased
production rather than a price increase. Kaldor (1979:282) summarized these beliefs in
the following statement,
If agricultural output is limited by the scarcity of land and not by the availability 
of labor, and the price of industrial goods in terms of agricultural products is
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dependent upon the minimum wage which must be paid to labor, then industrial 
production will be limited by demand and not by the available resources ...
This argument is diagrammed in Figure 28.
One can identify both capital and labor utilization shifts which respond to the quantity 
signals in the market, both of which alter output and hence readjust the stock on hand 
to normal inventory levels.
In Kaldor’s world model, the agricultural sector is considered external to the 
industrial sector and it is the willingness and ability of agriculturalists to trade surplus 
production for industrial commodities which allows the industrial sector to grow. In 
Young’s model, it was the elasticity of demand for the individual sector’s products which 
determined the first sector’s income. Young assumed that, as long as demand is elastic,
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increased production will result in increased sales receipts if prices are permitted to 
decline with falling costs. This assumes, of course, that these increased sales do not 
come at the expense of other sectors of the economy. Recognizing this qualification, 
Kaldor distinguished between demand which originates from outside the economy and 
that which originates from inside the economy. The former would be represented by 
agricultural demand for industrial products or exports in general, whereas the latter 
represents a Keynesian component of endogenously created demand within the economy. 
It is this addition which led Kaldor (1968, 1972) to characterize his work as a Keynesian 
growth model. In the final analysis, the internal or endogenous component of industrial 
demand is dependent on surplus primary sector production as the initial condition for 
economic development. These relations are diagrammed in Figure 29.
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Notice that the accumulation of capital in industry is funded endogenously out of 
profits resulting from expanding markets: however it is also this very accumulation which- 
determines productivity. The extent to which the industrial sector consumes (i.e., 
agricultural imports and endogenous industrial consumption) versus exports and invests 
will determine its future growth rate (Kaldor 1981). An increase in demand thereby sets 
up a self-reinforcing process of industrial growth which is not necessarily experienced 
by the agricultural sectors. Although capital accumulation can occur in agriculture and 
thereby increase productivity in that sector, this potential is far less than the dynamic 
returns experienced in industry. Furthermore, due to the flex-price nature of agricultural
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markets, productivity advances in this sector of the economy are passed on directly to 
customers via the market rather than being retained by producers (e.g., in industry) 
through higher wages and profits. Therefore, Kaldor concluded that the terms of trade 
will always move in favor of the industrial sector whenever technological change occurs 
in either sector of the economy (Kaldor 1986:197).
The sectors of the economy which experience increasing returns, whether these be 
firms, industries, regions, or nations, will evolve spontaneously through endogenous 
relations. Although this growth must initially be sparked by external stimulation, this 
life-line may diminish in size relative to other relations. For example, following one line 
of thought on the topic, although the imperialistic relationship between industrial and 
agricultural-primary products economies may have provided the initial impetus for the 
former’s growth, these former economies may continue to experience increasing 
prosperity even as their relations to the latter diminish due to reciprocal trade relations 
with other industrial economies.
The four previous diagrams can be combined into a single representation of the 
industrial sector of the macroeconomy in order to highlight the positive causal loops 
within a Kaldorian model, see Figure 30. Within this industrial sector, there are two 
stabilizing circularities which equilibrate the quantity signal of inventory-stock and 
industrial-output:102 (1) The willingness-to-invest circularity which connects industrial- 
output to the profitable-capital-infrastructure variable through the inventory-stock of this
m  Italics are used in the following discussion to identify the different variables within the causal 
diagram.
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particular market (i.e., industrial output in general as opposed to agricultural output)..
(2) The capital-utilization circularity between industrial-labor-force, industrial-output, 
and inventory-stock. The first of these circularities reflects a capital adjustment response 
to changes in industrial output while the latter reflects a labor adjustment response to 
such changes. Kaldor’s emphasis on quantity signals within a fixed-price rather than the 
traditional flex-price framework is represented by the use of an inventory variable rather 
than a profit variable.103
The most important complementary circularity in this diagram is that between the 
size-of-the-market, the technically-possible-infrastructure, and then through to industrial- 
output. This relationship represents the traditional division-of-labor and extent-of-the- 
market circularity first proposed by Smith two centuries earlier. However, this 
circularity is augmented by two additional complementary loops formed by inserting the 
size-of-the-market between industrial-output and inventory-stock in the two 
aforementioned negative loops. The resulting circularities are usually assumed to be of 
the adjustment variety (i.e., traditional Keynesian analysis with MPC< 1) although the 
addition of exogenous-consumption provides an additional factor which is not 
endogenously constrained. This consumption dimension of Kaldor’s model could include 
the division of industrial-output between re-investment and consumer spending, although 
we will not explore this possibilities here.104
103 Although it is assumed that quantity and price signals are just two sides of the same coin, the 
theoretical inclusion of one rather than the other has practical implications for the dynamic behavior of the 
system even without fixed-prices (e.g., inducing oscillations; see Mass 1980).
104 Kaldor’s (1949) interest in advertising can also contribute to this facet of the model.
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This causal representation of Kaldor’s model is completed by two auxiliary 
relationships: (1) The complementary circularity between ability-to-invest, industrial- 
output, investment, and labor-productivity. This represents Kaldor’s notion of 
endogenous investment. (2) The stabilizing circularity between the investment-gap, 
investment, and actual-capital-infrastructure recognizes the fact that when the technically 
possible division of labor is actualized within the capital infrastructure of the economy, 
there is no incentive to invest in additional innovative capital equipment.
Kaldor’s concept of disguised unemployment is not reflected in Figure 30 since its 
inclusion would require an agricultural sector (experiencing diminishing returns). 
However, the industrial-labor-force variable reflects the pull of a portion of the total 
labor supply into industry and away from agriculture (or services). It is therefore around 
this variable, through the inclusion of the causal loops of Figure 27 and an explicit 
agricultural sector, that the model could be expanded to represent the divergence between 
industry and agriculture.
It is important to note that on at least one occasion, Kaldor noted diseconomies 
associated with excessive industrialization such as "environmental problems in housing, 
public services, congestion, and so on" which he believed would be caused by fast rates 
of population growth into industrialized regions through immigration (Kaldor 1970:344). 
Areas which experience industrial decline will experience the opposite, which is the 
existence of under utilized social infrastructure. From this analysis, he established a role 
for policy by concluding that if the market process were left alone, there is reason to
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believe that regional concentration of industrial activities will proceed further than 
socially preferable.
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It has already been noted that the endogenous limits to industrial expansion will be 
determined by the technological relationships and demand elasticities. Due to this fact, 
the basic requirement for continued economic expansion is that the different sectors in
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the economy expand "in due relationship with one another" such that "bottlenecks" not 
occur in key sectors (Kaldor 1986:196). Therefore, future development is continually 
dependent on balanced development in the present. Of course, the very possibility of 
balanced growth is an intriguing and unsolved problem. While Kaldor (1986:195, 
footnote 11) recognized that the natural resources of the earth are finite and could pose 
a constraint, he appeared to be an optimist (or perhaps devil’s advocate) with respect to 
substitute resource creation through technical innovation.
Kaldor’s contribution to the evolutionary dimension of economic thought involves 
his formidable criticism of equilibrium economics on both the theoretical and empirical 
front. By emphasizing broad statistical generalizations which could be addressed with 
a model including complementary relations but not the contemporary neoclassical 
approach, he developed a strong refutation of equilibrium economics within the field of 
economic development. In addition, his work as an economist, as opposed to Myrdal, 
lent credence to his thinking and led to the development of detailed models of economic 
interrelations.
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Contemporary Evolutionary Literature: A Characterization
Whereas one can focus narrowly on the seminal theories of individual economists 
for long spans of history without doing injustice to the whole, a different approach is 
required during the critical stages of theoretical development when no obvious route for 
advance is visible (e.g., the Increasing Returns debates). The history of economic 
thought becomes the history of economic thoughts when the profession moves into 
periods of what Kuhn (1970) would call revolutionary science. It is this author’s belief 
that the contemporary evolutionary paradigm is participating in just such a conjuncture. 
One of the reasons for this is that the literary presentations which have been employed 
by all the aforementioned theorists of this dissertation are no longer acceptable. Why is 
this so? Simply put, it is a consequence of the growth of computer technology and 
empirical research on nonlinear systems and hence on the ability to formally embody the 
evolutionary dimension through computer simulation. However, as with all mathematical 
models, the conclusions will flow from the assumptions in a strictly logical fashion. As 
a result, it is necessary to have a theoretical perspective which guides the modeling 
exercise, and it is the historical and philosophical foundations of this theoretical 
perspective which is the primary concern of this dissertation.
What does contemporary evolutionary theory consist of? Although Darwinian 
themes of competitive selection are frequently appealed to, this is merely a negative 
feedback relation between a fluctuating system and its static context: nothing more than
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a dressed-up reinterpretation of equilibrium economics. However, this Darwinian theme 
merely needs to be expanded to include the influence that the system has on its context. 
In other words, a system and its context will be co-dependent. Many contemporary 
evolutionary theorists have realized this and have therefore proposed a more general 
evolutionary theory which contains, but is not limited to, the particular details of a 
simple Darwinian perspective. In addition, they have realized that there is a mental and 
volitional dimension to socio-economic evolution which distinguishes it from purely 
biological systems.105
A common definition of the evolutionary paradigm within the economics literature 
is that it is concerned with becoming rather than being and the emphasis is on process 
rather than structure (e.g., Allen 1988; Dosi and Nelson 1994). A dynamic 
independence is rejected in favor of explicit and thorough interdependence (Clark 1990; 
Freeman 1991). It is concerned with change which leads to qualitative difference (i.e., 
the emergence of novel patterns), in contrast to merely quantitative change (e.g., Allen 
1988). When dealing with quantitative change, the dynamic characteristics of path 
dependency and multiple equilibria are stressed (e.g., Arthur 1988). There is the implicit 
dismissal of closed systems which restrict the flow of resources across the system’s 
boundaries (i.e., conservative systems) in favor of open systems which permit the 
throughput of energy, matter, and information (e.g., Costanza et.al. 1993; Norgaard 
1985, 1987). Along these lines, whole books have been written (e.g., Dosi 1988; Nelson 
and Winter 1982), collections of essays compiled (e.g., Anderson et.al. 1988; England
105 This reference to biology is in the conventional sense of the words.
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1994; Hodgson 1995; Witt 1993), and a new Journal of Evolutionary Economics 
founded.
The general approach of all this research has emphasized three "concrete principle 
building blocks of an evolutionary theory" (Dosi and Nelson 1995). These are: (1) 
Units of selection which can be the "loose equivalents of the genes in biological theory." 
These can be thought of as the constituent elements of the system under observation 
(e.g., technology, behavioral patterns, and cultural traits). (2) The process and criteria 
of selection by which the spatio-temporal continuity of the aforementioned units is 
determined. (3) The endogenous process of adaptation, learning, and self-transcendence 
(i.e., the emergence of novelty) displayed by a given system. These three building 
blocks can be synthesized through a hierarchical representation, the causal details and 
philosophical foundations of which are developed in the next chapter.
Although the majority of contemporary work in the field of evolutionary economics 
is being conducted along Schumpeterian lines (e.g., Freeman 1982), this dissertation has 
stressed a distinctly different lineage in order to highlight a different historical and 
methodological facet of the evolutionary perspective within economics. In particular, this 
dissertation has attempted to establish a broader concept of the socio-economic system 
that includes psycho-social and political variables in the hopes of developing the 
foundations from which a truly progressive model of socio-economic development will 
emerge. In order to do this, it has explored theorists who were interested in the field of 
economic development as a whole rather than a more narrow economic focus. One of
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the disadvantages of taking this approach has been the de-emphasis of the hierarchical 
dimension as presented in the last two sections.
Returning to these hierarchical ideas, I would like to elaborate on the 
aforementioned qualities of the evolutionary paradigm. The endogenous process of 
adaptation, learning, and self-transcendence is comprised of a dynamic flux between 
conservative and expansive/degenerative forces. These forces have been conceptualized 
in this dissertation as stabilizing and co-dependent circular relations. Co-dependent 
circularities have the potential to be explosive, but can be "contained" when nested 
within stabilizing relations. This nesting of circularities is captured in concepts of the 
socio-economic process which present different layers of circular relations. It seems 
logical to propose the use of a hierarchical concept of the socio-economic system based 
on the expansive and conservative dynamic of these nested circularities. However, these 
relations will not always be given to our perceptions. They are highly nonlinear and all 
novelty that emerges is experienced after the fact. Therefore, an evolutionary theory 
must explicitly accept the emergence of novel qualities. At the heart of the evolutionary 
perspective is an attempt to describe the emergence o f qualitative distinction through the 
act o f understanding systemic relations. Towards a clarification of the evolutionary 
paradigm, a mathematical formulation of the general phenomena of increasing returns is 
presented below in order to highlight the characteristic qualities of nonlinear systems
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A Formal Model of Complementary Relations
W. Brian Arthur’s (1988, 1989, 1990) model of increasing returns phenomena 
provides a clear and concise presentation of the quality of complementary/divergent 
systems which will complement the literary presentation of the previous theorists 
discussed in this dissertation. His model involves two new technologies which are 
competing for the same unfilled niche in the consumer market. These technologies are 
assumed to be fully developed in a technical sense but incompatible with one another. 
While one could make this an increasing returns model by simply allowing the price of 
the consumer product to fall as production expands, Arthur chose not to rely on scale 
economies inherent to production. Instead, he proposed that the benefits to purchasing 
a given technological standard were dependent on the availability of complementary 
products, which thereby results in the co-dependence of these complementary markets.
As a historical example, Arthur presented the market for VCR tape players in 
which the consumer originally had a choice between VHS or Beta technologies: Which 
one does she choose? If the two VCRs are of equal quality, price, aesthetics, etc., then 
the decision may come down to something like the availability of rental tape outlets (i.e., 
a complementary product). Therefore, if one lives in an area that has numerous VHS 
tape rental stores and few Beta tape rental stores, one would tend to favor buying a VHS 
tape player. What determines the ratio of VHS to Beta tape rental stores? Obviously, 
the size of their respective markets. But the size of the tape rental market is heavily 
influenced by the number of people who own the respective tape players. Therefore, 
under the assumption that tape rental availability is correlated with the current ratio of
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tape players in use, one could model the probability that a consumer chooses to purchase 
a VHS rather than Beta tape player as equal to the number of VHS tape players divided 
by the total number of tape players in current use.
This scenario was formalized by Arthur, Ermoliev, and Kaniovski (1987) and 
labelled a Polya Urn problem.106 Imagine the setting ... one has a big um which 
contains two equally sized but different colored balls: one red, one black. The dynamics 
of this model involve the removal of one ball from the um which is subsequently 
returned to the um along with an additional ball of matching color and size. Therefore, 
additional balls will be added to the um sequentially with a probability equal to the 
proportion of red and black balls in the current population.
# of Red Balls
Probability (Next Ball Added is Red)=
Total # of Balls
# of Black Balls
Probability (Next Ball Added is Black)=
Total if of Balls
Prob (Next Ball Added is Red) +  Prob (Next Ball Added is Black) = 1
106 See also Katz and Shapiro's (1985, 1986) work on consumption externalities whereby, for example, 
consumers value a product more highly when it is compatible with other consumers’ products. Although 
their model reaches identical conclusions and is more noticeably economic in structure, it lacks the 
penetrating simplicity of the Polya Um framework.
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Such a system will display three interrelated characteristics: multiple equilibria, 
path dependency, and the tendency to lock-in to a particular color ratio of red to black 
balls. The first of these means that the system has the potential to settle into more than 
one stable equilibrium in the long run. With the Polya Um, many different final color 
ratios are possible. Although it will start at 1:1, it will soon be 2:1 in favor of one 
color, and will more likely reach 3:1 than 2:2 in the next period, and the situation 
continues to unfold. In the VCR scenario, the market settled into a complete 
standardization in favor of VHS technology. However it may have initially possessed 
the potential for a great variety of stable outcomes. One could imagine both complete 
Beta standardization or an East Coast/West Coast split where each region adopts a 
different technological standard.
What determines which outcome the system actually settles into? While there may 
obviously be significant factors which cause the system to evolve in a particular 
direction, path dependency refers to the idea that the particular historical path a system 
follows will help determine its current state.107 In contrast to systems that settle into 
specific equilibrium states regardless of their historical antecedents (e.g., a marble 
spinning around a bowl), this implies that the temporal arrangement of events, even 
seemingly insignificant events, may be very important. With the Polya Um scenario, the 
first few balls selected have a greater impact on the final ratio than later selections. With 
respect to our VCR market, one might be led to believe that the decisions of the first 
wave of consumers, and perhaps the advertising efforts and support services aimed at
107 Other words frequently used to represent this characteristic are hysteresis and ergodicity.
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them, exerted a larger influence on the final market outcome than the choices of later 
consumers. So what? The economy standardized in favor of VHS instead of Beta tape 
players, but they both serve the same purpose and the fact that one dominates the market 
makes little difference, right?
Perhaps. However, the tendency to lock-in to a particular systemic relation (i.e., 
stable equilibrium) presents an obstacle to future change. What this means is that the 
support which the different elements of the system provide to one another is so strong 
that this complementarity may inhibit the successful introduction of innovative 
alternatives. Turning to the Polya Um problem, once the ratio of black to red balls has 
become established at 9.9% red (e.g., 12345:1357), a significant shift in this ratio is 
unlikely to occur.108 With VCRs, it is believed by many electronic engineers that Beta 
technology is superior to VHS, but a switch from VHS to Beta technology would now 
be extremely difficult since standardization has already occurred.
A more vivid example of how standardization can result in the continued use of a 
recognizably inefficient technology is typewriter keyboard layouts (David 1985).109 
When mechanical typewriters first came out, typists were experiencing a problem with 
typewriter keys jamming since the rate at which they could type was faster than the rate 
at which the typewriter could register the letters. As a result, a keyboard layout was 
designed which purposefully slowed down the rate at which someone could type by
108 Notice that ‘stability' remains relative to the unit of measure. Although the tens decimal place may 
be stable at 9, the thousands or hundred thousands decimal place may still display a high level of 
unpredictability until an even larger population of balls exists.
109 See also Cowan’s (1990) exploration of the lock-in of nuclear power reactor technology.
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placing the most frequent letters in the more difficult places to reach, i.e., the QWERTY 
layout. This solution was an ingenious way to increase efficiency by decreasing typing 
speeds and hence decreasing the probability of the typewriter keys jamming. However, 
in the contemporary world of word processing software and Pentium microprocessors, 
the problem of people typing faster than the "typewriter" can register the letters is non­
existent. Yet even though a U.S. Navy experiment in the 1940’s on the DSK (Dvorak 
Simplified Keyboard) demonstrated that the increased efficiency of retraining a group of 
typists "would amortize the cost of retraining within the first ten days of their subsequent 
employment" (David 1985:332), the complementary relations between QWERTY 
keyboards and existing human capital prevents the economy from making the transition: 
this is what is meant by inefficient technological lock-in.
The possibility of inefficient technological lock-in is unequivocally antithetical to 
laissez-faire politics and free market ideology.110 The principal concern will involve 
the depth of and accessibility to information concerning the long-range feasibility, both 
technically and financially, of competing and complementary products (Farrell and 
Saloner 1985; Cowan 1987, 1991). However, even when individuals are fully informed, 
the probability that society might lock-in to an inefficient technology or market relation 
is far from zero when private and social benefits diverge and self-seeking behavior is 
primary (e.g., a prisoner’s dilemma situation). Cowan (1991) also concluded that 
although governments can. overcome coordination problems due to divergent private and
110 While this increasing returns scenario could simply be labelled an imperfect market, it is obviously 
not amenable to an equilibrium formulation. Therefore, while there are similar issues within mainstream 
theory, the following ideas form a distinct subset of imperfect markets which has not been significantly 
explored.
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social benefits, the ambiguity of the future still remains. Inefficient lock-in resulting 
from uncertainty is inescapable and the goal must be to increase information flows and 
decrease coordination barriers. This idea of open communication to overcome inertia and 
generate progressive change is a prevalent theme of social existence as a whole.
The literature on technological lock-in has centered around a hypothetical dogfight 
between similar products that satisfy the same consumer need (or want). The presence 
of complementary relations implies that an inefficient technology may gain a dominant 
position due to historical circumstance rather than objective superiority. In the case of 
competing technologies, this usually means the technique which minimizes the energy, 
material, time, or cost of production. However, these criteria for determining what is 
an inferior solution are heavily influenced by the current values and priorities operating 
in the economy (e.g., labor costs and discount rates), and one cannot speak of inferiority 
and superiority unless one has such a standard from which to judge. When we speak of 
chemical and physical processes (i.e., engineering problems) these standards may be 
easily ascertained, e.g. steel is stronger than wood. When issues of human welfare (both 
cross-sectional and intergenerational) are involved, the demarcations between good and 
bad, efficient and inefficient, or superior and inferior are not always very clear. 
Furthermore, no portion of contemporary social existence is free of valuation: even the 
de-valuation of values is a quite significant value to hold. While values have the 
potential to change, the conservative inertia inherent to complementary relations may 
resist this change. Yet this web of past actions which is based on past values forms the 
economic heritage of current social existence.
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CHAPTER 4
PARTS, WHOLES, AND HIERARCHIES: A PORTRAIT OF REALITY 
The Language of Conceptual Hierarchies
The goal of science should be to pierce the veil of delusion, to go beyond mere
appearance and apprehend Truth. From a human perspective, the world seems to consist
of certain forms which "stand out" against the backdrop of their surroundings and present
themselves as being relatively stable through time. Such forms are conceived of as
‘wholes,’ ‘things,’ or ‘entities,’ in recognition of this perceived autonomy and stability.
In looking more deeply at the internal organization of these things, one finds that their
inner dynamics consists of the interaction of ‘parts,’ which may themselves appear as a
single entity when viewed from a more detailed perspective (e.g., from molecular to
atomic systems). The word system is used to emphasize the idea that these entities are
not immutable and self-existent per se, but the interrelations of parts which may appear
as a single entity due to their spatio-temporal continuity in relation to a given
perspective. This process metaphysics was described by David Bohm at a conference
on theoretical biology (paraphrased by Platt 1970) as:
the idea that the universe should not be regarded as made up of "things" but of 
a complex hierarchy of smaller and larger flow patterns in which the "things" are 
invariant or self-maintaining features of the flow. The shape of a waterfall or 
a match flame, or the shapes of clouds, which have a certain constancy even
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though masses of moist air are flowing through them and continually condensing 
and evaporating, would be "things" of this type.
The particular "flow pattern" which is the focus of our attention at a given point in time
will be referred to as the focal system. What is perceived of as the parts and wholes will
depend on the spatio-temporal dimension of perception relative to the spatio-temporal
flow pattern or interactive process of the observed system (i.e., the relationship between
the observed and the observer). More accurately, one could say that things manifest in
accord with the existence of the observer. One of the concerns of this chapter is the
definitive placement of human awareness within the spatio-temporal flux of reality and
the resulting decomposition of experience into a hierarchy of parts and wholes.
It is obvious that the perception of a distinct system per se will require that a 
system maintains a semi-autonomous dynamic consistency relative to the observational 
frame; in other words, random relations between elements are not considered to be a 
systemic interaction even though they may influence one another. This homeostatic 
property permits one to conceive of the system in the first place. But, the essential 
aspect of being a whole, as opposed to merely a logical aggregation of parts, is the 
presence of a synthetic quality which emerges due to a meaningful pattern formed by the 
different parts. This idea is captured in the commonly made statement that the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts.
There is, however, a logical paradox within this contention that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts since what appears to be continuous from the vantage of sensory 
perception has become discrete from a conceptual perspective. In the language of 
mathematics and logic, individual elements are existentially independent of one another
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and qualitatively static: the quantity of these elements can change, but it is impossible to 
capture a qualitative leap from the parts to the pattern within this conceptual framework. 
In order to conceive of a synthetic quality, one must accept discrete jumps within one’s 
language which define a new qualitative level: one could say that the whole transcends 
the "logic" of its parts. In this chapter I accept the presence of such qualitative leaps and 
proceeds to build from this point. This acceptance is never reified, but remains 
contingent on the continued effectiveness of this framework in the problem-solving 
process.111 However, the burden of empirical proof is placed on aggregative concepts 
rather than this hierarchical alternative.
The representation of a pattern which possesses different qualities from those of its 
individual parts involves the notion of conceptual leveling. As one increases the spatio- 
temporal dimension of perception (i.e., larger resolution and longer time span), the 
decomposition of experience changes. Things which were semi-autonomous systems 
become the parts of a larger interactive process. As the spatio-temporal perspective is 
increased further, these systems become the parts of an even larger interactive process. 
If a synthetic quality appears within a system, then it can be called a whole to signify this 
new level of integrity. Each shift from the parts to the whole, and then to the whole as 
a part (i.e., parts-whole and whole-part relationships), can be spoken of as a change of 
level within the conceptual hierarchy (i.e., a different order of things). Wholes which 
appear as the parts of the focal system will be identified as lower level systems. The
111 The problem-solving process is defined as the human endeavor to cope with, understand, and 
possibly transcend the state of human existence. This conceptual framework does not correspond to a 
hierarchy of power, but a nesting of conditional relationships which exist simultaneously and manifest to 
perception through variations in the spatio-temporal decompositions of perception.
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larger whole, of which the focal system is a part, will be identified as a higher level 
system. When all these levels are conceived together, they form a nested hierarchy of 
structural order. This is diagrammed in Figure 31.














| —  one level-------------- >
< one level -»[
It must be remembered that hierarchical organization is a conceptual framework used to 
represent simultaneous decompositions of experience rather than being a characteristic 
of some ultimate reality. As a result, there will never be an ultimate hierarchical 
representation, but only variations around major qualitative themes determined by spatio- 
temporal perspective.
As an example of such conceptual levels, neoclassical microeconomic theory 
conceives of individual consumers (i.e., the process of consumption) and individual firms 
(i.e., the process of production) as the fundamental wholes of the macroeconomy (i.e.,
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regional market process): these three processes occur simultaneously.112 The quest for 
microfoundations is an attempt to mathematically aggregate these individuals and firms 
to get the macroeconomy. If the macroeconomy displays patterns which are important 
in and o f themselves (e.g., cities, industries, regions, or nations), such a theoretical 
aggregation will be inappropriate and the derived macroeconomic model will be 
conceptually biased. In other words, it will not accurately represent the qualities which 
compose the macroeconomy through their interaction. While the microeconomic parts 
do form the material substratum of the macroeconomic system, our compiled perception 
of this physical continuity does not translate into the necessity for conceptual continuity. 
This is due to the fact that qualities not present in a purely physical or biological process 
are present in the socio-economic process, notably, self-consciousness.
Since self-consciousness is a distinctive characteristic of human existence and hence 
a structural quality active in social existence, it is important to address the strict 
independence which is commonly assumed by many scientists to exist between concept 
and experience.113 It is not altogether clear that this assumption is universally
112 While the quality of this economic agent is not an issue here, it should be noted that the neoclassical 
concept of ’economic man’ possesses few significant synthetic qualities above a hedonistically conceived 
animal. In denying human beings their distinctiveness, concepts of the socio-economic system built on such 
sterile foundations are stripped of their distinguishing synthetic quality. In addition, individual consumption 
and firm production decisions are frequently assumed to be made completely independent of one another. 
The relationship within these processes is one of strict competition. Few complementary interactions are 
allowed since they destroy the logic of the aggregation (e.g., Marshall’s external economies). As will be 
explored later, competition is only one facet of evolutionary change.
113 An important event in the genesis of the assumption that concept and reality are independent was 
the Enlightenment (e.g., the ideal of rational human thought and Cartesian metaphysical assumptions). 
Nature begins to be thought of as a machine which can be directly known. Many of our conceptions of 
nature have been built on such foundations through the emphasis on empirical fact, objective reason, and 
logical coherence. However, this particular method for discovering the relations manifest in Nature 
originated from a more fundamental and radical assertion concerning an individual’s ability to experience
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warranted. If one’s concept of ‘what reality is’ guides actions which participate in the 
creation of one’s experiences, and if these experiences inform perception, it is 
theoretically possible for the situation to arise in which one’s concepts lead to actions 
which create a perception of experience which supports and hence reinforces the initial 
conception. For example, Myrdal (1944a, 1944b) postulated that racial prejudice may 
result in the withholding of social services (e.g., medical care and education) from 
specific groups deemed inferior. However, this denial of services meant that this 
‘inferior’ group tended to actually be less educated, less healthy, and less affluent. This 
low state of socio-economic being subsequently serves to reinforce the prejudicial 
concepts that went into its creation. While one could contend that the prejudicial 
concepts of social reality are true, this truth has no ultimate validity outside the complex 
interdependencies in which it participates.
This chapter will investigate the possibility of a complementary co-dependence 
between concepts and perception as it relates to the formation of socio-economic theory. 
By explicitly including such epistemological dimensions, one can gamer new insights 
which correct misconceptions concerning the academic community’s relationship with 
social reality and which, therefore, inform future action. Keynes (1936) once 
commented that politicians are frequently slaves to the theories of defunct economists,
and understand reality directly for one’s self. At its heart, the Enlightenment was a reaction to the Catholic 
church’s claim to a monopoly on Truth. No longer was it accepted that Truth flowed selectively through 
particular institutional and cultural channels. Instead it was seen to be accessible to all who applied 
themselves towards its discovery. Unfortunately, these foundations have become blurred. Intolerance has 
shifted through time from a particular individual’s ability to know Truth towards strict adherence to a 
particular method o f inquiry which is sanctioned as universally valid. This claim that the methods of 
gathering knowledge are singular and universal is ironically reminiscent of past claims by the Catholic 
Church that, "Holy thought can be expressed only in Latin" (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:50).
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and Mirowski (1988) could be interpreted to say that many economists have been slaves- 
to the theories of defunct physicists. To the extent that these defunct physicists were 
slaves to the theories of defunct philosophers, the deepest assumptions of socio-economic 
theory are open to investigation.
If such a co-dependence between concept and perception exists, one is led to 
questions of academic responsibility. Do our concepts of society drive social evolution? 
Or does social evolution create our concepts of society? Are these two separable? If our 
concept of socio-economic interaction influences the way society evolves, then this 
influence needs to be explicitly acknowledged. What is the risk involved in assuming 
a strict independence between concept and perceived reality, as opposed to their 
dependence? If one assumes that concepts influence social evolution and they do, one 
must take some responsibility for the way the world is. If concepts do not influence 
social evolution, then whether one takes responsibility or not is unimportant. However, 
if one assumes conceptual independence when such an assumption is false, one divorces 
the artisan from his or her work under the illegitimate jurisdiction of objectivity. This 
game is diagrammed in Figure 32.
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The following discussion presents a philosophical foundation for socio-economic 
theory which accommodates these ideas through the open espousal of an evolutionary 
perspective. The goal is not to provide a new economic or social theory, but to propose 
a new manner of conceiving of the socio-economic process which will, in turn, allow a 
truly evolutionary theory to emerge. In particular, a systemic perspective is proposed 
which emphasizes complementary co-dependent relations which are constrained by their 
participation in both divergent and stabilizing relations. From this perspective, an 
embodied complementary co-dependence would serve as a metaphorical engine fueled by 
lower level relations (e.g., photosynthesis with plants and the Krebs cycle in cellular 
respiration) and motivates higher level structures. The application of this idea to the 
socio-economic process will require substantial background work and is not attempted 
until the final section of this chapter.
201
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Furthermore, by introducing this philosophical alternative many economic insights 
which were previously thought to be in logical opposition to one another can be 
integrated into a coherent whole. For example, neoclassical economics with its emphasis 
on individual decision can be coupled with the Institutionalist’s emphasis on 
culture/technology and a Marxian emphasis on class struggle. This feat is accomplished 
through the recognition that each of these different perspectives addresses a different 
layer of structure within the conceptual hierarchy of socio-economic interaction as a 
whole. Although differences of opinion and boundary conflicts will undoubtedly lead to 
the possibility that the insights of one perspective may improve another perspective or 
even cause the latter to be absorbed into the former as a simple logical extension or 
reduction, these perspectives should primarily complement one another. To argue that 
one is absolutely true and the others absolutely false is similar to three blind men who 
are groping an elephant in different places (e.g., the trunk, ear, and leg) and claiming 
simultaneously to know what the elephant is.114
This discussion starts by exploring the assumptions surrounding the mediation 
between human concepts and ‘what the world is’ by the process of perception. Next, it 
explores the analytic framework with which theoretical concepts are built. These ideas 
will allow us to develop a static hierarchy concept which will consist of two 
complementary components: the structure and process dimensions. Structural elements 
are the qualitative variables engaged in an interactive process, a process which may 
create a pattern with meaning in and of itself. This is amenable to formulation within
114 This metaphor is adapted from The Udana (Ireland 1990:Chapter 6.4), which is a collection of 
discourses attributed to the Buddha.
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a conceptual hierarchy of synthetic qualities. By exploring the concept of process using 
the notions of positive and negative circular causality, a further refinement of the 
conceptual hierarchy is possible through the recognition of synthetic processes. This 
hierarchy concept can then be used to identify the differences between the natural and 
social sciences due to both the fixed position and process of human perception within it.
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Interrelations between Concept. Perception, and Experience
The assumption of absolute independence between concepts, perception, and 
experience is not made in this dissertation. The view adopted here is that the process of 
sensory perception is relative by its very nature and that concepts and experience may 
be complementary and co-dependent. While the use of one’s perceptions in the 
confirmation/falsification of one’s concepts is an accepted fact, the influence that one’s 
concepts assert in the determination of which variable are relevant within one’s field of 
perception is not widely appreciated. If the focal system per se is outside the influence 
of individual actions, which are guided by one’s concept of the situation, then the co­
dependence between concept and experience is attenuated and the phenomenon will 
display a relative fixity when observed. However, as individual action begins to 
participate more fully within the focal system per se, concepts begin to influence 
phenomena in a more subtle fashion (e.g., the socio-economic process). One is to some 
degree placed within a "Which came first?" paradox. In other words, an individual’s 
actions are the expression of their volition or will.115 This expression of one’s will 
through the choice of what action to take is informed by two things. First, concepts of 
‘what reality is’ which serve to anticipate the experiential response to one’s actions. And 
second, perceptions of the current ‘state of reality’ from which this experience is
115 Although I have avoided the topic of human will and volition, which would lead into a philosophy 
of existence, I would appeal to Buddhist insights in any such discussion. The interested reader is referred 
to Sangharakshita (19S7, 1967).
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presumed to flow. These individual actions or inaction determine one’s experience,, 
which is then filtered through perception and thereby brought into comparison with one’s 
original concepts. When the concept of how reality should be is in agreement with how 
it appears, the concept of ‘what reality is’ is taken as having some degree of validity 
(i.e., not falsified). In other words, our original conjectures are not refuted and thereby 
continue to serve as guides to our actions: the trial and error process of knowledge 
accumulation has not resulted in error.116 This process of validation and falsification 
is complicated by the fact that perceptions are not simply given to observation and 
individual actions may actively participate in the focal system per se. This postulated 
interrelationship is diagramed in Figure 33.
116 Although the Problem o f Induction will not be addressed in this discussion, the reader should be 
aware of its presence. What is the Problem of Induction? It involves the attempt to draw conclusions 
regarding the future, based on one’s knowledge of the past. In doing this, it presupposes that a 
generalization, or law, that has been found to hold in the past will continue to hold in the future (see Pheby 
1988; Blaug 1994). However, the use of this inductively derived idea, that there is a uniformity between 
the past and the future, cannot be used to justify induction itself: such a justification would be circular. 
Therefore, one can never confirm a theory as ’true’ through inductive methods since the future will always 
be outside of one’s field of knowledge. As an alternative to induction. Popper (1972, 1983) has suggested 
that we think of the growth of knowledge as a process of trial and error, or conjectures and refutations, 
in which our concepts are continually being tested against our perceptions. In this way, acceptable theories 
fa il to be falsified, rather than verified, through experience.
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Figure 33: Interrelation of Concept. Perception, and Experience












E x p e r ie n c e_ P e rc e p t io n
Subject/O bject
Dichotomy
While all interactive processes may not be in a co-dependent relation with human 
concepts, it is highly likely that socio-economic systems are. The concepts which 
individuals hold with respect to ‘what reality is’ play an active role in the spatio-temporal 
stability and evolution of technology, tradition, culture, religion, and ethics. Such 
notable economic and social theorists as Marx (1844), Veblen (1899), Weber (1904- 
1905), Tawney (1926), and Ayres (1944) have all espoused such a view, albeit with
206
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
differing twists.117 A recent theorist who included such a co-dependence in his 
economic theory was Gunnar Myrdal. Succinctly put, Myrdal (1944) believed that 
prejudicial views as to the superiority and inferiority of different classes of people could 
result in either easy or restricted access to certain social services (e.g., health care and 
education). The denial of these services, however, caused some people to be less 
educated and less healthy, thereby providing a perceptual reinforcement for the original 
beliefs (see Figure 19). In other words, these concepts of ‘what reality is’ provide the 
conditions whereby a reality which is perceived to be in accordance with these original 
concepts emerges. It is not that these concepts are necessarily false, in the sense that 
they are at odds with perception, but rather that they participate in a co-dependence 
which has no ultimate validity; one’s concept of ‘the way the world is’ contributes to the 
conditions for that world’s emergence. What makes Myrdal such a notable proponent 
of these ideas is his general recognition of the complementary relationship between an 
expanded social ideal and socio-economic progress (see Figure 18). The prevalent way 
of life will either suppress or encourage the endogenous process of socio-economic 
development.
Although the vast majority of economists do not normally address such questions, 
the contention that an individual’s working concept of social existence plays a significant
117 Although this may seem to be the reverse of what these theorists proposed (i.e., the individual 
determining the evolution of culture), one must remember that only individuals possess concepts. Since 
culture is no more than a shared belief in the ‘way things should be,’ a collection of statistical individuals 
can lack true individuality (e.g., characterized by forming their own beliefs) to such an extent that the 
group begins to exert a homogenizing influence on the world views of the individual. In this way, culture 
and tradition begin to influence socio-economic evolution through the sanctioning of acceptable belief. 
These issues are dealt with more thoroughly in the last section of this chapter.
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role in creating society is a viable proposition which begs to be fully explored.118 For 
example, Frank et. al. (1993) has found that people trained in neoclassical economic 
theory act differently from those who lack such training. In fact, they act in a notably 
more self-interested manner. Is this behavior ‘natural’ or a result of concepts of what 
is natural? Furthermore, does this concept of what is natural help to recreate its own 
reality? This is not to argue, of course, that the doctrine of self-interest is universally 
false. However, it is not universally true, unless we define all actions as being self- 
interested, in which case the concept of self must be addressed.
In opposition to the possibility of a co-dependent relationship, the conventional 
assumption is twofold: (1) one’s experience is independent of one’s concept of ‘what 
reality is’ and (2) the way we conceptually embody our experiences is somehow related 
to the actual structure of some reality per se. These two assumptions create a 
competitive relationship between our concept of ‘what reality is’ and our experience. In 
other words, in attempting to conceptually embody our experience, any deviation of 
perception from concept signals a discrepancy, discrepancy is taken as evidence of poor 
fit, and poor fit leads to the rejection of the previous conceptual framework and the 
formation of a more accurate representation. This corresponds to saying that there is a
1,8 Of course, the act o f knowing cannot be sterilized through one's theoretical assumptions. For 
example, Muth’s proposal of the rational expectations hypothesis, originating from his work with Charles 
Holt, Franco Modigliani, and Herbert Simon on "satisficing" behavior under uncertainty, served to cut the 
Gordian knot. Simon (1979:505) commented that, "instead of dealing with uncertainty by elaborating the 
model of the decision process, he [Muth] would once and for all - if his hypothesis were correct - make 
process irrelevant" (see also Colander and Guthrie 1980). What RE does is remove the human dimension 
from the socio-economic process by asserting the primacy of a particular structural foundation. The RE 
hypothesis effectively robs "the coordination of economic activities as an economic issue of its most 
fundamental significance" (Wible 1984:93).
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stabilizing circularity between one’s concept of ‘what reality is’ and some reality perse. 
Within this framework, experience is given the status of being ontologically primary, and 
concepts are taken to be secondary.
Since concepts have no influence on this reality, but are in perfect structural 
correlation with its implicate order, epistemological concern is restricted to the empirical 
discovery of ‘what reality is’ and the clearing up of confused concepts about such a 
reality through their lack of concordance with experience. For example, a model which 
is able to describe the current situation or predict the future course of events (determined 
through perception) is deemed to be of a higher quality than one which cannot. Models 
which describe a wide range of phenomena are preferred to those which describe a 
smaller range. In addition to these direct tests against experience, a model can have 
aesthetic value which is reflected in its internal logical consistency and simplicity of 
form. Along these latter lines, one is permitted and encouraged to investigate ‘what 
reality is’ vicariously through logical extrapolations of one’s concepts. The verification 
of such pen and paper theories rests in their confirmation with the actual phenomena they 
attempt to describe or predict."9
To begin to discuss these philosophical proclivities, it is necessary to explore the 
entrenched working assumption that our experience of tangible things represents the 
ultimate objective existence of some reality per se. Such an assumption is frequently 
supported through a plea to common-sense or simple thought experiments which testify
119 Although my choice of the criterion of verification rather than falsification may seem philosophically 
immature, it is made because human actions are typically guided by what is believed to be true rather than 
what is known to be false.
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to the ‘real’ existence of things or entities. For example, a book which is used to thump, 
you on the head exists. The puddle of water you step in exists. The person you hug 
with compassion is witness to the existence o f things. You perceive yourself to exist. It 
is this appearance of individuated existence coupled with the concept of independence 
which is the starting point for formal logic, theoretical science, and hence all scientific 
perspectives on human experience.
However, rather than assuming an inherent quality to things per se , an alternative 
and less demanding assumption would be to contend that this quality o f thingness results 
from the interactive spatio-temporal relationship between human beings and the 
conditions being observed. In other words, that appearances and concepts are not of a 
reality which exists independent of what we are. Yet, the idea that things have an 
independent and inherent existence has been directly woven into our concepts of what it 
means to know something. One might assume that their sense organs (i.e., sight, 
hearing, smell, taste, and touch) perceive the world as it is, and that they conceive of it 
as it is, but this merely demonstrates a strong anthropocentric bias.120 Furthermore', 
it might not be assumed that everyone can perceive this independent reality in an 
opportunistic sense, but that everyone does perceive this reality: not an equality of 
opportunity, but one of actuality. Not only is it possible that our perception of the world 
is imperfect, but also that the things we conceive of may have only a relative existence 
derived from our own spatio-temporal placement within the dynamic flux of reality.
120 Bartley (1987:34-38) presents the limitations of a frog’s visual perception to demonstrate its 
crudeness with respect to human perception and then bluntly asks whether it is appropriate to assume 
perceptual perfection in humans.
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From this perspective, the issue is not the existence of an absolute and unified ontological 
being, but the epistemological relationship between human perception and the concepts 
it engenders.
It is possible to see how the inclusion of an observer introduces the necessity for 
epistemological considerations, for if the observer is outside reality per se, and thereby 
able to perceive it as a whole, any resultant concept of this reality will not be fully 
accurate since it fails to include the observer. In other words, the presence of a knower 
divides reality by entering into it from a particular perspective. The operational 
effectiveness of this relative concept o f experience will depend on the degree to which 
the systemic interaction of interest has been divorced from associated variables which 
play a significant role in its behavior. A complete concept of reality is a logical 
impossibility.121 Paradoxically, the ‘ultimate’ concept of reality can only exist in the 
complete absence of any epistemological dimensions: all concepts are by their very nature 
relative concepts as long as the duality between the knower and the known persists.
This chapter assumes that one’s concept of reality is the cumulative impression of 
a personal sensory experience through time and space which can ultimately stake claims 
to only relative validity. One might be tempted to say that we all live in our own worlds 
to some extent. This does not mean that different individual’s perceptions and 
experiences do not correlate: such a contention would be ludicrous, we are all human. 
To the extent that we all exist as human beings within a context of physical, chemical,
121 John von Neumann’s conclusion that the degree of complexity in a predictive model must be equal 
to or greater than the phenomenon being modeled is relevant here (see Asp ray and Burkes 1966).
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biological, and psychological conditions, our concepts of the world will be similar to one 
another. However, most individual’s concepts and perceptions of social existence will 
differ from one another through different twists (e.g., differences in physique, cultural 
heritage, and life experiences). Therefore, two identically placed observers could have 
identical concepts of physical interaction while concurrently demonstrating a large 
divergence between their concepts of social interaction (e.g., a Chinese and an American 
engineer).
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The Decomposition of Experience through the Process of Perception122
While the process of perception seems to be enjoyed to various degrees by many 
different biological organisms (e.g., plants, insects, animals, and humans), the particular 
structuring of perception can be quite distinct between different forms of life (e.g., see 
Wachtershauser 1987). These different decompositions represent arrangements which 
have significance relative to the perceiving organism: perception is the process of 
discriminating between gradients which are relevant to the organizational continuity of 
the perceiving system (e.g., seeing predators and detecting dinner). While one cannot 
present all potential perceptual distinctions, since the variations are infinite, one can talk 
about how the addition or alteration of existing sensory modalities alters the structural 
decomposition of experience.
Varela et. al. (1991:165) used the perception of color (i.e., what they call the 
"color space") to illustrate this variation in perceptual sensitivity. They noted that while 
the dimensionality of visual perception in humans is trichromatic (3-dimensional 
sensitivity), other organisms possess tetrachromatic (e.g., goldfish and turtles) and even 
pentachromatic perception (e.g., diurnal birds such as pigeons and ducks). Although it 
is possible to translate the differences inherent to a three dimensional color space into
122 These issues have also been addressed by Hayek (1976). Weimer (1982) serves as a nice 
introduction to Hayek's thought in general, and his theory of perception in particular. In addition, Popper 
and Eccles (1977) present both philosophical and neurobiological perspectives on the nature of perception 
and the existence of the self.
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four dimensions i f  three dimensions are shared by both perspectives, the distinctions 
possible within a four dimensional space can never be translated into a three dimensional 
framework without loss of information. For example, a 3-dimensional experience of 
yellow might be fast-yellow, and slow-yellow (using time as a qualifier we all 
understand) within a 4-dimensional framework. While the distinctions possible within 
the former framework are possible within the latter one, the inverse is not true (Varela 
et. al. 1991:183).
While animals may be restricted to one set of perceptual decompositions, human 
beings are able to augment their inherited sensory modalities through the use of 
instruments which translate particular spatio-temporal characteristics of otherwise 
unobservable phenomena into observable ones. For example, the frequency of a neuron’s 
action potential is translated into auditory clicks and visual curves. Through the use of 
these observational instruments, the set of possible structural decompositions of reality 
increases. However, it must be remembered that this augmented perspective is actively 
constructed, translated into our native perceptual language, and then synthesized into 
concepts. The following section presents the epistemological limitations inherent to the 
process of perception in order to provide a foundation for later discussions concerning 
the concepts of circular causality and synthetic qualities which emerge from the 
aggregation of elements. It presents the biophysical foundations which decompose 
experience into an observation set characterized by the spatio-temporal dimensions of 
perception. Although this observation set will be dialectic in nature, this quality will be 
abstracted from and the set will be generically labelled the inherent structure o f
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perception. Once the field of potential perceptions to which attention may be directed 
is identified, the discussion can turn to the conceptual construction of a "unified" 
perception through the criteria of significant and meaningful patterns within the 
observation set.123
The Limitations of Sensory Perception
When a human being has experiences via sensory perception, there are 
characteristic dimensions of time and space inherent to particular sensory modalities 
which structure the maximum detail available, beyond which the demarcation between 
‘things’ is not possible. In discussing this notion of perceptual structuring, the human 
eye will be presented as a representative sensory modality.124 The following discussion 
is intended to establish the fact that the process of human sensory perception presents a 
set of dialectically discrete signals which are merely a subset of all such possible 
decompositions. This discussion is intentionally a terse, general introduction to the 
insights available within the psychological field of sensation and perception.
123 This task is simplified through the recognition that the majority of unobservable phenomena are 
translated into a visual language through symbolic concepts (e.g., numbers, letters, and words) and 
representations.
124 The following discussion, which derives from three primary sources (i.e., Clark 1993; Cornsweet 
1970; Levine and Shefher 1991) will hopefully provide the reader with a general understanding of the 
structuring that occurs within the process of perception. The visual system is chosen since it has been 
intensively investigated for over 200 years and current debates center around the "proper explanation of 
the facts" rather than the facts themselves (Evans 1974:4).
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What is the inherent structure of perception? The temporal dimension o f perception 
represents the fastest rate of spatial fluctuation (i.e., temporal difference) that is 
perceptible to a human being by means of a particular sense. For example, at what rate 
(i.e., flashes per second) does a blinking light go from being perceived as a blinking light 
to a light which is constantly on? One can also investigate different facets of the 
perception of spatial qualities. How bright must a light be relative to its context before 
it becomes perceptible? This question alludes to the fact that perception is not solely 
determined by the object of perception itself, but by the contrast between the object and 
its background. A small bright light which is imperceptible during the day is easily seen 
at night. Affiliated with this is the resolution of spatial perception; how large must a 
light be relative to one’s field of view in order to be perceived? These two questions 
concerning the spatial dimension o f perception are obviously inversely related: large 
objects (i.e., those which subtend a large area of visual perception) will require less 
contrast to be perceived while small objects will require more. Furthermore, the 
questions concerning the temporal and spatial dimensions are interrelated: large objects 
of high contrast which subtend a large area of the perceptual window will be 
distinguishable at smaller temporal intervals than objects of low contrast which subtend 
a smaller area.
The discussion of visual perception will begin with the spatial dimension of 
perception. There are two varieties of light receptive cells found in the retina of the 
human eye (i.e., the physiological screen onto which images fall). These are known as 
rods and cones. All rods contain a single type of light sensitive pigment, rhodopsin,
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while cones are divided into three distinct types on the basis of three different light 
sensitive pigments (i.e., each cone has only one of these pigments present). It is the 
interplay of multiple receptors of different sensitivities which provides the perception of 
color. While the cones are concentrated at a high density in the very center of the retina 
directly behind the lens (i.e., the fovea), the rods are distributed around this area with 
their density declining as one moves further into the periphery. Therefore, when we 
direct our eyes to a particular object, its image falls predominantly in this central area 
of the retina which is composed almost exclusively of a high density of cones. This 
gives the image we perceive greater resolution since the density of receptors is high, and 
provides more acute color perception since there are three different photoreceptive 
sensitive pigments present. This distribution of rods and cones is particular to humans 
and some other primates and is not a general characteristic of visual systems in biology 
(Levine and Shefner 1991:92). Thus we can conclude that humans have a peculiar mode 
of visual perception, one contributing to a particular sense of reality.
Each of these four types of receptor cells is most sensitive to a particular 
wavelength of light (i.e., the spatial quality discriminated for) and display a decreasing 
sensitivity to light of increasing and decreasing wavelengths around this particular 
wavelength of peak sensitivity. As a result, each type of receptor responds differently 
to different visual stimuli. The following figure plots the proportion of light quanta 
absorbed by a rod versus stimulus wavelength to yield what appears to be a slightly 
skewed almost-normal distribution (from Levine and Shefner 1991:101).
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Figure 34: The Spectral Absorption of Rhodnpcin
400 450 500 550 600 650
Wavelength (nm)
From this graph, it is easy to see that in order to find out how many quanta of light a rod 
actually absorbs one must not only know the wavelength of light, but also its intensity 
(i.e., the total number of quanta involved in the stimulus).
The translation of this absorption of light quanta into a neural signal is 
accomplished through what is known as an action potential (i.e., the basic unit of 
information in the nervous system). The physiological process underlying this event is 
not as important as the resulting structure the signal takes, since it is the frequency of the 
action potentials rather than their size and shape which changes as a function of stimulus 
strength.125 Therefore, stronger stimuli produce more action potentials in a given time
129 From a hierarchical perspective it is interesting to note that action potentials result from the multi­
level interaction of electrical, chemical, and organic processes. In particular, a balance between electrical 
and chemical gradients is mediated by a change in the neuron’s membrane which selectively alters its 
permeability to certain ions. This organic alteration of the axon membrane lasts for a period of less than 
four thousandths of a second. See Levine and Shefner (1991:Chapter 3:46-47) for a textbook discussion 
of neurophysiology.
218
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
period than weaker stimuli. However, since the process by which action potentials are 
propagated requires time, the frequency response of these potentials is limited. This 
establishes a temporal dimension inherent to the process of visual perception.
One of the ways that receptors overcome this inherent limitation is by responding 
to stimuli change and contrast rather than absolute levels of stimulation.126 By holding 
the stimulus’ context intensity (I) constant while varying the stimulus intensity, one can 
start to ask questions concerning the intensity differential above background required to 
elicit a response from the visual receptors. Beginning with a context of darkness, one 
finds is that rods have a lower threshold o f sensitivity to stimuli intensity than cones.127 
In other words, the rods are sensitive to lower levels of stimulus intensity, relative to a 
dark context, than cones. Since it is the synthesis of different visual receptors’ responses 
to a stimulus that provides the perception of color, and since the threshold for cones has 
not been exceeded, there is actually a range of stimulus intensity above a dark 
background that will be colorless (i.e., perceived in black, white, and grey) to human 
perception. It is not that the stimulus lacks color, but merely that humans are unable to 
perceive these differences at such low intensities.
126 It is said that a frog placed in a pan of slowly heated water will not be able to sense the impending 
doom before it is too late. In other words, perception is not transitive.
137 'Threshold sensitivity* is defined as the level of stimulus above ambient levels which is detectable 
with experimental probabilities greater than chance. For example, a subject is asked to respond whether 
a light is seen or not seen. There are four possibilities (I) that a stimulus is present and seen, (2) present 
but not seen, (3) not present but seen, and (4) not present, not seen. Chance is defined as the point at 
which the subject responds correctly to the presence/absence of the stimulus fifty percent of the time. If 
the subject is able to discriminate at a rate greater than this fifty percent level, they are said to be able to 
discriminate the stimulus from its context. It is interesting to note that subjects will display discrimination 
rates greater than chance even when they claim that they are unable to perceive any stimulus differentials.
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As the intensity of the stimulus above background, AI, increases, the threshold of 
sensitivity for cones will be exceeded, but the sensitivity of the rods loses its 
responsiveness and the signal becomes saturated. In a binary framework, one could say 
that rods come to be continually "on" and hence provide no information on signal 
variability within this range. In a similar manner, as the context illumination (I) 
increases, rods will cease responding to signal variability (AI) since the context itself will 
dominate their response. This results in two dialectically distinct ranges of visual 
sensitivity which respond to low (scotopic: rods) and high illumination (photopic: cones), 
the former being perceived as colorless. Note that this difference will also result in 
different perceptions of color brightness within high and low illumination contexts. This 
is demonstrated by the fact that in the dim light of early morning reds look the blackest 
of all colors: as light increases the blues emerge as the brightest only to be overtaken by 
yellows and greens in full sunlight. This is know as the Purkinje Shift (Levine and 
Shefner 1991:146-147). Although this combination between stimulus and context creates 
a host of interesting sensory phenomena, only a general stimulus-context intensity 
relationship is investigated here.
The issue of determining the stimulus intensity differential (AI) necessary for 
stimulus detection is captured in Weber’s Law. This general relationship states that AI 
is in constant proportion (k<  1) to the average level of background intensity (I).
Weber’s Law AI = AI
It is important to note that receptors will lose their sensitivity below threshold and their 
signal will be saturated at high stimulus strengths. Therefore, this law breaks down at
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both low and high levels of intensity. As stated earlier, at low levels there is a minimum 
AI necessary to stimulate the receptor. And at high levels, the time period required for 
the sensory receptor to reset the signaling process places an upper bound on the range 
of different signals it can send. In other words, the frequency of action potentials per 
second is limited by the time necessary for the receptor to create such a signal. One is 
left with the following qualitative relation.
Figure 35: Receptor Responses versus Log of Stimulus Strength
Receptor
Response
Log of Stimulus Strength
Such limitations are also highlighted through a discussion of color perception (i.e., 
the photopic sensitivity range) which involves the synthesis of three different receptor 
signals (i.e., the three types of cones) into a single perception. While past scientists have 
attempted to identify distinct colors with distinct wavelengths of light (i.e., a ‘pure’ color 
stimuli), such a simple correlation has been found to be inaccurate. In fact, color is 
merely the psychological labelling of a physiological event which has a one-to-many 
character; in other words, impure stimuli composed of different wavelength lights can 
yield identical color perceptions to a pure stimulus consisting of only a single wavelength
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of light. Two physically different stimuli result in identical receptor responses. Such
a match is called a metameric match. One can begin to understand this perceptual
phenomenon by using the spectral absorption of rhodopsin (see Figure 34), the visual
pigment found in rods.
For example, photons at 450 nm and at 550 nm both have approximately a 5 percent 
chance of absorption. Approximately the same number of absorptions will occur in 
response to light of 450 nm as of 550 nm, so whatever effects are produced by one 
can be produced as well by the other. The receptors cannot discriminate between 
those wavelengths. (Clark 1993:31)
When one includes the intensity of light, the problem of non-uniqueness becomes even
more complex since different absorption rates can be compensated for through different
intensities.
To match the effect of 100 quanta at the 500 nm wavelength, one simply needs to 
increase the intensity of the stimulus at 575 nm, to make up for the lower rate of 
absorption. (Clark 1993:31)
The solution to this non-uniqueness problem is to have multiple receptors with 
different absorption spectra and then to compare their individual responses for a given 
stimulus. Since there are three distinct types of cones which have three different spectral 
absorption distributions, corresponding to short, medium, and long wavelength 
photopigments, different light stimuli which have identical effects on the medium 
wavelength photoreceptor will have different effects on its short and long wavelength 
counterparts. The discrimination made possible through these varied responses is the 
perceptual phenomenon we call color. However, it still remains possible to adjust the
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intensity of three arbitrarily chosen reference light sources to get a metameric match with 
a pure source (Clark 1993:43).128
The most important point to extract from this discussion of color perception is the 
recognition that perception is a structuring process which possesses an inherent trade-off. 
If this structuring is so narrow as to make the receptors sensitive to only a unique 
wavelength, i.e., a spectral absorption distribution with only a single peak rather than a 
range, the problem of multiple stimuli yielding identical perceptions is removed. 
However, one would need an infinite diversity of such specialized receptors to 
compensate for an individual receptor’s lack of sensitivity to other stimuli. The receptor 
has become too specialized. Expanding an individual receptor’s realm of noticeable 
stimuli expands the problem of non-uniqueness in exchange for broader sensitivity. The 
extent to which one suffers from non-uniqueness is determined by the spectral absorption 
distribution around its peak (i.e., its variance); higher variance corresponds with a 
greater breadth of sensitivity but a decreasing ability to easily differentiate between 
similar stimuli. The trade-off which evolves between the breadth and focus of sensitivity 
will be reflected in the parameters of this spectral absorption distribution. Since this 
distribution will taper off at both ends, two proximate quality stimuli which fall within 
the outlying range of the different receptors will be indistinguishable from one another.
128 There are stipulations that must be met for this to be true, but these qualifications do not detract 
from the fascinating fact that physically distinct stimuli produce identical perceptions. These stipulations 
are as follows: First, none of the three reference lights can be a linear combination of the other two. 
Second, we allow for the match to include negative values of the reference lights: this translates into an 
addition of this particular reference light to the pure source, thus matching this new combination with the 
combination of the remaining two reference lights. Third, we assume that the experiment is conducted 
against a neutral background in order to nullify the affects of stimulus/context interaction since intensity 
and color contrast can alter such matching exercises. And finally, one must note that the size of stimuli 
relative to the visual field can complicate the situation.
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Therefore, the synthesis of varied signals to yield color perception will have a limited 
range of function.
A fascinating parallel can be drawn between this trade-off and the construction of 
conceptual categories (i.e., mental representations of spatial qualities and temporal 
continuity). Within the process of conceptual embodiment, one is also faced with a 
trade-off between uniqueness and similarity; extremely narrow criteria for a spatial 
quality will allow a unique mental discrimination, but reduce the general applicability of 
the concept within theoretical relationships. To the extent that different things possess 
qualitative similarities which result in similar interactions with other things, much can 
be gained by de-emphasizing their uniqueness and highlighting their similarity to yield 
theoretical generalizations. In contrast, excessively broad criteria of similarity reduce 
the uniqueness of individual qualities and hence have the potential to dilute the power of 
theoretical understandings.
This simple presentation is not intended to address the idiosyncracies of visual 
perception and those interested in a more detailed analysis are referred to sources such 
as Comsweet (1970) and Levine and Shefner (1991). For example, the adaptation of 
receptors to light and darkness is a fascinating feat of physiological magic, as is the 
synthesis of these base level signals through higher level neurons to create the perception 
of vertical and horizontal lines. However, what the current presentation does do is 
provide a brief introduction to some of the spatio-temporal limitations inherent to the 
process of perception. Through this brief discussion, one is introduced to the presence 
of threshold effects and non-uniqueness. Prior to this point in the discussion, the stimuli
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might have been taken as obvious and unambiguous. It is therefore important to address, 
the question of how one determines what the important stimuli are within a setting.
Concepts as Guides to Perception
The process of sensory perception involves the recognition of difference: without 
difference there is no perception. In other words, differences which have absolutely no 
bearing on a system cannot be said to exist within that system’s perceptual world view. 
In fact, the visual process incorporates a slight endogenous unsteadiness to accommodate 
the physiological need for difference within the perception process. Within this set of 
perceptions, concepts and mental images represent the retention of patterns of perception 
which make a. meaningful difference, and thereby represent a process of distillation which 
occurs within the possible scope of perception. Allen, O’Neill, and Hoekstra (1987:67) 
comment that the limits to perception are "what it is possible to see: within these limits, 
transformation and analysis further confine what is seen to something commensurate with 
human comprehension." An old Arabian proverb takes this even a step further in stating 
that, "the eye is blind to what the mind does not see" (Evans 1974:20).
This dissertation uses the words perception and concept instead of fact and theory 
to ground the discussion in the realm of human experience and shift it away from the 
subject/object overtones of the latter pair of terms. While the word fact is frequently 
taken to mean ‘the state of things as they are,’ perception is explicitly ‘the state of things 
as they appear.’ Everyone should realize that to assert that facts (i.e., perceptions) exist
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in dependence on theory (i.e., concepts) is fa r  from  radical. Many social scientists and 
philosophers have contended that fact and theory can be tangled up in a paradox of first 
movers when it comes to social theorizing (e.g., Myrdal, Kuhn, Kant, Foucault, 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, etc.).
The identification of meaningful patterns in perception is a question with which 
Gestalt psychologists have grappled for years. Although many assume that stimuli are 
self-evident and that one must merely identify when they are present, the task of 
perception will also include identifying what the relevant stimuli are. It is not the 
relative size, intensity, or color of a stimulus which is important here, but the 
establishment of the stimulus/context distinction. For example, what do you see in the 
following illustration?
Figure 36: Multiple Equilibria in the Perception of Form
T
What one perceives will depend on whether one chooses to make black or white the 
background. If white is chosen, then the image of two faces will appear. If black, then 
the image of a vase. Is it possible to see both pictures at one time? This question is not 
an issue of whether one can conceptually understand that both perceptions are possible, 
since this is obviously true, but whether one can truly perceive in both ways
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simultaneously. Although I know of no experimental results which address this 
phenomenon, my inclination is to contend that such an act is impossible since it would 
imply the division of awareness within a single focal point of perception.129 In other 
words, the uniqueness of the vase must be sacrificed to increase one’s perception of the 
faces, and vice versa: to be aware of both simultaneously is to be aware of neither one 
fully.
The identification of the elements of the focal system becomes more complicated 
when one realizes that perceptions frequently inform one another through both temporal 
sequence and spatial context. For example, what do you see in this next illustration?*30
129 Please see Kruse and Stadler (1993) for supportive research.
130 This is from Barlow and Mollon (1982:118).
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Figure 37: Concept as Guide for Perception
The eye will survey the different parts of this scene in order to compose a concept of 
what it represents as a whole. The horizontal line, a small "ship" in the "distance," the 
light versus darker surface, and the "trees" all help to create a distinction between water 
and land which then lends meaning to any further perceptual survey. Such a mental 
composition might be more difficult for the layman to construct out of Picasso’s Friendly 
Nude and other such early cubist art work which require a more specialized pre­
conception. However, the general rule is that pre-conceptions of phenomena and form 
(e.g., cubist art: the presence of different perspectives in a single perception) allow us 
to order the perception and extract an appropriate concept of ‘what it is .’ In this way,
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concepts lend a predisposition to perception. For example, while the above illustration 
is easily perceived as a beautiful shore, one can also find another image within this 
scene: that of Napoleon standing between the two trees. Barlow and Mollon (1982) go 
even further than this by interpreting this space as representing Napoleon in particular, 
an interpretation which may say more about these authors than the picture itself.
These perceptual phenomena are possible since the eye does not see the whole
scene in its totality, but builds up this totality from a compounding of the details.
The image of a room, or any other situation, is in the mind. Any details in that 
image, except the very broadest, have been built up by successive glances 
directly at these details; both the details and the broad image are retained by the 
mind for as long as they are wanted and then as quickly erased ... (Evans 
1974:21)
This composition of the whole image from the perception of its constituent parts is 
influenced by conceptual expectations and is done in a similar manner to the scientific 
method.131 For example, the following figure is ambiguous:
131 Studies have also found that translation differences exist due to cultural and experiential factors. 
For example, one experiment presents the capital letter "T" constructed in such a way that the vertical and 
horizontal lines which compose it are identical in length. Subjects are then asked which segment is longer? 
Of course, since both are of equal length, one would assume that the response rate would be S0:50. 
However, it was found that people from mountainous regions tend to see the vertical segment as longer 
while people from desert regions tend to see the horizontal segment as longer.
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Figure 38: Conceptual Referencing within Perception
The observer may begin with the hypothesis that the loop to the left is a face; 
which means the triangular projection on the far left is a nose, the black band 
below is a necklace, and so on. As each part falls into place, no hypothesis need 
be rejected, and the young lady is seen. Alternatively, if the first hypothesis was 
that the loop to the left is a nose, then the triangle is a wart on it and the band 
is a mouth. No hypothesis need be rejected, and the old lady is seen. There are 
no details drawn completely enough to cause the rejection of any particular 
hypothesis. (Levine and Shefner 1991:285-286)
Therefore, as long as the string of conceptual hypotheses goes unchallenged within the
process of organizing the constituent pieces of perception into a conceptually coherent
whole, there is no reason to question the translation process (see Kruse and Stadler
1993). In a statistical language, given the confidence intervals of the observer, there is
no reason to reject the initial concepts used to translate perception.
Another illustration of such a concept-perception filtering is witnessed in 
psychological experiments where individuals were briefly presented with arrays of four 
letters, and then asked to determine whether a particular target letter had been present 
(Johnston and McClelland 1974). The experimental population is divided into two 
groups: the first group is asked to look at a central position and read the word, while the
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second group is told the position that the target letter will be in and asked to watch only
that position. What is surprising is that the first group was more successful than the
second at performing this task.
That is, it was easier to read an entire four letter word and deduce whether it 
contained the target letter anywhere within it than to find the target letter in a 
forewarned position. One would think we recognize letters in order to read 
words, but in this experiment the words were read to identify the component 
letters. (Levine and Shefner 1991:259)
Similar findings have been obtained with identifying lines imbedded in coherent versus
incoherent figures (Weisstein and Harris 1974; Wong and Weisstein 1982). Therefore,
one must conclude that perception is not merely a passive process of receiving
impressions of dynamic reality, but requires the observer to consciously identify what
‘the’ perception is.
This potential co-dependency is made more complex when instruments (e.g.,
microscopes and photographs) are introduced which allow us to perceive the otherwise
hidden differences within reality. For example, one way that the human nervous system
signals stimulation is through a discrete change in its polarization which is transmitted
along the length of the neuron’s axon (i.e., an action potential). This phenomenon is
unobservable to human perception without the use of instruments.
The amplified nerve signals must be displayed in a way that the experimenters 
can understand. If the signal consists of action potentials, it can be fed to a 
loudspeaker, just as the output of a stereo amplifier goes to a loudspeaker. Each 
time an action potential occurs, the loudspeaker produces a click. The 
experimenter can often get an idea of how various stimuli are modulating the rate 
of firing by listening to the signal. (Levine and Shefner 1991:59, italics added)
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It may also be helpful to have a written account of this signal as a function of time, but 
such a graph cannot be drawn by hand with a pen and paper. Such a technique would 
be much too slow.
The only kind of pen that can obtain speeds high enough to trace an action 
potential that is completed in a fraction of a millisecond is a ‘pen’ consisting of 
a beam of electrons ‘writing’ on a phosphor screen [i.e., an oscilloscope]. 
(Levine and Shefner 1991:59)
The concepts which calibrate these instruments, and thereby focus our senses which 
peer through them, introduce a more explicit conceptual dimension to our experiences. 
The choice of significant elements within and between different observation sets is 
influenced by one’s concept of the problem. In other words, one’s pre-conceptions serve 
to lend direction to the admissible perceptions which confirm/falsify one’s concept of the 
situation.132 One chooses the spatio-temporal qualities which are highlighted and 
frequently even the orientation of the observational instruments (e.g., optical, infrared, 
radar, etc. involved with images of the Earth from satellites). Effective translations (i.e., 
capable of accurately informing the observer’s operational concept of the system under 
investigation) will, by necessity, pair the spatio-temporal dimensions of the observation 
process with those of the phenomenon under investigation. In other words, a 
phenomenon must be observed on its own terms in order to be conceived with accuracy. 
However, to the extent that the augmented perceptions are not tailored to the
132 For example, American geneticist Barbara McClintock’s theory that genes can jump from one place 
to another within a cell (i.e., transposable elements) was rejected by her colleagues in biology and genetics 
for thirty years since it was at odds with the received wisdom. McCIintock was awarded the 1984 Nobel 
Prize for her work along these lines. Another example is the theory of Apoptosis in molecular biology 
(i.e., programmed cell death) which is now heralded as a fundamental biological mechanism which offers 
much promise in cancer research (Meyn 1994).
232
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
phenomenon they seek to observe (e.g., quarterly economic data based on the orbiting 
of the earth around the sun which is used to assess the dynamics of a manufacturing 
economy), attempts to build concepts from this observation set may not accurately 
embody the process under observation.
Although all phenomena will not be significantly influenced by the conceptual 
dimension, it is important to appreciate when this co-dependence must be accounted for 
theoretically. One can begin to address this issue by realizing that although human 
concepts can roam freely through a mental universe, the biophysical process of 
perception fixes one’s perspective. For example, a human being will either see through 
the eyes, hear through the ears, smell through the nose, taste with the tongue, or feel 
through the skin.133 Unless one transcends the human condition, one’s concepts are 
from a distinctly human perspective which is derived within the process of human 
perception. By acknowledging this fixed nature of observation rather than allowing it to 
arbitrarily roam through phenomenal space, tangible differences appear between 
observing relatively lower (e.g., physical, chemical, and biological) versus higher level 
systems (e.g., self-consciousness). This creates unique difficulties for conceptualizing 
the latter as opposed to the former, leads to a richer understanding of the relative success 
of the natural sciences as opposed to the social sciences, and identifies avenues of future 
social research which may prove fruitful.
133 The number of different sensory modalities is not as important as their existence as modalities. The 
inclusion of additional sensory modes would not change the quality of the argument presented here, 
although the hierarchical arrangement of synthetic qualities might be significantly altered.
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The Observation Set
From this presentation of visual perception in humans, the following characteristics 
of a given process of perception are posited:
(1) Perception is a process which identifies a particular spatial dimension (i.e., 
quality) within a context. However, there exists a trade-off between sensitivity 
to multiple stimuli versus the identification of a unique stimulus. To the extent 
that receptors possess a range of sensitivity, there will be a many-to-one 
correspondence between the phenomenon being observed and the resulting 
perception.
(2) Given a receptor’s sensitivity to a particular spatial quality range, there will 
be a threshold of sensitivity above ambient distributions required for detection. 
Stimulus intensity above this threshold will contribute a quantitative dimension 
to a given spatial quality. Saturation occurs when marginal increases in the 
stimulus intensity no longer produce a noticeable change.
(3) The process of perception is a nesting of physical, chemical, and biological 
conditions that requires the duration of time. The temporal interval between 
perceptual ‘moments’ is a characteristic of a particular perceptual process and 
contributes a temporal dimension to any observational set.
(4) Perceptions which do not change will cease being attended to in time. 
Therefore, if one is to remain aware of constant differences, the perspective must 
be shifted to create the perception of change.
(5) Perceptions can and are physiologically integrated into composite perceptions 
(e.g., color vision). This process of integration results in a multidimensional 
perception which possesses the four aforementioned characteristics.
These individual observation sets of distinct sensory modalities (i.e., vision,
olfactory, auditory, tactile, and gustatory) can also be compiled into a master set which
informs a mental concept of the phenomenon (as per #5). The most fundamental
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composition of multiple modalities into a mental concept is the emergence of the concept 
of self versus other. It is from this reference point, the central "I" of existence, that 
observational and conceptual extensions are made. For example, instruments are placed 
between "I" and experience in order to change the spatio-temporal decomposition of 
perception and hence the apparent structure of ‘what reality is.’ From this evolutionary 
perspective, humanity’s ability to use external instruments to augment the process of 
perception supports the claim that economic development is a continuation of biological 
evolution (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:11).
An interesting aspect of this use of instruments to augment perception, which is 
aided by concepts which compile the new perceptual extensions into an overall vision, 
is that it must literally begin at our feet (i.e., that which is known) before ascending to 
the heavens of planetary interaction or descending into the depths of atomic structure. 
In other words, our concepts and instrumentally augmented observation set must co- 
evolve. The acceptability of these augmented perspectives is dependent on one’s ability 
to incorporate them into one’s overall world view through either a conceptual 
understanding of the process of translating unobservable to observable phenomena (e.g., 
the Hubble telescope) or the final perceptual orientation (e.g., visions of God). The 
individual pieces of the concept-perception circularity must "fit" one another, and an 
isolated knowledge of either perceptual direction without a corresponding knowledge of 
the perceptual translation process, or vice versa, is a dangerous ledge to rest one’s faith 
on. Crystal balls whose perceptual process and orientation are unknown must have one 
of these chasms breached or face dismissal as mere kaleidoscopic toys.
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Therefore, while the five aforementioned characteristics form the latent potential 
within one’s observation set, one must also include the influence of an observer’s 
conceptual framework and expectations when considering the actual observation set 
acceptable to that observer. As a result, the following concept-perception filtering 
characteristics are included.
(6) A mental aggregation of individual spatio-temporal qualities can occur in such a 
way that a tendency for temporal co-variance and spatial proximity results in these 
qualities being conceived of as related. The perception of such an aggregation is 
referred to as a mental perception of form.
(7) Since indirect observation via instrumentation creates a characteristic spatio- 
temporal decomposition, conceptual priors and expectations are frequently used to 
orient augmenting instruments. These guided perceptions are then used to confirm 
and falsify the very concepts which contributed to their initial selection.
(8) The degree of coherence believed to inhere within the resultant percept- 
concept correlation is determined by one’s tolerance for ambiguity. Some degree 
of ambiguity will always exist since no perception can ever serve as a fu ll 
representation: all concepts are ultimately false.
It is to the structure and process of mental conception that this discussion now turns.
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The Internal Coherence and Incoherence within Mental Conception134
Sometime in the past, humans gained the ability to compile their perceptions into 
a coherent, unified whole. The senses were somehow "pulled together" and the concept 
of an external reality emerged from this unification (see Appendix D). This synthetic 
ability to conceive of a separate reality allows one to manipulate and anticipate one’s 
experiences, and therefore live more effectively than those who lack such working 
understandings. Furthermore, it was discovered that learning from others was easier and 
safer than discovering for oneself. This opportunity to learn vicariously led to a building 
of communal knowledge. To aid in this endeavor, taxonomic science evolved as a 
system of classification for the filing of descriptive propositions. In such a system, an 
object is characterized by a unique set of spatial qualities and the interactions between 
such objects are remembered as particular events. Since each particular piece of 
knowledge has to be remembered individually, in its uniqueness, the extensive use of 
taxonomic science was limited by memory.
It was at this stage of human development that theoretical science emerged from 
taxonomic science as an "economy of thought" (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:15).135
134 The ideas of this section are heavily influenced by the work of Georgescu-Roegen.
135 It is interesting to note that Georgescu-Roegen (1971:22) saw theoretical science as a living 
organism which has a "genesis and evolution". It "emerged from an amorphous structure - the taxonomic 
science - just as life emerged from inert matter." It possesses a purposeful mechanism in the quest for 
knowledge, for the sake of knowledge. It reproduces itself since any "forgotten" proposition can be 
rediscovered from the logical foundations. It grows since the same foundations continually produce new 
propositions. And lastly, it preserves itself since destructive contradictions are automatically removed from
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General relations between different classes of qualitatively similar objects could be 
established. Instead of memorizing all knowledge directly, it was only necessary to 
memorize the principles of interaction, the criteria for similarity, and the rules for 
unfolding the whole of knowledge from this base. Knowledge is thereby relieved of the 
"burden of singular instance, the tyranny of the particular" (Medawar as cited in 
Georgescu-Roegen 1971:27). This recognition of recurring tendencies in the covariation 
of stable qualities reaches its conceptual climax in the mechanistic conception of nature. 
Spatial qualities such as mass, malleability, and form (e.g., springs versus gears) are 
taken to be general characteristics of physical objects such that the relationships between 
objects become generalized. One abstracts from the uniqueness of objects in favor of 
their similarities. An object is then represented by a  variable whose magnitude 
represents either an intensity or its proliferation in space. Georgescu-Roegen believed 
that within such theoretical models, the constant and quantifiable nature of the 
relationship between objects is a consequence of the fact that they display no qualitative 
change over the course of their variation (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:102). The fact that 
the quantitative relationship between the first set of variables is qualitatively identical to 
that between the hundredth creates an indifference to scale which manifests itself 
mathematically as homogeneous (first degree) linear relationships. Relations which are 
not indifferent to scale represent the presence of qualitative change and a stretching of 
the effectiveness of that particular theoretical concept of experience.
the structure.
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Theoretical Science
Georgescu-Roegen’s analysis of theoretical science begins by establishing two 
classes of propositions: a-propositions and /3-propositions.136 One can think of a- 
propositions as the qualitative elements of a process and j8-propositions as the quantitative 
elaborations, combinations, and extensions of these categorical foundations through the 
rules of logic and causal reasoning. In other words, a-propositions represent the building 
blocks and /3-propositions the buildings of theoretical concepts. A notable quality of /8- 
propositions is that they always preserve the integrity and individual identity of the a- 
propositions they are composed of. Due to this fact, /3-propositions will be referred to 
as aggregations of their a-class constituents.
The three laws of logic which establish the discrete individuality of a-propositions 
are identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. The law of identity states that a thing 
(referred to as 3) is always equal or identical to itself (3 equals 9f). This law formulates 
"the material fact that definite things, and traits of things, persist and maintain 
recognizable similarity amidst all their phenomenal changes. Wherever essential 
continuity exists in reality, the law of identity is applicable" (Novack 1971:23). The law 
of contradiction is the negative formulation of the law of identity. If a thing is always 
equal or identical to itself, it cannot be unequal or different from itself (3 is not non-S). 
This individuated exclusiveness is completed in the third law, that of excluded middle. 
A thing cannot be parts of two opposing classes simultaneously. From these three laws,
136 Although Georgescu-Roegen proceeded from a model of theoretical science to phenomena, others 
have proceeded from phenomena to scientific understanding (e.g., Hayek 1967d; Popper 1972). To do 
this, they have frequently begun their discussions by categorizing phenomena, e.g., as clouds and clocks 
in Popper’s case.
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difference and identity are "completely different, utterly disconnected, mutually exclusive 
characteristics of both things and thought" and "the correctness of one judgement 
invariably implies the incorrectness of its contrary and vice versa" (Novack 1971:21). 
These formal laws of logic establish the basic rules by which theoretical science 
maintains individual distinctions within the class of a-propositions.
Geometry is one of the champions of theoretical science and its process of logical 
extrapolation. The a-propositions might be: (1) assume that one is given a triangle (sum 
of all angles is 180°) which (2) possesses one right angle (90°). Then the /8-propositions 
would include: (1) the sum of the other two angles is 90°, (2) the area of the triangle is 
equal to one half the product of the lengths of the two sides adjacent to the right angle, 
and (3) the sum of the square roots of the two sides adjacent to the right angle is equal 
to the square root of the hypotenuse (i.e., the side opposite the right angle).137 
Therefore, one can extrapolate from a small set of initial conditions to various aggregate 
relations and a diverse set of actual experiences (i.e., all triangles which share the a-class 
assumptions corresponding to these /8-class rules).
If an a-proposition is not accessible to direct experimental verification (e.g., the 
self-interested character of human nature), it is assumed to be indirectly verified if the 
logically derived /8-propositions agree with observation. There are three qualifications
137 The Pythagoreans, who have this geometric theorem named after them, developed a whole 
philosophical world view based on whole numbers. It is rumored that once while at sea, one of the 
Pythagoreans discovered the square root of two (i.e., 12+12=2) as a possible length for the side of a 
triangle. Since this value cannot be expressed by the ratio of two whole numbers (i.e., an irrational 
number), this created such chaos within their neat world that they threw the person who discovered this 
"new* number overboard and everyone who knew of this aberrant fact was pledged to secrecy (Kline 
1959:45).
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to be made along these lines: (1) If /3-propositions derived from a-propositions are found 
to disagree with observation, or conversely if /3-propositions not derived from the a- 
propositions are found to agree with observation, then as long as the logical 
extrapolations of these theoretical constructions are sound, the a-propositions will fall 
into doubt. (2) If cj-propositions are discovered from which the a-propositions can be 
logically derived (i.e., more elemental propositions), one simply replaces the old a- 
foundations by the newly discovered u  ones. (3) If two or more sets of a-propositions 
yield /3-propositions which do not contradict perceptual experience, then the basis on 
which one chooses between these two sets of elemental propositions is not a matter of 
theoretical science but rather a matter of taste.
The first of these three points establishes the role of perception in confirming and 
falsifying the axiomatic foundations of a theory. Little needs to be said about this. The 
second point highlights the economy of thought inherent to theoretical science: the old 
a-foundations are replaced within the theoretical structure by the more elementary w- 
foundations rather than being retained. This substitution will (1) simplifying the 
theoretical model by decreasing the number of elemental spatial variables necessary (i.e., 
similar to removing the lowest common denominator in fractions) and (2) increase its 
structural accuracy and possibly its breadth of application. A retention of these a- 
foundations in full knowledge of the existence of deeper u ones is a categorical 
simplification within one’s theoretical concept only when the logical bridge between these 
two levels has been built. For example, not using a fully detailed concept of a car when 
attempting to drive one represents a categorical simplification: an aggregative model of
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the car built from its basic elements is possible, but very cumbersome. However, if this 
logical bridge does not exist, the use of ^foundations in coordination with a  derived 13- 
propositions in aggregate analysis represents an unsubstantiated metaphysical assumption. 
To the extent that such aggregative structural assumptions are inappropriate, the 
effectiveness of one’s concept of the focal system will decline: metaphorically speaking, 
these concepts could be said to be out o f focus.138 The third point is perhaps the most 
interesting since it allows for different theoretical concepts to co-exist to the extent that 
the focal system’s apparent structure and relations per se do not allow for judgement 
between these alternatives. The rules of theoretical science (i.e., logic extrapolation) are 
inert as principles by which to re-align the spatial-temporal dimensions of the observation 
set in order to make such a judgement. This latter point has implications for the social 
sciences since concepts may influence actions which help shape experience, and thereby 
feed one’s perceptions which informed the initial concepts.
To the extent that the a-propositions accurately capture the qualitative elements of 
a system, and as long as these qualitative dimensions remain relatively consistent, one 
is able to quantitatively extrapolate from them. For example, Michael Polanyi (1967) 
attributes the success of engineering to the consistent and well-known qualitative 
physical/chemical conditions which are embodied in a theoretical model to deduce 
favorable arrangements. It owes its success as a manipulative art to these non-changing 
foundations. This caused Georgescu-Roegen (1971:36, emphasis added) to claim that
l3( It is interesting to note that the metaphysical assumption that "what reality is" has a single leveled 
implicate structure (i.e., that the way we conceive o f the world is the way the world is) cannot be falsified. 
The quest for "the proper” decomposition of experience which can be effectively embodied in a theoretical 
model is a never-ending one.
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theoretical science is "thus far the most successful device fo r  learning reality given the 
scarcity pattern of the basic faculties of the human mind." It has fostered significant 
advancement in the knowledge of inanimate matter, served as a check on literary 
thinking, and helped free humanity from the indiscriminate application of animistic habits 
of thought. However, it has also fostered the impression that it offers the only sound 
method for the expression and cultivation of knowledge.139 The essence of this flaw 
resides in the failure to acknowledge the limitations o f theoretical science and the attempt 
to apply it indiscriminantly and universally. This failure to acknowledge the limitations 
of theoretical science is related to the belief that the way we conceive of the world is the 
way the world is; that reason and logic are synonymous.
The strength of theoretical science resides in the fact that for a given set of a- 
propositions, the corresponding /3-propositions are uniquely determined through the rules 
of logic. What are the limitations of theoretical science? Since theoretical science uses 
the rules of logic to derive /3-propositions from a-propositions, it is susceptible to the 
same limitations as logic itself: this being that one must posit a cardinal measurability 
for the qualitative elements contained in the theoretical concept. Cardinal measurability 
implies the specific property of existence as a quantum or elementary unit which displays 
qualitative consistency in the face of subsumption and subtraction (Georgescu-Roegen 
1971:98). There are phenomena, however, which elude such prerequisites and therefore
139 This emphasis of a singular method of knowledge is reminiscent of the Enlightenment during which 
the Church’s self-proclaimed monopoly on truth was challenged. In opposition to this, some individuals 
contended that they possessed the ability to discover fo r themselves (see Cassirer 1951). It is the 
ossification of this creative individual urge to know into a static and universal method of knowing that is 
challenged in this dissertation.
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elude the grasp of a purely aggregative theoretical concept. To the extent that such 
phenomena are present, a logically continuous and universal theoretical science is not 
possible.
Quantity versus Quality: The Spatial Dimension of Concepts
A quality is defined as that which makes something what it is, while quantity is the 
exact amount of a particular thing. The essence of this distinction between quantity and 
quality is related to the perceptual distinction between parts and wholes. There are two 
types of qualities, those which can be logically reduced to more elemental qualities and 
those which cannot without destroying their uniqueness. The former is merely a 
categorical simplification. In the latter case, a composition of elements will possess a 
synthetic quality which is not present in the theoretical aggregation of its qualitative 
elements (i.e., distinctive characteristic of the parts as whole). While quality is 
essentially related to the perception of a discrete whole (i.e., parts as whole), quantity 
is the conceptual manipulation of constant quality (i.e., whole as part).
Bateson (1979) has highlighted this distinction between quality and quantity using 
the notion of a pattern. While it is impossible to create a pattern with a single quantity, 
a ratio between two quantities is the very beginning of a pattern.140 However, a pattern 
will only possess a synthetic quality if it makes a difference as a whole within the
140 An interesting point to note is that whereas multiple rabbits or multiple turtles per se can form only 
a limited pattern, a group of human beings can form a much more complex pattern due to the conceptual 
dimension of human existence. People who are biologically identical can be mentally distinct. It is this 
intangible diversity which provides an intangible heterogeneity to individual human existence.
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observer’s concept of the process. In other words, a pattern warrants individualized 
attention and conceptual embodiment only if it has meaning as a pattern within the 
process under observation. Patterns which do not make a difference do not need to be 
conceived of as being distinct from their quantitative aggregations. For example, 
individuals who come together to form a firm establish a pattern of relations which is 
important in and o f itself. Therefore, economists model a firm as an individualized 
whole (hence the black box model). In contrast to this, a perfectly competitive market 
is a pattern of firms and customers which is not significant per se and can therefore be 
modelled through a simple theoretical aggregation of more elemental parts.
Along these lines, Polanyi’s (1962, 1967, 1975) work concerning tacit knowledge 
involves the implicit recognition of meaningful patterns in perception.141 The idea is 
that the description of some phenomena is not necessarily expressible in a language of 
their constituent parts, but involves a leap of understanding which allows for the 
comprehension of a system per se. Polanyi (1967:18) even argues that to delve into the 
particulars of a pattern may actually destroy the understanding one has of it as a whole. 
He qualifies this by noting that an engineer’s understanding of a machine may go much 
deeper than that gained through its routine use by the factory worker without necessarily 
hindering the engineer’s understanding of the machine as a whole.142 However,
U1 See also Hayek (1967c, 1978).
142 This is obviously connected to the temporal rate of interaction between the laborer and machine 
which dictates a limit to the complexity of one’s active concept of this ongoing interaction. For example, 
one does not "think" about all the discrete motions involved in driving a car nor the process of the car per 
se. Yet, a car is amenable to a high degree of logical reduction into its pieces without doing violence to 
"what a car is."
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machines are the pinnacle of theoretical conception and with many other phenomena this 
act of logically integrating the relations between an entity’s particulars to yield the whole 
still leaves something out. For example, although grammar is composed of words, it 
involves the interrelations between these words and an isolated knowledge of words 
provides no insight into the structure of grammar.143 These intuitions lead Polanyi to 
conclude that the "ideal of eliminating all personal elements of knowledge would, in 
effect, aim at the destruction of all knowledge. The ideal of exact science would turn 
out to be fundamentally misleading and possibly a source of devastating fallacies" 
(Polanyi 1967:20).
Remember that in Georgescu-Roegen’s analysis of theoretical science, the 
elementary meaningful patterns (i.e., synthetic qualities) which form the foundations of 
our theoretical concept are denoted by a-propositions. All concepts (/3-propositions) built 
from these fundamental blocks are the result of the logical aggregation of these elemental 
foundations. Through comparing these qualitative foundations and their theoretical 
aggregation with the corresponding phenomenon which actually appear to human 
perception, Georgescu-Roegen divides phenomena into three distinct orders o f rationality 
to implicitly acknowledge that some patterns present a synthetic quality.
Phenomena o f the 1st order o f rationality are those which can be discovered with "the 
tip of the pencil doing some algebra or logistic calculus on paper as is the case in 
mechanics” (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:116). There is no synthetic quality that arises and
143 Along these lines, although Cajun and Creole were originally thought to be simply local dialects of 
the same language, linguistic research has discovered that they represent the mixing of French grammar 
with English words and English grammar with French words respectively.
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therefore a logical extrapolation of the constituent qualities provides an accurate concept 
of composite phenomenon. It is this class of phenomena which allows itself to be 
investigated vicariously through theoretical extrapolations and reductions. The discovery 
of the planet Pluto through pen and paper calculations is a wonderful example of the rich 
possibilities offered by theoretical science when dealing with such phenomena.
Phenomena o f the 2* order o f rationality are those which must first be observed 
before they are known. However, this novel quality of a pattern is predictable given 
"identical" conditions (i.e., an identical quantitative pattern of qualitative parts). Since 
such qualitatively unique events are properly categorized as a-propositions, a hierarchical 
series has established itself within the class of a-propositions through a given pattern of 
a-class elements which produce a synthetic quality. This new a-proposition corresponds 
to a pattern of lower level a-class elements such as the /3-class propositions do, but it has 
a uniqueness about it which goes beyond the theoretical aggregation of its 
foundations.144 For example, when a chemist combines elements (e.g., hydrogen and 
oxygen) in some novel fashion, she may discover new qualities (e.g., wetness) which will 
continue to emerge when identical combinations of these conditional elements are 
recreated. However, in the first instance, she is unable to predict the quality of a novel 
pattern by simply considering the qualities of its constituent parts.
144 Logic has always had a difficulty with distinctions between elements of a class and the class itself. 
The fact that theoretical science’s first victory was geometry helped to cover-up this difficulty since 
geometric relations involve only being, no aggregative qualitative distinctions, no class distinctions, and 
no becoming. Note that three prominent philosophers who proposed the universal validity of logic (i.e., 
Russell, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein) all abandoned such aspirations in later works (Barrett 1979).
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Phenomena o f the 3rd order o f rationality have pointed implications for socio­
economic theorizing. The basis on which Georgescu-Roegen draws this last distinction 
concerns the predictability of the synthetic quality that emerges from the pattern. While 
2nd order phenomena present identical results in identical conditions, phenomena of the 
3rd order of rationality will elude one’s attempt to predict the outcome after repeated 
"identical" combinations. Georgescu-Roegen believes that such systemic inconsistency 
is prevalent in the organic and super-organic domains. For example, a hostile natural 
environment may spawn both a highly peaceful culture as well as a highly aggressive one 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1988). Another example he cites is the diverse traditions of marriage 
which include buying the bride, the bride bringing a dowry, or no transaction at all 
(Georgescu-Roegen 1971:117). These phenomena display a multiplicity of solutions 
which are not witnessed in 2nd order phenomena. Since such events are typical in the 
realm of the social sciences, Georgescu-Roegen believes it is therefore necessary that 
such sciences rely more heavily on sui generis methods as a "logical necessity" when 
dealing with 3rd order phenomena (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:119).
These conclusions concerning the non-predictable nature of 3rd order phenomena 
result from Georgescu-Roegen’s failure to recognize the conceptual dimension of human 
existence (i.e., self-consciousness). What is the meaning of "identical" conditions in a 
social context? When Georgescu-Roegen says that an adverse environment can spawn 
both a peaceful and aggressive culture, the basis by which he equates these two situations 
is materialistic. In other words, both instances involve an adverse environment and a 
group of people. Likewise with respect to marriage, all three possible situations involve
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a man, woman, cultural group, and environment. However, one potential difference 
within both of these examples is the conceptual models that the individual participants 
possess. In other words, the relationships between different individuals and those 
between individuals and their environment may have different meanings to the 
participants. One should be talking about 3rd order phenomena as possessing a 
conceptual dimension which is mental, not material, and therefore tacit and intangible 
from a material perspective. Therefore, one can dismiss this third classification in favor 
of the explicit recognition of self-consciousness (i.e., a synthetic quality which introduces 
the conceptual dimension) which may evade materialistic attempts at measurement.
Returning to the hierarchical nesting implicit within 2nd order phenomena, the 
synthetic quality of a pattern does not appear within an aggregative theoretical concept 
built from its constituent qualities. Therefore, such patterns will not have individual 
meaning unless one assigns them such meaning within the categories of logic. But, the 
law of contradiction requires that a pattern of elemental qualities cannot simultaneously 
be equated to both a sum o f its parts and more than the sum o f its parts. There are two 
representations of a single phenomenon which are both accurate: this cognitive 
discrepancy is similar to the ambiguous figures of perception presented earlier, except 
for the fact that the former has a spatio-temporal depth not present in the latter. For 
example, a human being is perceived to be both a biological animal and a self-conscious 
individual. From one perspective, a human being can be conceived of as a biological 
organism; we engage in all the activities that other biological systems do, such as eating, 
defecating, sleeping, and reproduction. Yet, however complex an understanding one has
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of these biological processes, such a concept will provide very limited insight into self- 
consciousness. In other words, a theoretical aggregation built from biological qualities 
and biological interactions provides only a limited understanding of human existence, one 
that abstracts from its most significant feature.145
Georgescu-Roegen calls such phenomena dialectical and argues that reality appears 
to be dialectic in nature. When coupled with the assertion that mental conception is 
analytic in character, this proposition denies the possibility of an ultimate theoretical 
conception of reality. However, since it is the poles of our dualistic concepts which 
define the dialectic interstices, one begins to realize that this dialectic character of 
phenomena is co-dependent with the analytical structure of conception. This recognition 
of a dialectic experience in light of humanity’s analytic orientation is the most 
philosophically significant theme of Georgescu-Roegen’s The Entropy Law and the 
Economic Process (Neidhart 1992).146
Two points need to be addressed immediately. First, the presence of dialectical 
concepts (such as young/old, night/day, and life/death) still allows for definitive 
meanings since the overlap of "Of" and "not-Of1 is not "throughout the entire range of 
denotations" (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:47). For example, while the question, "What is
141 One might contend that some humans "live'' more in the realm of biology and simple stimulus- 
response psychology than others. Note, however, that this is an individual choice and that self- 
consciousness is an individual quality.
146 The aversion to complex philosophical problems has led this particular idea to be virtually 
unexplored within the economic profession while Georgescu-Roegen’s own emphasis on thermodynamic 
concepts has received the most attention. Since his later works focused primarily on entropy as the 
ultimate constraint on the expansion of the economic system, his work has been aligned with the first two 
laws of thermodynamics and may rise and fall with their popularity (i.e., notions of out-of-equilibrium 
thermodynamics).
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the quality of being alive?" may not lend itself to a distinct boundary between life and 
death, the qualities of life and death are nevertheless distinct. Second, it must be 
stressed that the presence of this "Of" and "not-Of" logical paradox is a result of the 
analytic nature of the human thought process and the relativity of perception, not of 
imperfect measurement. While imperfect measurement may result in conceptual 
difficulties, it is unsubstantiated and anthropocentric vanity to argue that all conceptual 
difficulties are the result of imperfect measurement.
While Georgescu-Roegen’s insight into the analytic/dialectic relationship inherent 
to conception is quite profound, he failed to explore these ideas to their full depths. One 
might say that his ideas remained tethered to the human perspective. This discussion 
unfolds the implicit richness of these ideas by developing a conceptual hierarchy which 
provides a dialectic depth through the interaction of parts to form wholes. While I would 
not contend that such a vertical dimension is completely missing from Georgescu- 
Roegen’s work, it is not explicitly drawn out. The difficulty is that since these 
hierarchical relations collapse relative to the spatio-temporal dimensions of human 
perception (i.e., one always perceives an interaction of parts which form the focal 
system), this depth must be intuited through one’s concept of meaningful patterns and the 
synthesis of varied, but simultaneous, perspectives.147
An exploration of Georgescu-Roegen’s use of the term dialectics is worth while. 
In general, he defines dialectic concepts as those which are "surrounded by a penumbra
147 This is similar to the fact that even though vision is only two-dimensional, we intuit a third 
dimension through the synthesis of two distinct perspectives (i.e., eyes) and three dimensional geometric 
concepts (e.g., shadows and relative shifts in spatial position). See Levine and Shefner (199l:Chapter 12) 
and Bateson (1979).
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within which they overlap with their opposites" (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:45). For 
example, the quality of being alive is distinct from not being alive, but the point at which 
a process goes from being inanimate to living is not easily demarcated in practice, as 
current debates in medical ethics attest. This could be said to be a vertical application 
of the concept of dialectics since life emerges out of non-life and emphasis rests on the 
emergence of a synthetic quality within a pattern. In contrast to this use, two patterns 
can be classified as possessing the same quality while remaining quite distinct at the same 
conceptual level. For example, the concept of democracy has a dialectic nature since 
both the United States and Mexico can be called democracies even though they remain 
very different politically. This could be called a horizontal dialectic since the synthetic 
quality is given, and two systems are equated on the basis of their possession of this 
quality. Therefore, these two examples represent different types of dialectics, a 
distinction which is not made explicit in Georgescu-Roegen’s work.
One can clarify this distinction by noting that the concept of democracy is dialectic 
in the sense that it is used to characterize a structural quality within the political process. 
Democracy is perhaps a synthetic quality within the political process (i.e., from 
monarchy, to oligarchy, to democracy), but it does not symbolize the emergence of an 
autonomous and novel process. Therefore, there is a linguistic ambiguity or lack of 
precision involved in the categorization of a political process as simply democratic. In 
contrast, the concept of life is used to characterize an autonomous and novel process. 
In order to perceive its dialectical nature, one must alter the spatio-temporal dimensions 
of the observation set to reveal the non-livingness of its physical and chemical
252
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
foundations. It represents not only the emergence of a synthetic quality, but also the 
potential for novel interactions. One could say that life is a process dialectic which 
involves the synthetic quality of being alive while democracy is a structural dialectic. 
This distinction, however, should not be reified. For example, life is frequently used 
when taking about ecosystems as being living processes. Within this latter use of the 
term, our perspective has expanded such that the quality of being alive becomes one of 
many structural characteristics of the process and many different processes can be 
referred to as being alive just as many different political systems can be referred to as 
being democracies.
These ideas are captured by introducing a hierarchical leveling within our concepts 
which provides a "depth" to our overall representation. The fixed perspective of human 
perception is complemented by altering the spatial (e.g., microscope) and/or temporal 
(e.g., photographic exposure) dimensions of observation to create an array of 
simultaneous structural decompositions of interactive processes. For example, a cell will 
appear as an individual entity from one perspective and as an interactive process from 
another (e.g., mitochondria, cellular membrane, protoplasm, etc.). From an even faster 
temporal and smaller spatial perspective, these interactive parts will appear as individual 
entities themselves, and even this viewpoint gives way to the interactive process between 
organic and inorganic molecules. In other words, as the spatio-temporal dimensions of 
the process of perception are changed, the structural qualities and the interactive process 
which manifest itself to perception will change.
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The Meaning of Hierarchy
Let’s take a few steps backwards and ask what is meant by a hierarchy? Although 
the word hierarchy is commonly associated with the class structure of society or the 
administrative structure of a firm, this idea of ranking structurally identical elements on 
the basis of authoritative power is not used here.148 Instead, the word hierarchy is 
taken to symbolize a nesting of simultaneous conditional relationships which manifest to 
perception through variations in the spatio-temporal decomposition of reality. A 
conceptual representation of phenomena will therefore involve levels o f contemporaneous 
structural parts-whole relationships. The ordering of these levels is only useful in 
coordination with the ability to intervene in this hierarchically conceived process. Self- 
consciousness represents just such a quality in that one appears to exist independently of 
the situation, whereas stimulus-response psychology represents a non-reflective mental 
existence. Therefore, the emergence of self-consciousness as an active participant in the 
greater system is necessary for hierarchical ordering to have any meaning.
Herbert Simon (1969) provides a speculative rationale for the evolution of 
hierarchically nested patterns through a thought experiment involving an environment 
which displays random perturbation. These perturbations destroy any unstable 
configurations by returning them to their dissociated elemental components. In order for 
a particular configuration to persist, its unit assembly time must be lower than the time 
between subsequent perturbations. For example, assume that there are 1000 pieces 
needed to assemble a watch and two different techniques. The first technique is to
'* For a discussion of the varied use of this term over the years see Wilson (1969) and Grene (1988).
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assemble all 1000 parts in a single step, while the second technique breaks the assembly- 
process into ten 100 part stable sub-units which are then combined to form the watch. 
If we assume that total assembly time is a linear function of the number of components 
involved in each step of the process, we could conclude that the first technique (1000 
parts, one step) would be slightly faster than the second (10 times 100 parts and one step 
of 10 parts). However, in an environment of uncertainty and chance fluctuations (e.g., 
phone calls and visits by customers), perturbations which occur more frequently than the 
sub-unit assembly time will undermine production. As long as this perturbation 
frequency is slower than the sub-unit assembly time of the second technique but faster 
than that for the first, the second methods use of nested stability patterns will prove 
superior. In accordance with this theoretical mindwalk, one finds that the difference 
between the temporal rates of development for different processes will frequently serve 
to identify the different levels within the conceptual hierarchy.
For a given spatio-temporal perceptual anchor, the conceptual hierarchy will 
involve three parts.149 If one defines the structure and interaction that one is concerned 
with as the focal level, this will be bounded by a higher and lower level. These higher 
and lower levels will influence the focal level dynamics through constraint. The lower 
level provides the structural elements from which the focal dynamics evolve while the 
higher level provides boundary constraints which set the context for the focal dynamics. 
Since these divisions abstract from the simultaneity of phenomena, it is important to 
remember that higher level phenomena are partially composed of focal level dynamics,
149 This triad has been identified by many different theorists (see Salthe 1985:75-77).
255
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and that the focal level helps to create the context for systems at lower levels than itself. 
This pervasive, nested interdependence between levels highlights the co-evolution 
between a system of elements and its context, e.g., as with economy-environment 
interactions (Norgaard 1984, 1985).
The apparent discreteness, and hence non-transitivity, between these different levels 
is due to the fact that their interactive processes occurs at different homeorhetic rates 
(i.e., the time period required to fully propagate a given change through the causal links 
of the system).150 In other words, given a particular focal level process, the interactive 
process of higher level phenomena move significantly more slowly while those for the 
lower level phenomena move at a much faster pace. Therefore, both of these bordering 
levels will appear to be constant relative to the focal level (e.g., geological and atomic 
interaction rates relative to that of human existence) and will behave like "rigid bodies" 
in their relation to one another (Simon 1973:10). However, this conceptual separation 
of distinct levels should not be taken to imply a complete absence of dynamic interactions 
among these levels. It is always possible for high level "events" or low level 
"amplifications" to play a more direct role in a focal system’s dynamics (Salthe 
1985:138).
Since these directly contiguous levels define what cannot happen rather than what 
will happen, one could say that an open dimension exists for the focal system. While it 
is possible that the lower and higher levels define a unique range in which the focal 
system must exist (i.e., representing a mere aggregation problem), such a deterministic
150 This idea is espoused by Simon (1969,1973), Allen and Starr (1982), Bateson (1972), and Salthe 
(1985, 1989).
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interpretation abstracts away from the non-transitive nature of synthetic qualities and the 
co-evolutionary interplay between levels.151 Since this hierarchy is a conceptual 
compilation of simultaneous perceptions, the historical record should bear witness to the 
evolution of particular classes of systems which traverse the levels of our overall 
conceptual representation as they develop and unfold, while concurrently presenting us 
with an existing continuum of such systems. During this process of unfoldment, the 
middle of the hierarchy (i.e., the cutting edge of qualitative distinctions) is continually 
within the context of lower level possibilities and higher level constraints, even though 
these relations are co-evolving within the interstitial systems themselves.
Although our language would need to distinguish between these distinct levels by 
necessity, it also makes sense to use words as an economy of speech (i.e., to represent 
a mechanical process such as a personal computer). However, whereas an economy of 
speech is amenable to theoretical reduction, synthetic qualities are not. In both instances 
the configuration of parts is represented by a unique label. To add further complexity, 
the fact that language has evolved dictates that although it will trace the evolution of 
emergent meaning through time, this relation between language and meaning has the 
potential to become locked-in to ineffective forms of representations. In other words, 
certain words which symbolize significant relations may be retained in a language even 
after their significance has disappeared.
151 Resnick and Wolffs (1993) ideas on overdeterminism are a critique of mainstream neo-classical 
theory on these grounds. They contend that the neoclassical concept of the economy is placed in a dynamic 
straightjacket by theoretical assumptions which leave no open dimension and is therefore sterile with respect 
to creativity by assumption.
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Hierarchies and the Evolutionary Perspective
There are two different ways to differentiate between the levels of interactive 
process within the conceptual hierarchy. The first of these highlights the complementary 
interaction between parts which create patterns with synthetic qualities: the parts-whole 
transition. From this perspective, a representative hierarchical order might consist of 
individuals interacting to form families and firms, families and firms interacting to form 
local neighborhoods or cities, cities interacting to form regional economies, and regional 
economies interacting to form the national or world economy. The analytical emphasis 
is on the structural interaction of the parts to form the synthetic qualities of the whole. 
If such a synthetic complementarity does not exist between the parts, the whole would 
be a simple sum of its parts and a distinct analysis would be unnecessary.
An alternative emphasis highlights the interactive competition between similar parts 
for participation in the larger process: this facet corresponds to the competition of wholes 
as parts. In other words, it concerns itself with functionally similar wholes and 
establishes the range of competitive interaction between these structural elements. It is 
this aspect of hierarchical organization which has traditionally been stressed in 
evolutionary theory (e.g., Darwinian selection of the fittest) and involves an individual’s 
competition within the group. Although it is erroneously assumed that the viability of 
a synthetic quality (e.g., a new organism) is determined solely within this competitive 
interaction, such a view does not fully understand the interplay between complementary 
and competitive interactions.
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The different emphases between these two orderings is critical: the first 
corresponds to complementary circular relations, and the second stabilizing ones. 
Neither one is the evolutionary theory, rather it is their combination which provides 
coherence and clarity to a theory of evolution. Both contribute to the structural identity 
of the elements, one addresses the competitive interaction which serves to define 
functionally homogeneous individuals while the other presents potential individuals as the 
complementary interaction of lower level elements. From a different perspective, one 
could say that the higher level complementary ordering provides the selection criteria or 
niche from which the process of lower level competition proceeds. In addition, it is the 
lower level competitive ordering which identifies the qualitative elements which 
participate in the higher level compositional ordering. The synthesis of these two criteria 
is established within the growth and development of a particular system which traverses 
our conceptual hierarchies through time.152
This duality of language can also be explored at a more fundamental level through 
the concepts of structure and process. For example, while it has already been contended 
that things have only a relative or conditional existence, this thought leads naturally to 
the affiliated idea that things are defined by their relations. If one were to then contend
132 This distinction has direct relevancy for economic thought. One should be aware of the fact that 
Marshall’s use of the term biology emphasized the spatio-temporal continuity o f an entity and its interactive 
parts rather than the inter-individual or inter-firm competition for survival which is typical of Darwinian 
evolutionary thinking. In fact, the biological dimension to Marshall’s writings centered on organizational 
efficiency, and was concerned with an evolving whole rather than competing parts. This observation 
explains Hodgson’s (1993) rejection of Marshall’s evolutionary perspective in favor of Darwinian 
foundations and Foster’s (1993) attempt to tie Marshall, Georgescu-Roegen, and the dissipative structure 
literature (e.g., Prigogine 1976,1980; Allen 1988; Allen and Sanglier 1978,1979,1981) together into a 
single evolutionary conception.
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that only relations existed, she would not be completely wrong but could be askedr 
relations between what? Upon close examination, it becomes obvious that there is a 
difficulty in proclaiming the primacy of process (i.e., interactive relations) over structure 
(i.e., things) since without structure there can be no coherent concept of process. This 
is the paradox involved with the process/structure dichotomy inherent to conception. 
One must therefore conclude that neither an exclusive emphasis on relations nor things 
is accurate. Rather, both are required within our thought process and these two modes 
of conception are complementary. The over emphasis of one over the other will 
ultimately result in either nihilism (process) or essentialism (structure).
A similar appeal to a dual method of conception is made in Bohr’s formulation of 
the complementarity principle to explain the wave/particle duality of quantum physics. 
Bohr noted that,
... classical explanation was achieved through the representation of conceptually 
disjoint systems [waves and particles] by one, unified and coherent mode of 
description; whereas complementarity achieves explanation of conceptually unified 
coherent systems by disjoint modes of description, (cited in Pattee 1978:193)
This complementarity perspective is based on the idea that the perceived duality does not
have ultimate existence, but is a residue of the subject/object dichotomy inherem in the
act o f perception. It is human consciousness which distinguishes an object from within
the flow of time to establish the characteristic of sameness and structural quality. In
contrast, a classical theorist would claim that our level of knowledge has just not
advanced far enough, but that as it does advance, this duality will be resolved.
In brief, the skeleton of our epistemological portrait is one in which flow patterns 
which are relatively consistent become the structural dimension of one’s concept of
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reality. These structural dimensions are then used as the different elements of the 
interactive process under observation. As synthetic qualities emerge from these 
elemental substrata, they will require individual embodiment within our concept of the 
process but will not change the fundamental essence of the interaction. For example, 
new species introduced into an ecosystem may change its structural composition but will 
not necessarily change the process of ecological interaction (e.g., a forest after the 
introduction of a novel plant species). One could say that the new structural components 
will compete for a position within the existing ecological interaction. Although the 
process may not remain the same structurally, the relations between its compositional 
elements will embody the same limitations and potentials as previously.
While it could be said that the process of interaction never changes, but only 
actualizes latent possibilities, when these latent possibilities are sufficiently unique within 
our hierarchical concept, we embody them in a new template of structural interaction. 
Since our hierarchical concept is one of simultaneous phenomenal interaction, these novel 
processes represent a leveling o f interactive process. It should be noted that although the 
emergence of a single, isolated synthetic quality may not signal an observable change in 
the process of structural interaction (since it represents an isolated innovation), the 
emergence of a host of such structural qualities may. For example, life is a synthetic 
quality which presents a significant shift in the potential interactions of the emergent 
system. However, a singular instance of life may not be sufficient to fully manifest the 
interactive potential that such a quality harbors.
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In order to better understand this conceptual complementarity between structure and 
process, one can utilize the distinction between complementary and competitive 
orderings. Beginning with a competitive ordering, imagine functionally similar parts 
vying for participation in a stable synthetic structure which forms spontaneously (i.e., an 
initially complementary relation which becomes stabilized) within the interactive process 
between the elements. This is diagrammed as follows (dotted lines represent the 
complementary process):
These synthetic qualities may continue to compete within the dynamic context they 
emerged from and may even represent an intermediate step in the formation of a more 
elaborate pattern novelty, as in Figure 40.
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However, it may also be the case that a synthetic quality no longer competes with 
these other elements on their own level per se, but transcends the limitations of these 
previous interactions by displaying the potential for unique interactions. It is this 
transcendence which will be called a process novelty or synthetic interaction. By 
combining the ideas of a synthetic quality and process novelty, the hierarchical concept 
becomes much more complex (see Appendix E for an application of this theoretical 
framework within existing economic theory). This nesting of static and dynamic 
relationships is depicted in Figure 41.
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This diagram should be read as follows. As functionally similar elements compete to 
participate within the complementary processes occurring, a synthetic quality may 
stabilize within the overall process (i.e., a structural novelty). This synthetic quality will 
then re-engage in the ongoing process of interaction from which it emerged. However, 
this synthetic quality may also transcend this competitive and complementary process per 
se by introducing novel interactive possibilities (i.e., a process novelty). This latter 
example represents leveling which is affiliated with the idea of different laws o f 
interaction (e.g., physical versus biological).
Although this discussion of the interplay between synthetic process and structure 
has been analytic, it is best thought of as being dialectic. The emergence of novelty is 
not a uniform transition in which, e.g., a "complete" set of synthetic qualities emerge
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together to form the distinction between the concepts of a purely chemical versus 
biological process. Rather, the emergence of synthetic qualities and novel interactions 
is the slow climb of individual systems. The emergence of a synthetic quality or process 
novelty signals a distortion of the previously appropriate theoretical concept such that the 
particular theory under consideration becomes an inaccurate representation of the focal 
system. I will contend that a given theoretical concept will lose its effectiveness as the 
difference between the spatio-temporal dimension of perception and the homeorhetic rate 
of the focal system widens. Although this hypothesis seems to hold in lower level 
interactive processes since increased spatio-temporal dimensions shift one between the 
purely physical, chemical, and biological realms, the synthetic qualities of mind and self- 
consciousness alter this trend. The essence of the problem seems to be that the very 
space-time continuum is revealed by self-consciousness and hence there is a significant 
nonlinearity which signals a further order of qualitative change which is occurring. 
Without exploring this apparent nonlinearity in more detail, one might simply say that 
the structural decomposition and interactive process are co-determined in such a way that 
progressively deeper levels of structural detail used in combination with a fixed focal 
process will diminish the effectiveness of one’s understanding.
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Structural detail of process?-------- — — > |
(e.g., nuclear elements)
Structural detail of process?-----------------------------------------------   |
(e.g., atomic elements)
Structural detail of process? > \
(e.g., molecular elements)
Structural detail?  > |
(e.g., cellular elements)
A similar conclusion holds with respect to progressively deeper levels of interactive 
process used in combination with a fixed decomposition of structural detail. For 
example, if one wishes to describe the interaction of molecules one might consider using 
the concepts of quantum, atomic, chemical, biological, or psychological interaction. 
However, chances are that a "template of chemical relations" would prove most fruitful.
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A Classification for Structural Elements
In order to formulate a concept of interactive process, one must establish the 
different types of structural elements which are possible. To address this issue, I wish 
to expand upon three types originally suggested by Georgescu-Roegen (1971:Chapter9). 
First, there are those elements which appear only as a Stock/Flow, such as many of the 
raw materials used in economic production. Such structural parts are absorbed by the 
process in such a way that they apparently cease to exist (i.e., input) or come into being 
(i.e., output) as the interactive process unfolds. As an example, imagine a box which 
contains twenty pieces of candy. We can use this candy to make twenty people happy 
now or twenty people happy tomorrow with the qualitative identity of the candy being 
completely consumed in the process.
The second type of structural elements are those which are significant within the 
process but are transformed due to participation only after prolonged interaction. 
Georgescu-Roegen (1971:224) calls such elements Funds o f Services. An example of a 
fund is a light bulb that lasts five hundred hours. This bulb cannot be used to light five 
hundred rooms for an hour, but involves a service of lighting one room for five hundred 
hours: roughly speaking, one can refer to this as a measurement of systemic lifetime.
The last type, which I shall call Systemic Elements, consist of those elements which 
undergo noticeable qualitative change during the interactive process but are able to 
restore their previous state of qualitative existence given the necessary period of time. 
In other words, Systemic Elements can be thought of as Funds of Services which are 
noticeably degraded as they participate in the process, but have the ability to return to
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their previous state which gave them meaning within the process. An example of such 
a structural element in economics is the rested laborer as opposed to a tired laborer. 
Since a theoretical concept of the process allows only monotonic qualities which vary 
quantitatively, one must either represent these two states of a systemic element as 
distinctly different (i.e., treat them as a Stock/Flow), ignore this systemic degradation 
(i.e., treat them as a Fund of Service), or add a quantitative continuum from 
rested-*tired.153
These classifications identify the significant quality which the different types of 
elements contribute to the process under observation and are determined by the 
homeorhetic rates of the different structural elements relative to the focal system. 
Structural elements which appear as Funds in lower level processes will appear as Stocks 
in higher level processes (i.e., longer time periods). This distinction finds expression 
in the spatio-temporal dimensioning of the structural concepts. Stocks/Flows are 
consumed in the process and it is not necessary to note their lifetime or homeorhetic rate 
as a system, but only the spatial density of this consistent quality. As a result, they are 
quantified as a Stock (Units) of potential Flows (Units/Time).
In contrast, Funds of Services provide a consistent spatial quality which is not 
significantly consumed in the process, but has a limited temporal existence. Their 
importance within the process is as a catalyst and it is their effective life span in this 
capacity which must be noted. Unlike a Stock, Funds are not saved and spent, but
133 la economics, laborers are usually typified as a Fund of Services with respect to production. 
However, if there happens to be a hysteretic effect such as psychological impairment due to episodes of 
unemployment, this simplification is inappropriate (e.g., see Darity and Goldsmith 1993).
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require a duration of time in which they are either used, decay, or lay idle. 
Furthermore, their rate of use is restricted by their inherent systemic structure. The 
dimensions of a Fund of Services is (Quality x Time), which can be aggregated in order 
to appear as a Stock of Funds (Units of Quality x  Time) from which the services provided 
are dimensioned as a set number of qualitative units which have a definite lifetime. For 
example, a machine represents a fund of services which persists for a specific number 
of machine hours. The service provided to the process is one machine. Note that if one 
has a fund of identical elements, then as this aggregative fund becomes larger and the 
systemic lifetime of its elements smaller, it can be represented as a stock with an 
input/output flow based on the lifetime of a representative element. However, if the 
qualitative nature is changing between successive additions or if their systemic lifetime 
changes significantly, such a categorical simplification may break down. One example 
of this dilemma is the measurement of capital within economic models. This provides 
insight into the relationship between Funds of Services and Stocks of Flows: what are 
Funds from one perspective can be conceived as Stocks from a broader spatial and longer 
temporal perspective.
Systemic Elements possess both spatial and temporal variations which are 
significant to the process. One could say that systemic elements enter the process as a 
Fund which experiences a noticeable qualitative change in its systemic state due to 
participation in the process (Unitst^Unitsl+,). Once again, it seems as if systemic 
elements will make a transition into the conceptual category of a fund as the spatio- 
temporal dimension of one’s perspective is broadened and extended. In other words, as
269
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the temporal dynamics of the process under observation becomes slower, the adjustment 
of the Systemic Element will occur at a relatively faster rate and these transitional periods 
will become relatively shorter. At some point, the element will begin to be perceived 
as a Fund. Therefore, how an element is classified depends on its homeorhetic rate in 
relation to that of the interactive process under observation.
In addition to these three structural elements, there will also be environmental 
parameters which form the context, atmosphere, or setting for a systemic process. The 
fundamental difference between an environmental parameter and the previously 
mentioned classifications is that the former pervades the entire context of the process and 
displays no spatio-temporal change as the process unfolds. This is not to say that there 
is no interdependence or co-evolution between the focal process and its context, but 
rather that the focal process occurs at a speed significantly faster than its environment. 
As a result, the qualities of higher level and aggregative phenomena display no 
meaningful quantitative or qualitative variation relative to the focal level process. For 
example, the mass of the earth provides a gravitational parameter which is constant 
relative to the process of human existence. However, the earth has not always had a 
constant mass when viewed from the perspective of the evolution of our galaxy; nor does 
the earth exist independently of human civilization. Another example is that while one 
can speak of culture/tradition as being constant relative to an individual’s daily life, if 
the focal process becomes one of a human lifetime or generations of families, this 
culture/tradition context may be perceived to change (if not qualitatively, at least 
quantitatively). These four types of structural elements are presented in Table 3.
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An example of the shifting classification of structural elements relative to a 
systemic process is nicely captured within the distinction between public goods and 
common property resources within economics. This classification of resources does not 
represent a quality of the resources per se, but of the resources in relation to the 
economy. As the economy expands, what was once considered to be an Environmental 
parameter becomes a Systemic element in danger of becoming a Fund of Services. 
Therefore, we observe the fact that resources previously thought to be public goods (e.g., 
clean air and water) have become common property goods and may degenerate 
completely or become some form of a club good or private good in the future.
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Concepts of Interactive Process
The concept of an interactive process can be thought of as a template of relations 
in which the aforementioned structural elements are pieces of a dynamic puzzle.134 
This template must be able to accommodate the systemic behavior of stability, 
development, and degeneration. In addition, it should attempt to understand the 
emergence of synthetic qualities, even if this understanding is fated to remain ex post 
facto. This chapter uses a derivative of General Systems Theory and the conceptual 
dichotomy between positive and negative circular relations, which was presented in the 
first chapter, to develop a qualitative analysis of process within a conceptual hierarchy 
of systems.
The Heuristic Value of Causal Loops. Although causal loop diagramming 
represents a loss of structural detail within one’s concept when compared to formal 
differential equations, whether this loss of structural resolution also represents a decline 
in meaningful content is not so obvious. While the ability to predict the dynamic 
behavior of a particular system through differential equations has visible merit, this 
dissertation is concerned with the general quality of dynamic interaction within the 
conceptual hierarchy. Thus, the value of causal loop diagrams within this dissertation 
resides in their use as heuristic tools. One caveat: although these circular relations are 
frequently labelled positive and negative, which then leads to a comparison within the
154 If the structural element is purely categorical with no dynamic interactive quality, then science 
remains taxonomic. The move to theoretical science and the notion of generic process involves the 
categorization of dynamic interactions.
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semantic dichotomy of disequilibrium and equilibrium, this is not an accurate appraisal 
of their difference. A more appropriate term for positive loop relations would be 
evolving, developing, or, conversely, degenerative: these words embody a sense of 
unfolding. This shift to the language of evolving and equilibrating relations (i.e., 
complementary/divergent versus stabilizing), prevents one from drawing hasty 
conclusions regarding the necessity of choosing one of these facets over the other since 
they are no longer mere inversions of one another, which is not true of the language of 
positive/negative or equilibrium/disequilibrium.
Whereas a metaphysical bias towards equilibrium templates has served to exclude 
the use of most evolutionary templates from the intellectual arena, the inclusion of the 
latter requires the former in order to make any sense. In an equilibrium process, change 
involves a preservation of the quantitative relations between elements and a balancing of 
forces: like weights on a scale, the template of relations remains consistent and the 
quality of these interrelations is preserved. Therefore, equilibrium allows for the 
recognition of systems per se. The fact that stabilizing circular relations are the 
conceptual counterpart of perceptual stability, in coordination with the assumption that 
‘things’ exist, has lead many theorists to propose the primacy of stabilizing loops within 
scientific models of the world. However, the problem is not equilibrium relationships 
per se but rather their universal application. In contrast, the inclusion of complementary 
circular relations does not lead to the exclusion of equilibrium concepts. Rather, it 
expands these notions to accommodate our perception of multiple equilibria, path 
dependency, persistent asymmetries, inefficient lock-in, and the emergence of novelty.
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For example, the economic concepts of external economies, economic development, 
technological change, and increasing returns are due to complementary relations between 
heterogeneous elements and have therefore escaped the equilibrium lens which 
emphasizes stable structure. Their inclusion within the overall concept of an interactive 
process creates a richer theoretical description of the nature and possibilities of change.
One must not think that the inclusion of these complementary circular relations 
completes one’s conceptual models in a logical sense. They are not missing links which 
will fill-in the holes of our scientific concepts while leaving their metaphysical 
foundations standing. Concepts of reality built from the assumption of the inherent 
existence of structure and things cannot simply incorporate the concept of an evolving 
process without calling into question these first principles it holds dear: novelty and 
inherent existence will clash. However, it is so alluring to extrapolate the relative truth 
of stable processes into the absolute truths of inherent existence that it is difficult to 
accept an evolving co-dependence without attempting to fit it into a theoretically 
continuous whole of static being. One could contend that such ideas go against our 
mental and emotional conditioning. Perhaps an analogy from the history of thought in 
physics will be helpful. While the geocentric models of the universe proposed that the 
earth was at the center, the heliocentric models refuted this in favor of a belief in the sun 
being at the center. Going beyond these views, the cosmological picture derived from 
Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity posits that there is no center of the universe 
(Mook and Vargish 1987:178). To think in terms of the complete absence of a center
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is extremely difficult. What does it mean to be without a  center? Similarly, what does 
it mean to ultimately have only conditional existence?
Circular Causality and the Conceptual Hierarchy. What is the relationship between 
circular causal relations and conceptual hierarchies? Circular causal loops allow the 
interactive processes that take place between structural elements to be elaborated on and 
thereby provide a platform from which a deeper exploration of the conceptual hierarchy 
can be launched. Recall that the inability to theoretically aggregate the qualitative pieces 
of a pattern into an appropriate concept of the pattern itself creates a layering of parts- 
whole relationships. This layering has been coined a conceptual hierarchy within this 
dissertation.
Stabilizing circularities make an obvious contribution to this qualitative layering 
since they engender stability within the pattern of interrelations (i.e., the stability of parts 
as a whole). In addition, divergent circularities represent the competitive process 
between elements for a specific niche (i.e., the competition between wholes as parts). 
What role do complementary circularities play in this hierarchy? As one surveys the 
synthetic qualities which appear to perception, they seem to involve the entrainment of 
a complementary circularity within a context of stabilizing circularities through an active 
management of its conditional elements (i.e., environmental constraints in general). In 
this way, complementary circularities seem to be associated with the interstices of the 
structural hierarchy and play a role within the particular evolution of an interrelated set
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of variables.155 One might say that they represent the endogenous process of 
conditional transcendence, a transcendence which reflects the system’s transition into 
more refined levels of conditionality. For example, life transcends physical 
conditionality by becoming more than mere matter and hence opening a previously closed 
window of interactive possibilities.
Complementary relations are the evolutionary dimension of concepts of process, 
and the laboratory for investigating them is the realm o f the particular rather than that 
of the general: evolutionary growth is a transformative process of the individual.156 
For example, in a very concise exploration of the nesting of complementary and 
divergent co-dependence, Arthur (1987, 1988b, 1989) demonstrated the presence of path 
dependency, multiple equilibrium, and configurational lock-in: characteristics which all 
point to the potential for a unique transformational process. The most interesting of these 
characteristics is configurational lock-in since it implies that the stability of a pattern is 
not determined solely on the basis of the efficiency of the pattern relative to its context, 
but also on the relative efficiency within the pattern itself. For example, David (1985) 
discusses the continued use of the relatively inefficient QWERTY keyboard layout due
135 Because of this fact, it is not possible to predict the actual trajectory of evolutionary development 
in any quantitatively precise manner: it represents an unfolding of a co-dependent circularity which will 
display multiple-equilibria and path dependency. However, while the particulars may evade us, an 
explanation of the principles underlying the evolutionary process need not. This distinction between an 
explanation o f the particular versus an explanation o f the principle has been developed and used extensively 
by (Hayek 1967a, 1967d).
156 This fact has frequently been lost sight of since it is in competitive interaction with the general that 
the particular finds itself. What is the general? It is the niche in which the particular unfolds. Therefore, 
the particular finds itself affiliated with the "group" to the extent that it unfolds into a similar niche or is 
a complementary facet of a mutually constructed niche.
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to its complementary relation with other facets (e.g., labor and capital 
infrastructure).157 Although QWERTY was efficient relative to its context at one time, 
the context has changed. Such frameworks have also been used extensively to discuss 
the geographic distribution of industry and urbanization (e.g., Allen and Sanglier 
1978,1979,1981; Arthur 1988a; Kaldor 1981; Krugman 1991c; Marshall 1898; Myrdal 
1956, 1957, 1968). From such a perspective, the current configuration of economic 
activity and infrastructure is partially dependent on the historical concatenation of 
conditions and may possess inbred inefficiency which resists change.
Change between the variables of a complementary co-dependent relations is self- 
reinforcing. While this expansion is explosive with respect to the current context, the 
context itself will change. The evolving system begins to interact with relatively 
different elements which create different constraints and alter its previously expansive 
tendencies. The system may expand into stabilizing circularities which did not previously 
exert themselves (e.g., the economic development of Japan and an international extent-of- 
the-market constraint). Or, this expansion may be dependent on a divergent relation with 
a systemic element whose spatio-temporal integrity may limit the expansion of the focal 
system. For example, underdeveloped countries (or workers) cannot go below 
subsistence standards of living without losing the systemic quality on which developing 
countries (or capital owners) depend.
In order to clarify these concepts of evolutionary processes, circularities which 
include only Stocks, Funds, and Systemic Elements without involving any higher layer
IS7 See also Cowan (1987) and David (1985).
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elements (i.e., environmental parameters) will be called horizontal circularities } s% 
Vertical circularities will be those which nest these horizontal circularities (i.e., lower 
level relations) within the higher level variables such as parameters of atmospheric 
quality, context/setting, or mood. This distinction allows me to conceive of the 
evolutionary change o f a system by the predominance of a horizontal complementary co­
dependent relation which either (1) expands within the limitations provided by lower level 
elements which are themselves anchored by stabilizing circularities, or (2) expands into 
restraints provided by higher level stabilizing relations. Therefore, there can be both 
internal and external restraints on change, respectively.
The evolution of a particular system can be conceived of in a few different ways. 
For example, one could imagine that it is stable in only a roughly probabilistic fashion 
rather than manifesting a strict point equilibrium or limit cycle. This is easily conceived 
by including chaotic relations which display quantitative randomness and therefore 
provide a stochastic element to the system.159 Such systems will deny us the ability to 
predict the exact quantitative dynamics of the system since infinitesimally small errors 
in initial conditions will engender completely different quantitative interrelations. 
Furthermore, these periods of unpredictable dynamic behavior may be interspersed within 
relatively consistent behavior (i.e., transitive chaos). However, whereas the quantitative 
detail of the system may be elusive, the quality of the system may not. For example,
158 Discussions of isolated horizontal circularities are done merely for convenience under the implicit 
recognition that such independent existence is never fully accurate.
159 Along these lines, see Cesar das Neves (1988) for a basic introduction to the process of poverty 
equilibrium based on the work of Nurkse, Myrdal, Galbraith, and Leibenstein. In addition, the seminal 
papers by Lorenz (1963) and May (1976) may be of interest.
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a predator-prey interaction may display chaotic behavior while the quality of the relation 
and the greater forest ecosystem remains stable. It is possible that these chaotic 
tendencies could provide oscillations within the system which engender a change in its 
quality. One could imagine that a system possesses complementary relations which are 
presently inactive. If the system’s perturbations happen to exceed some critical 
threshold, which is likely to be multidimensional, this circularity reinforces the deviation 
and the relations expand.160
These ideas can also be expressed through the notion of a key variable, or pattern 
of variables, which connects the system to lower level phenomena. If this key is 
bordered by two negative links, these links may place the reinforcing elements of the 
focal system in the position of being suppressed (see Figure 5). Unless this variable 
changes, which is dependent on the current relations within the unexpanded system, these 
potentially expansive relations can not manifest themselves fully. This scenario addresses 
contingent evolutionary change since structural variations within the current system may 
be necessary to initiate further development. However, once this spiral of growth has 
begun, the momentum behind continued development may far surpass what one might 
expect from the small deviations of the key variable.
There are many empirical complementary co-dependent relations, some of which 
seem to be accepted as synthetic qualities, which exist within economic theory. For
*® This is similar to ideas developed by Prigogine (1976, 1980) and Prigogine et. al. (1977) within the 
field of out-of-equilibrium thermodynamics, which have subsequently been extended into economic growth 
theory by Allen and Sanglier (1978, 1979, 1981) and May (1989). In Prigogine’s work, a change in the 
flow of energy causes systemic re-organization, while Allen and Sanglier’s work substitutes an increasing 
population (i.e., labor and goods flow).
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example, a black box theory of the firm acknowledges the synthetic quality which- 
emerges from a pattern of human beings, technical know-how, and capital equipment 
engaged collaboratively in production. If this firm were to gain a monopoly or 
monopsony position in a given region, it would become much more, qualitatively, than 
a firm which merely employs resources to produce products: it will possess a social and 
political significance which may influence the regional socio-economic process. One can 
make this evolutionary distinction more pronounced by considering multinational firms 
which experience multifaceted complementarities much more complex than the economies 
of scale associated with single commodity production. It is not so easy to delineate neat 
economic boundaries within which such entities participate since they frequently become 
meaningful within a broader context of national or even global social relations. Some 
of the larger multinationals are a more significant force at the global level of socio­
economic analysis than are some political unities (e.g., Coca-Cola versus Nicaragua).
Moving outside the conceptual confines of the notion of a firm, one could present 
industrial networks (e.g., the computer or automotive industry) which possess 
complementary co-dependent relations which foster the expansion of the industry as a 
whole. Such ideas are contained in Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1990[1920]) and 
were the theoretical foundations for his Industry and Trade (1915). It should be noted 
that the stabilizing circularity within which these industrial networks evolve includes the 
ecology of consumer preferences for the products available to society (Young 1928). 
Therefore, the emergence of novel products will influence the process of social
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interaction (e.g., the Internet).161 In support of this claim, note that the socio-economic 
context we live in now is distinctly different from what it was even twenty years ago.
Smith’s (1937[1776]) exposition on the emergence of the market system, through 
an unfolding division of labor made possible by institutional changes within English 
society, is another example of such an unfolding evolutionary process. The rich 
possibilities for the economy could not manifest themselves until the ability of peasants 
to effectively hold property had changed. These initial changes in private property rights 
opened up the opportunity for and increased the motivation to expand the division of 
labor. These unfolding economic relations possessed an internal momentum which 
caused institutional changes that the existing social relations were unable to arrest. The 
significance of these changes is captured in the emergence of a new field of study dealing 
with structural elements which had not manifest themselves fully in the past (e.g., in 
Antiquity and the Middle Ages) ... this discipline being political economy. But how 
much qualitative change does this transformation in socio-economic interaction entail? 
Has the process of social interaction significantly changed? Or is this simply a structural 
novelty?
141 See Harvey (1989).
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Building the Conceptual Hierarchy
Now that the process of mental conception and perception per se has been 
addressed, this next section can explore the relation between the two more fully by 
explicitly introducing the dimensions of space and time (i.e., the spatio-temporal). One 
might say that one’s concepts come into greater focus, which manifests as a more 
effective operational understanding, when the spatio-temporal dimensions of perception 
are matched with the system’s qualitative and interactive process. Similar to a distorted 
visual perception, a distorted concept will still fail to achieve its goal: to effectively 
translate and represent experience. Although the set of effective operational concepts 
was limited in the past as a result of the physiological constraints of perception, this has 
been overcome, to some degree, through the use of observational instruments.
The initial assumption is that a specific focal system can be characterized by a 
particular set of structural qualities and their homeorhetic rate. By fixing the dimensions 
of perception, a decomposition of the observational experience occurs which creates 
explicit spatial appearance and temporal relatedness. Additional observation sets can be 
created of otherwise unobservable phenomena through the use of instruments which allow 
one to take "pictures" at both faster/slower and smaller/larger perceptual dimensions. 
For example, one can compile data on population size, sales volume, pollution readings, 
temperature, chemical densities, and electro-magnetic radiation. Such observation sets 
will have a temporal dimension (e.g., every quarter for GDP or every ten years for
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Census Data) and will frequently extrapolate a representative sample of spatial qualities 
and their covariations (e.g., consumer spending, average age, or income) to determine 
the general pattern of the focal system. The main point is that every observation set 
carries with it a spatio-temporal dimension.162
Homeorhetic Difference and Apparent Quality of Being
One can speak of the time period necessary for a focal system to realize stable 
internal relations, e.g., after perturbation, as its homeorhetic rate. Two points: (1) 
Homeorhesis is a term coined by embryologist C.H. Waddington to represent the quality 
of stability within a trajectory or time extended course of change. Homeorhetic is used 
instead of homeostasis in order to avoid some of the equilibrium bias of the latter term: 
the former is a stabilized flux and the latter a stabilized state. (2) A representative 
homeorhetic rate involves stabilizing relations set by the structural elements of the system 
and its atmospheric parameters (e.g., thermometer reading = temperature). The rate at 
which this process achieves stability will depend on the rate at which it closes the gap 
between the actual state of the system (e.g., temperature) and the goal (e.g., thermometer
162 It is interesting to reflect on the fact that the categories of time and space emerge within the process 
of self-consciousness. There is no reason to assume that such qualities exist outside of this systemic 
process. One might speculate that the dimensions of time and space are endogenous to the process of 
observation due to distinctions drawn by a discriminating awareness. While the complex logical paradoxes 
created through the use of a space-time framework when reflecting on the nature of self-consciousness shall 
not be discussed here, the quality of self-consciousness as manifested within individuals is explicitly 
included as an active element of the socio-economic process. This conceptual dimension, however, will 
evade observation in the traditional sense except perhaps through the trace of an individual’s speech and 
actions.
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setting, 70° F). If rate is constant, it can be shown that 95% of this gap will be closed 
in a time period of approximately 3Irate (Goodman 1974). Whether the remaining gap 
represents a significant deviation from stability is a question of perspective and meaning.
Phenomena which remain spatially local, but stabilize at a homeorhetic rate 
significantly faster than the temporal dimension of observation, are not perceived as 
manifesting interactive change, but as a quality o f thingness (e.g., hardness or flexibility 
in atomic/molecular interaction). For example, the temporal dimension of the process 
of human visual perception results in a blinking light being perceived as either a blinking 
or continuous light depending on the rate o f blinking relative to the alpha rhythms o f the 
visual cortex (Varela et. al. 1991:73-75). On a more pedestrian note, the propeller of 
an airplane will appear as a Juzzy surface and a sparkler twirled through the air appears 
as a line o f light, even though we know that these perceptions are not true. The temporal 
dimension of the system relative to that of the process of perception determines the 
system’s appearance.
Is it possible to claim which perceptions are an illusory representation of the ‘true’ 
system? On what basis do we determine what is and is not an illusion? While it is a 
difficult task to speak of truth in a universal sense, one can contend that false 
representations will yield ineffective concepts. For example, an illusory lion (e.g., a 
holographic image) does not have the whole set of qualities which make a ‘real’ lion. 
This holographic lion depends on a particular machine to create this image, its 
appearance requires human intervention, and it consists of only the visual quality of a 
lion, but would lack substantiality with respect to touch and smell. This will translate
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into different responses. While the illusory lion is nothing to be afraid of, a real lion is. 
The belief that the illusory lion is a threat, and the resulting chaos this could cause 
among an audience (e.g., group panic or individual coronary problems), is unnecessary. 
In a similar way, one would not want to touch the illusory surface of an airplane 
propeller. The determination of the illusory-ness of our perceptions is influenced by our 
ability to alter the spatio-temporal conditions of the system (e.g., an airplane engine or 
holographic plate) and thereby create or destroy the perception. When we no longer 
volitionally support these conditions, the appearance fades and we are left with more 
accurate perceptions. The absence of our influence on the phenomenal process under 
observation is assumed to allow the phenomenon to appear in its ‘natural’ form. This 
lack of distortion on the part of the observer is of critical importance when considering 
the conceptual dimension of socio-economic phenomena. What would such a freedom 
from distortion entail?
Returning to sparklers and propellers, the fact that increasing the speed of a 
point/line can create the perception of a line/surface leads to the possibility that the 
relation between a system’s homeorhetic rate and the temporal structure of perception 
may change the spatial appearance of a phenomenon. Since touch is a sensory 
perception, this may even translate into physically tangible differences. For example, 
the atoms which compose the table I am writing on move at a much faster speed than I 
can perceive. In fact, the desk is more space than matter, but I perceive and experience 
it through sight and touch as a solid due to relative spatio-temporal differences. Unlike 
the airplane’s propeller, I cannot influence the temporal dimension of this process.
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Therefore, I assume the ‘natural’ autonomy of this system, and my perception of its 
inherent insubstantiality must be inductively gathered through instrumentally augmented 
observations or deductively through analogy.163
The phenomenon of shifting dimensional appearance can even be explored from a 
mathematical perspective. For example, it is possible to construct a sponge (formally 
named a Menger sponge, see Figure 43, reproduced from Schroeder 1991:180) which 
has zero volume but infinite surface area: this is done by iteratively removing the central 
twenty-sevenths from a cube and from all its subsequent subcubes. These ideas can also 
be applied to lines and surfaces (e.g., see Rosser 1991).
Figure 43: Illustration of a Menger Sponge
10 A physicist might refer to this as the inability to collapse probability functions, these probability
functions being an aggregative representation of the higher speed dynamics of lower level processes.
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Therefore, something can appear to exist within three dimensional space (i.e., possessing 
volume) yet lack such existence from a mathematical perspective. Such findings provide 
support for the possibility that the apparent dimensions of a process (i.e., its structural 
qualities) are by no means self-evident or given to perception.
How does one deal with such insubstantial perceptual dimensions? Rather than 
sticking to the belief that things possess only integer dimensionality, one could expand 
the concept of dimension to allow for fractal dimensions. In this case the Menger sponge 
would have an effective dimension of 2.73 (Schroeder 1991:180). Yet even these notions 
of fractal dimensions are not immune to perceptual variations caused by a changing 
resolution. For example, Mandelbrot (1977) notes that changes in the spatial appearance 
of an object will occur as the spatial resolution of perception is allowed to vary. As this 
resolution is increased, the size of the phenomenon relative to one’s field of view will 
increase, the deeper structural substructure will manifest to perception and the initial 
structure is lost:
... a ball of 10 cm diameter made of a thick thread of 1 mm diameter possesses 
(in latent fashion) several distinct dimensions. To an observer placed far away, 
the ball appears as a zero-dimensional figure: a point. ... As seen from a 
distance of 10 cm resolution, the ball of thread is a three-dimensional figure 
[solid]. At 10 mm, it is a mess of one-dimensional threads [lines]. At 0.1 mm, 
each thread becomes a column and the whole becomes three-dimensional again.
At 0.01 mm, each column dissolves into fibers, and the ball again becomes one­
dimensional, and so on, with the dimensions crossing over repeatedly from one 
value to another. (Mandelbrot 1977:17)
The structural detail within the observation set is determined by the degree of resolution
within perception. What is most interesting is that the judgement of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’
resolution would imply a knowledge of the process being observed. To conclude that a
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cell which is observed through a microscope is out of focus, one must know what in 
focus is. If no-thing exists, then resolution is not an issue.
Differing perceptual perspectives also have implications for the viability of 
controlled experimentation. Since the observer has definitive spatio-temporal existence, 
she will actually be part of some process’ spatial environment and hence be able to 
influence its context (e.g., atomic, molecular, and cellular interactions). This 
manipulative ability will not only involve spatial extent (e.g., human beings are larger 
than cells), but also temporal extent (e.g., humans live longer than cells). Therefore, the 
observer can, e.g., alter the chemical composition, temperature, and lighting which 
forms the context of cellular respiration. And since these systems have synthetic 
lifetimes significantly shorter than the observer’s, there is the possibility for multiple 
observations within this controlled environment.
In contrast, systems which appear at a higher structural level relative to the 
observer will not allow for controlled experimentation and easily repeatable observations. 
What becomes critical when attempting to conceive of these latter systems is the length 
of the observation set and the types of measurements taken.164 One example would be 
theories of ecosystem succession which explore the changing structural and relational 
composition within a developing ecosystem (e.g., the growth of forests). An observation 
set which is only one year long will not provide an adequate foundation. In addition, 
observations of cultural change must be composed and confirmed through
164 This is a current problem in the analysis of global wanning since data have only been collected for 
a few decades. The expeditions into the arctic regions to take ice core samples, yielding measurements 
of past C02 levels, is one attempt to circumvent this problem.
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intergenerational observations and offer no opportunity for conditional experimentation. 
Furthermore, if one is to rely on the historical record to inform representative concepts 
of higher level structures, then this observation set must correspond to the relevant 
elements of the system. The absence of relevant elements has the potential to skew the 
concept and lead to ill informed action (e.g., see Repetto (1992) concerning the flaws of 
the national product accounts).
Since the perception of structure within an interactive process results from relative 
differences in homeorhetic rates, systems with slower homeorhetic rates present the 
observer with an additional problem.165 Not only does the use of instruments create 
multiple perspectives which decompose lower level phenomena at different spatio- 
temporal dimensions, but being able to manipulate the environment of lesser wholes 
allows one to perform controlled experiments. Therefore, one is able to investigate these 
interactive processes through both a perception of simultaneous spatio-temporal 
decompositions and a controlled analysis of the systemic significance of individual 
elements.166 In other words, the synthetic quality of the whole as a p a n  of the higher
145 It is interesting to note that the direct perception of a higher level whole by an expanded 
consciousness which is cultivated through the active refinement of ooe’s existing consciousness (i.e., one 
which perceives with less distinction) would not be considered scientific, but rather a mystical experience. 
Such conclusions, however, would be incorrect. It is more appropriate to state that the process of 
refinement necessary to permit such perceptions requires the development of a host of qualities (e.g., 
giving, morality, patience, vigor, mediation, and wisdom, see Sangharakshita 1957). The laboratory for 
experimentation is the individual, and even though this is the only arena to test such theories, few people 
are willing to make the necessary efforts. Since this refinement is within the inherent process of 
perception, the experiences themselves cannot be shared but only described. Therefore, the higher 
evolution of consciousness is denied much as the average person 200 years ago would have vehemently 
denied the vacuous nature of reality within a world of apparently pervasive solid form.
166 For example, unaided visual perception can observe an infection of a cut as redness. A microscope 
can then be used to augment this observation set using various degrees of refined spatial sensitivity. Such 
refinements can also occur from a temporal perspective as instruments are used which are more sensitive 
to finer temporal distinctions. All in all, this creates a set of nested simultaneous observations which
289
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
process can be used to discern the significant elements which compose its pattern (e.g.,
the removal of the human appendix). Whereas the elements which compose lower level
systems may actually appear and disappear as the spatio-temporal dimensions of
perception are varied, the structural elements which compose higher level synthetic
qualities must appear within our conceptual re-organization of the existing observation
set. A lower level observer who perceives a higher level process is not able to alter its
environmental conditions as readily and will not have the privilege of using a synthetic
quality to experiment with the relevancy of its constituent parts. Instead, the whole must
be inferred from atmospheric variations which modify the interaction of its parts by
filtering the environmental conditions. Allen and Hoekstra (1987:71-72) offer an
example from ecology:
Consider diurnal temperature fluctuations and a forest. Outside the forest, 
temperature fluctuations are quite large. Inside, the biomass of the trees 
moderates these fluctuations. Forest trees experience cooler temperatures during 
the day and warmer temperatures at night than a single tree standing alone in a 
field. The forest tree experiences only the modified influence, and it is beside 
the point that the night temperature outside the forest is low. Thus it is by 
drawing an inference from the observation of the temperature inside and outside 
the forest that it can be stated that the environmental influence is modified by the 
forest.
Such environmental modifications lead to the discovery of synthetic qualities and the 
conceptual unification of higher level synthetic qualities. For example, the phenomenon 
of culture is perceived through an atmospheric quality: a civilized society presents an 
individual with a distinctly different atmosphere from one which is barbaric.
"naturally" decompose the focal system into its lower level constituents.
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Generally speaking, since a human observer perceives from a fixed position in 
reality, she will make observations as either a pan o f the greater system or the context 
o f a lesser system. This distinction significantly alters the means by which one can 
identify synthetic qualities and presents unique difficulties for socio-economic theory 
since there are very few systems to observe, these systems are not accessible to 
controlled experiments, and historical events will probably never repeat the contextual 
conditions necessary to confirm or falsify a socio-economic model. As a result, diverse 
proliferation of socio-economic models can co-exist without empirical feedback: these 
concepts evolve faster than their empirical counterparts. To overcome this potential 
problem, materialistic selection criteria for the structural elements of socio-economic 
theories have been adhered to. These ‘objective’ elements are then aggregated into the 
larger macro and global economy without much concern for the determination of higher 
level systemic properties. By restricting oneself to quantifiable elements, the concepts 
become empirically explicit and hence accessible to formal modelling. This allows other 
individuals attempting to understand the same focal system to learn from, critique, or 
attempt to refute a given concept of social existence more readily. One could say that 
the size of the experimental vacuum declines as a wider diversity of human experience 
and perspective is homogenized through this technique and brought to bear on the 
problem.
The problem is that quantification and mathematization begin to define the 
appropriate elements of a given system. As with theoretical science, mathematics is a 
"shorthand language, rather than an engine of inquiry" which should be illustrated by real
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life examples (Marshall as cited in Whitaker 1975). It is a conceptual tool which 
clarifies thought and highlights our understandings of phenomena, not a criterion used 
to identify the relevant variables in our theory. Qualities such as values, morals, and 
ethics are outside the jurisdiction of mathematics, and hence frequently taken to be 
outside the scope of socio-economic theory. In fact, these variables embody the essence 
of Georgescu-Roegen’s notion of 3rd order rationality: socio-economic theory composes 
its own observation set of variables. Yet, if variables excluded from the scope of 
discussion are circularly linked to the system per se, the conceptual model of the system 
will fail to effectively describe its behavior.
A good example of these difficulties is the economic theory of the firm, which 
recognizes the interdependence of component parts which are engaged in a process of 
production (e.g., labor, capital, raw materials). The firm is observed, and therefore 
conceived, as parts whose complementary interaction creates an atmosphere distinctly 
different from the surrounding environment. Due to this perception, these material 
observations are compiled as the significant characteristics of a parametric black box 
concept of what a firm is. The implicit acceptance of a parts/whole synthetic quality is 
witnessed in the division of profits. The fact that one portion of a firm’s profits is 
theoretically defined as variable (i.e., owner’s profits) allows the proceeds of the 
complementary whole to be divided between its constituent parts: the division of a non- 
summative whole through the inclusion of a variable component. This variable 
component also serves to absorb the fluctuating role of the individual firm within the 
competitive and complementary regional economic process. Although the competitive
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relations of these external changes are highlighted and emphasized in our theory without 
regard for the complementary relations, firms frequently recognize the complementary 
aspects of regional development and attempt to appropriate these greater economies 
through political concessions (e.g., tax breaks).
Causal Diagramming and the Structure of Perception. Causal loop diagramming 
can provide a more concrete image of this spatio-temporal structuring of the observation 
set. Suppose one is observing the dynamic relationship between a group of variables 
which interact with one another at two different homeorhetic rates. The first group of 
variables (dashed links; homeorhetic r a t e d i m e n s i o n e d  in, e.g., seconds) display 
interactive behavior that proceeds at a rate significantly faster than the second group of 
variables (solid links; homeorhetic rate, Tvl2, where T ^ ^ T ,^ ) .  The perceived form of 
this process will depend on the spatio-temporal dimension of the observation set used in 
analysis. If the process is observed at a temporal dimension which is fast enough to 
detect the interaction of the high speed dynamics (i.e., T ,* .* ^ , ,  meaning T,*, results 
in a structural decomposition which can be used to effectively represent these faster 
relations) then the interactive dynamic process of A, B, C, and D will be perceived, and 
the C-*E and D-*E link will appear as matter/energy or information flows, and the G-*B 
link will appear as an input. The structural elements E and G may appear as simply 
environmental parameters from this perspective (see Figure 44).
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Figure 44: An Observation Set with ‘Faster1 Temporal Dimension
However, if  a slower temporal dimension is used (e.g., Tiyil«T ob,* T vJ  then our 
perception of this process can change. The variables A, B, C, and D may appear as an 
entity (e.g., a Stock, Fund, or Systemic Element) and their internal process of structural 
interaction will appear to have a semi-autonomous quality. Although this interactive 
subset will not necessarily possess a synthetic quality, it will appear as a single entity 
from this perspective (e.g., a table, hurricane, or cell). Using [C]*1 to denote the 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Figure 45: An Observation Set with ‘Slower’ Temporal Dimension rT| lt^T ... » T t .^
This higher level decomposition will be nested within a still larger context. Whether this 
context is important enough to warrant investigation depends on the questions being 
asked, but one must always remember that the focal process co-evolves with this context 
and is never independent of it.
‘Significant1 Spatio-Temporal Differences. What exactly are ‘significantly faster’
and ‘significantly slower’ homeorhetic rates? This seems to be an empirical rather than
philosophical question. However, Herbert Simon (1953, 1969) and others (e.g., Simon-
and Iwasaki 1988) have suggested that the distinction between levels may be bound up
in the relative strength of attractive and repulsive forces between elements. In other
words, stronger forces will act at a higher speed than weaker forces. The ability to
abstract from lower and higher levels is then related to the distinctiveness of the temporal
separations. He states,
we can build a theory of the system at the level of dynamics that is observable, 
in ignorance of the detailed structure or dynamics at the next level down, and 
ignore the very slow interactions at the next level up. The goodness of our 
approximation will depend only on the sharpness of the high frequencies from
+
B[C]-'DA (+ /-) F
+
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the middle-range frequencies, and of the middle-range frequencies from the low 
frequencies. (Simon 1953:11)
Therefore, the sharper the temporal distinction between levels, the more distant will
stable patterns be from one another, and the more easily will one be able to identify these
distinctions.
The preservation of this temporal leveling is of critical importance in mathematical
equations which attempt to embody causal relations. Frequently, individual elements are
carelessly aggregated into a whole and different temporally dimensioned elements are
hastily added and subtracted to yield some mathematical insight. However, temporal
differences can create counter-intuitive solutions. For example,
Suppose that a young man has a choice between two jobs. Each offers a starting 
salary of $1800 per year, but the first one would lead to an annual raise of $200 
whereas the second would lead to a semiannual raise of $50. Which job is 
preferable? (Kline 1959:2-3)
While one may think that the answer is obvious, the use of both annual and semiannual
rates introduces a counter-intuitive solution. In order to see this, one can work out the
semiannual salary expected from the two options. A semi-annual increase of $50 means
that the semiannual salary will begin at $900 and then increase by $50 in each subsequent
period: i.e., $900, $950, $1000, $1050, $1100, $1150, etc. An annual raise of $200
will result in an annual salary of $1800 the first year, $2000 the second year, and $2200
in the third, which translates into a semiannual salary of: $900, $900, $1000, $1000,
$1100, $1100, etc. Since the salary increases start after the first six months with a
semiannual raise, it will pay more during the latter six months of each year and is
therefore preferable. Although this problem concerns simple dimensional complexities
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which can be overcome through clear thinking, it demonstrates the subtle difficulties of 
working with different temporal dimensions.
One implication of these findings suggested by Simon (1953) is that an element 
dimensioned in months cannot be freely intermingled with elements dimensioned in 
quarters without destroying the causal ordering contained in the equations. In other 
words, if a concept of nested systems has any value, this value will definitely be lost 
within mathematical manipulations which allow the unrestrained intermingling of 
differently dimensioned temporal variables. This is more than a mere plea to keep the 
dimensions of one’s variables in order since it implies that the temporal continuum (e.g., 
360 seconds = 60 minutes =  1 hour) is not necessarily amenable to aggregation and 
reduction. In other words, the addition of an inappropriately dimensioned "one" to both 
sides of an equation may destroy the causal ordering embedded in the equations if the 
appropriate dimensional distinctions are not preserved.
The Co-Evolution of the Economy and the Environment
Connecting these ideas to real world examples, one immediately thinks of the 
economy-environment interaction and the concept of sustainable development (e.g., 
Costanza 1991; Norgaard 1984, 1985, 1987). First, there is a high probability that the 
homeorhetic rates of these two processes are different from that inherent to human 
perception. This will limit one’s access to multiple observation sets and hinder the 
ability to utilize the methodology of controlled experimentation. Furthermore, both of
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these processes contribute an atmospheric quality (i.e., material affluence and biological 
sustenance) within which social existence has evolved, and hence become structurally 
dependent. The problem is that the complementary facet of the nesting of these two 
systems is not widely appreciated. Instead, the competitive interaction between niggardly 
nature and the socio-economic system is emphasized. As a result, both the expansive and 
degenerative co-evolutionary potential is missed.
Since both the economy and the environment are higher level phenomena relative 
to human observation, the higher level synthetic qualities which inform an effective 
concept of each process will be inferred by composition rather than being decomposed 
through varying perceptual dimensions (e.g., the political boundaries of economic 
processes or the emphasis on material possessions). The effectiveness of such concepts 
of higher level interactions must accord with one’s perception, but the possibility exists 
that significant spatial qualities are not collected and hence our concept will be biased and 
out of focus. In addition, the significant qualities which dominate the higher level 
interaction may change as the process itself evolves (e.g., Boyer’s (1988) models of 
growth regimes in economics).
Perhaps the simplest concept of this economy-environment interaction conceives 
of the economy as experiencing a progressive spiral (i.e., self-reinforcing process) of 
ever greater material growth. The earth is frequently included as an infinite stock 
variable: a horn of plenty with respect to resources and a bottomless sink with respect 
to waste. More recently, the environment has begun to be modelled as a systemic 
element, which could easily become a fund variable without precautions. However, such
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concepts invert the relationship between these two systems: the environment is seen to 
be a structural part of the economy. The slower and larger ecological process in which 
the economy is nested begins to be viewed as an element which can be manipulated, such 
as laws and technology, and this anthropocentric delusion becomes implicit within our 
actions. The ramifications of such beliefs are not immediately available to perception 
since the dynamic loops of the larger system proceed at a significantly slower temporal 
rate (e.g., soil erosion with intensive agriculture techniques, climate change, and species 
extinction).
Even as scientists begin to analyze the gross effects of increased urbanization, 
industrialization, resource depletion, and population growth, the more subtle interaction 
of human civilization with the earth’s ecology has yet to be explored (e.g., the prolific 
use of antibiotics and the evolving immunity of bacteria). One reason for this exclusion 
is undoubtedly the fact that subtle ecological changes resulting from our actions have not 
been dramatic enough to create an impression upon our senses. In fact, Western 
civilization lacks a fully developed notion of ecological interaction, let alone an effective 
concept of economy-environment interaction, and therefore is only now developing a 
conceptual foundation from which to inform such perceptions. These concepts thereby 
lack the accumulated historical record required for calibration and testing. We must 
optimistically hope that this spiral of conceptual advance converges on an effective 
description.
However, we remain unable to fully anticipate the unfolding of the ecological 
pattern we participate in. The implications of higher level structural variations on lower
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level patterns are phenomena of the 2nd order and remain unknown (e.g., the microbiodc 
organisms which provide the substratum for human existence). When the ecological 
system is stable (e.g., temperature, precipitation, and variabilities thereof), more complex 
lower level patterns can evolve (recall Simon’s watchmaker). While the discussion of 
synthetic qualities has been implicitly assumed to flow up from the pattern of individual 
parts, one must not forget that context may be a critical parameter of this pattern. For 
example, the transition of water from solid to liquid or liquid to gas is a result of 
contextual change. Plants are know to survive in some climates and die in others. The 
extinction of an individual, culture, species, or biosphere may be precariously balanced 
on environmental parameters with this dependency being impossible to perceive until 
after it occurs: 2nd order rationality.
Emergent Qualities and Scientific Knowledge
This section uses the previous discussion as a framework within which to 
investigate the overall structure of scientific knowledge. The working hypothesis I wish 
to put forward is that the major fields of scientific knowledge represent the predominant 
qualitative components of reality as human experience: matter, life, mind, and self.167 
A significant characteristic of this list is that each quality emerges out of its predecessor
167 This idea is taken from the Buddhist concept of the five niyamas, or five levels of conditioned 
existence: (1) the physical order; (2) the biological order; (3) the mental order; (4) the karmic or volitional 
order; (S) the transcendental (see Sangharakshita 1967:69). This formulation was offered as a response 
to the erroneous belief that everything is the result of karmic conditionality and seems just as applicable 
to notions of material dominance.
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in this list such that each subsequent quality appears to be nested within the previous one. 
Life is a quality of specific patterns of matter, mind is a quality of specific patterns of 
life, and self-consciousness is a quality of specific patterns of mind.168 Furthermore, 
each of these synthetic qualities also present a process novelty. As a result, the context 
of higher level systems will frequently include the synthetic qualities of lower level 
systems. This hierarchical order is implicitly supported through the separation of 
different fields within the natural sciences and their relationships to one another (i.e., 
physics, chemistry, and biology).169 The social sciences (e.g., psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, political science, and economics) do not continue this neat trend since no 
clean dialectic distinction between mind and self-consciousness has been accepted by 
Western science. However, it is these self-conscious individuals whose interaction with 
one another forms the object of social science investigation. None of the individual 
social sciences investigates this social whole. Rather, each explores different facets of 
this composition. In addition, this social whole does not represent a novel process, as 
with the natural sciences, but merely a synthetic quality.
Due to psychology’s emphasis on the internal life of the individual human being, 
it could concern itself with the spectrum of qualitative transition from mind to self, but 
will obviously fail as a purely theoretical extrapolation when attempting to bridge this
'* Theories of mind and consciousness which are built from philosophical speculations similar to those 
contained in this essay are available (e.g., Buddhist thought in general, Bateson 1972, 1988; Macy 1991; 
Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela et.al. 1991).
169 Newer fields, such as biochemistry and biophysics, may represent an investigation of the interaction 
of the emergent biological process (and structures thereof) within the broader context of chemical and 
physical processes.
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qualitative gap. In fact, it is commonly assumed that mind, and frequently self- 
consciousness, is just an aggregative biological phenomenon ... which it is, and isn’t. 
Regardless, this aggregative tendency based on materialist criteria is retained from the 
natural sciences, by assuming that social science explores a novel process rather than 
simply synthetic qualities within the institutional structures built from human beings and 
the diversity of lower level synthetic qualities. Even then, these investigations are 
frequently devoid of the distinguishing quality of human existence, self-consciousness. 
From the perspective of the hierarchical decomposition outlined above, the next field of 
science would be one which explicitly investigates the quality of being self-conscious and 
the evolutionary process of a self-transcendence. Social institutions would then help to 
provide the context in which this evolution occurs. They would be seen as means to an 
end, rather than the frequent belief that they are ends in themselves. Although Buddhism 
offers just such an analysis, these ideas will not be explored here even though the author 
considers these insights to be empirical support for the aforementioned hierarchical 
propositions.170
It is worth remembering that this is not an ontological assertion concerning the 
existence of such a hierarchy within some ultimate reality. It is our conceptions and 
perceptions which are discrete (or penumbral in Georgescu-Roegen’s system of terms), 
hierarchical, and spatio-temporally nested. The purpose of exploring this conceptual 
hierarchy is threefold: First, to hypothesize the relative validity of different scientific
IW The interested reader is directed to Sangharakshita (1969) and Cooper (199S) for an evolutionary 
formulation of Buddhist ideas. In addition, those which an inbred aversion to the use of a hierarchy 
concept are referred to Saramati (1995).
302
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
theories to the particular existential decompositions they seek to describe. As Polanyi 
(1975) has stated, even if Laplace’s Demon does know the exact past, current, and future 
positions of all atoms in the universe, this information would provide no insight into a 
field of daisies (i.e., the phenomena of life). Second, to posit that the fixed nature of 
human observation has divided our theoretical models into the natural and social sciences 
around the qualitative thresholds of the mental and self-conscious order of things. And 
third, to propose that the different fields of the established social sciences are merely 
different levels of synthetic quality within the novel process of self-consciousness.
Exploring this hierarchy of synthetic qualities and process novelties more deeply, 
a synthetic quality continues to be subject to the lower level interactive processes, but 
opens up a window of novel opportunities- within this interactive status quo. This 
conceptual hierarchy of scientific fields starts with matter and physics: electrons, 
neutrons, and protons interact to form atoms which interact to form molecules.171 Let 
us assume that the next emergent layer of order is life. Two significant characteristics 
of this conceptual shift from matter to life require our attention. First, life presents novel 
interactive opportunities which are not present for matter. It represents a system in 
entropic disequilibrium which actively perpetuates and replicates itself (see Maturana and 
Varela 1980). Of interest is the fact that the endogenous interactive dynamic which 
provides the motor for life consists of a positive causal loop between lower level 
elements that are contained within its systemic boundary (e.g., the photosynthetic and
171 Although it is easy to admit chemistry as another field within this nesting, that would stretch the 
limits of my understanding. This essay hopes to explicitly acknowledge the presence and investigate the 
implications of such a hierarchical layering within scientific knowledge rather than to establish a definitive 
number of layers.
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Krebs cycles).172 Second, this vertical transition from matter to life appears to be 
associated with increases in the minimum spatio-temporal dimensions of the system 
relative to human experience (i.e., self-consciousness). Simplistically, matter is observed 
to exist at a faster temporal and smaller spatial perspective than the smallest and quickest 
systems which would qualify as living. While this feet is not significant within the 
hierarchy of qualities per se, since it arises from the perspective of active observation, 
it becomes important when it is extrapolated into social systems.
The emergence of mind arises out of life just as life emerged out of matter. By 
mind, I am referring to non-volitional systemic behavior (e.g., a Pavlovian stimulus- 
response model), perhaps qualifying as instinctual behavior. Once again, mind seems 
to have arisen through a positive causal relation within life (see Cooper 1995). With 
respect to its minimum spatio-temporal dimension, the prediction that systems possessing 
the quality of mind would be observed to occur at a slower temporal and larger spatial 
perspective is not as obvious. However, the character of this shift needs to be more 
carefully thought through. For example, the spatial extension that occurs in the transition 
from biological to psychological systems involves the system’s spatial influence or 
effective spatial range. In other words, rather than the system expanding, the system’s 
context of interaction expands. In this way, purely biological and psychological systems 
present an ever incveasingfreedom o f interactive opportunity, of expanding context, while 
concurrently operating within narrower windows o f permissible environmental 
parameters. For example, an amoeba has more interactive freedom than a carbon
172 Such a conceptual approach has been proposed within the held of biology (e.g., see Reidl 1977).
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molecule, but the former requires stricter environmental conditions for existence than the 
latter, as diagrammed in Figure 46.
Figure 46: The Hierarchical Nesting of Interactive Processes
Subject to the Interactive 









Physical Yes No No
Biological Yes Yes No
Psychological Yes Yes Yes
This diagram conveys the idea that purely physical systems are subject to neither 
the limitations nor the possibilities of higher level processes. Likewise, biological 
systems operate within the limitations and possibilities of physical existence in addition 
to their own, but are not subject to psychological limitations nor open to the latter’s 
inherent possibilities. While this representation may appear tautological, in that physical 
systems are subject to physical laws, this tautology merely reflects the fact that structures 
are defined by their relations just as relations have meaning through the structures they 
interrelate. One can escape this apparent horizontal tautology by acknowledging that 
there exists a dynamic progression o f evolving individual systems, from inanimate matter 
to complex sentient life forms, which are moving through our static representation of this 
structure/process hierarchy. The introduction of time makes the horizontal circle a 
vertical spiral of growth and evolution, which breaks the horizontal tautology. It is this
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continuous dynamic which I believe led Marshall to proclaim that "Nature makes no 
leaps."
This spatio-temporal progression of these emergent systems can also be plotted out 
on a graph as in Figure 47. Obviously, since higher qualitative levels are embedded 
within their lower level predecessors, their spatio-temporal dimensions, based on a 
system’s homeorhetic rate and spatial boundaries, will be included in the latter’s range.
Figure 47: Spatio-Temporal Variations within the Structure-Process Hierarchy














Of particular note is the fact that the discussion itself is made from the perspective 
of a self-conscious observer. Therefore, there will obviously be a convergence of these 
spatio-temporal discriminators as one moves up this conceptual hierarchy. The empirical
306
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ramifications of this fact influence the manner in which observations of self- 
consciousness can be collected: one can only experiment and observe one’s own self- 
consciousness. In addition, the process of exploring self-consciousness requires the 
cultivation of awareness and therefore implies the presence of self-consciousness itself. 
Furthermore, the process of self-consciousness can never be demonstrated to another, but 
only inferred by dwelling in the situational context of another and considering their 
actions. This notion of "indwelling" is a fruitful idea introduced by Polanyi (1975) and 
subsequently used by him to explore art, poetry, literature, and religion. This line of 
reasoning is fascinating, however, it leads me away from my main points.
While the dimensions of time and space seem to share a high level of correlation 
within perception (e.g., slow phenomenal processes are usually large and fast ones 
usually small), synthetic qualities will not necessarily emerge within increasingly 
slower/larger phenomenal processes. For example, the emergence of organic life is not 
strictly related to the size of the molecular aggregation nor consciousness to the size of 
the organism. However, an extrapolative error of this type is present in the social 
sciences when socio-economic/political interaction is seen to represent a new field  of 
study; it is considered an emergent process rather than merely the emergence o f varied 
structures within a given interactive theme. Social science is the study of emergent social 
structures which result from the interaction of individuals. Although it is the evolution 
of an individual’s consciousness which represents an emergent process, such themes can 
be highly controversial.
307
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Within this hierarchy of qualitative change, do the social sciences represent a novel 
emergent process? There are four different possibilities: (1) There may be a complete 
lack of emergence in social systems such that social phenomena can be represented by 
logical aggregations of lower level structural elements (e.g., a mere stimulus-response 
system of psychological, biological and physical interactions). This seems to go against 
empirical fact since human beings have the potential to demonstrate more than simple 
stimulus-response behaviors. (2) Accepting the quality of sentience, social phenomena 
per se (e.g., culture and institutions) may represent structural novelties, but these novel 
elements may continue to act within a given interactive firamework of lower level 
possibilities and limitations (e.g., similar to the introduction of a new species into an 
ecosystem). In this option, human beings embody the pinnacle of interactive qualitative 
potential. This seems a bit presumptuous as a base hypothesis, although some people do 
hold this position. (3) One can, however, suppose that higher level interactive 
possibilities exist. Therefore, building onto the last possibility of structural novelty, 
these novel elements may begin to engage in novel interactions (e.g., the emergence of 
life within matter or mind within life). The question then becomes one of determining 
whether (a) it is the synthetic qualities of social institutions per se which engender 
process novelty, or (b) since social phenomena are composed of individuals, and since 
mind and self-consciousness are qualities of the individual organism, the next significant 
layer of novel process may be within self-consciousness and hence within the individual. 
From this last perspective, social phenomena help form the conditional parameters of the 
context which supports the evolution of the individual. Which of these possibilities we
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embrace is a difficult question that rests on one’s honest experiences and philosophical 
belief, within the illuminating context of awareness. What are the roots of qualitative 
social progress? This dissertation adheres to the belief that they emerge within individual 
action, and hence accepts 3(b) as the working hypothesis.
This choice of perspective does have practical implications. For example, some 
of the literature concerning environmental degradation due to economic expansion seems 
to imply that one can correct the problem by constructing the appropriate legal, cultural 
and economic social infrastructure. This overemphasis on institutions is epitomized by 
the attempts to establish Communist and Socialist regimes through political and 
institutional manipulations. While the ideals which fueled these initiatives were based 
on a vision of human relations, their arena of application and, hence, of communication 
were both wrong. What is important here is that we don’t have the tail wagging the dog, 
but recognize the hierarchical order of causal relatedness.
If it is within the individual that the next level of process novelty emerges (i.e., the 
evolution of consciousness), then an isolated change in the institutional conditions may 
not alleviate the problem: individuals may continue to evade the behavior towards which 
the institutions are attempting to steer them. For example, if the destruction of the 
environment is due to a human quality (e.g., the pursuit of wealth or power which is 
blind to the interdependence between people and the environment), then to the extent that 
institutional change merely alters the structural conditions under which these individuals 
act, rather than attempting to change individual attitudes and beliefs, the problems will 
continue. It is for this reason that a growing environmental awareness within the
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individual, as opposed to merely particular environmental regulations, is so critical.17? 
It is important to remember that since institutions are the result of individual behavior, 
the evolution of individuals’ self-consciousness will entail the emergence of new 
institutions. But this must not distract us from the realization that the process novelty, 
the truly new and creative way of interacting with the world, emerges from within the 
individual.174 In other words, we should be looking at our way o f living and our 
individual attitudes towards the meaning and purpose of human existence.
It is also possible to discuss the fragmentation of the social sciences from the 
vantage point of our conceptual hierarchy. Physics, biology, and psychology are all 
subdivided into narrower fields which represent the different subsystems and logical 
aggregations thereof. The social sciences, as a whole, are not markedly different from 
this. The subdivisions within the analysis of human interaction are made on the basis of 
the individual human beings, aggregates thereof. Sometimes these aggregates are 
represented as synthetic structural qualities (e.g., the firm in economics or culture in 
sociology) and sometimes as logical aggregates (e.g., perfectly competitive market 
structure in economics). Dividing the social sciences on the basis of what they study is 
interesting. Psychology is the study of the individual, which can rather ambiguously
173 This is, of course, not a call for ideological re-education. But rather for the cultivation of conscious 
awareness of the interdependence of things.
174 In making these assertions concerning the individual as the context within which the next level of 
process novelty arises, I am acutely aware of the possibility that some people may label my ideas 
individualistic. In this manner, they can easily place my ideas within a particular box on the shelves of 
their mind, a box which will undoubtedly contain a host of automatic associations. Rather than venture 
into this hornet’s nest at this time, I would like to direct the interested reader to Hayek (1946, 1967b) and 
Sangharakshita (1969). Hayek’s papers attempt to sort out the meaning of individualism with respect to 
social theory, while Sangharakshita discusses what true individuality consists of within the evolution of self- 
consciousness.
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includes the whole qualitative spectrum from simple mind (e.g., Skinner) to more 
complex models of the self (e.g., Freud and Jung). Sociology is the study of a group 
of individuals from within the group, while anthropology seems to embody a sociological 
perspective from one group on another (both current and historically). Political science 
involves either larger aggregates of individual human beings (e.g., nations) or broader 
spatial categories (e.g., class distinctions) than sociology. Economics is a distinct 
aberration within this pattern since it takes as its subject the material, and hence more 
easily quantifiable, dimensions of social existence.175
As the only social science eligible for a Nobel prize, economists purposefully
restrict themselves to structural elements and interactions thereof that are quantifiable and
thereby, hopefully, empirically testable. By concentrating on the material and hence
quantifiable dimensions of human interaction, economics has been able to form a concept
of the economic process which is independent of the structural qualities of self-
consciousness and even simple group psychology. The economic concept of the
individual has remained, as Veblen (1898) put it almost a century ago,
that of a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a 
homogeneous globule of desire for happiness under the impulse of stimuli that 
shift him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor 
consequent. He is an isolated, definite datum, in stable equilibrium except for 
the buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one direction or another.
173 It is important to note that historically, it was political economy that emerged in the 18th century
from Adam Smith's (1937(1776]) writing and was continued, for example, by Ricardo and Mill. 
Marshall’s definition of economics as "a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; examines that 
part of individual and social action which is most closely connected with the attainment and with the use 
of the material requisites of wellbeing” in his Principles (1990(1920]: 1) signals a split between political 
theory and economics which occurs around the beginning of the 20^ century. A further split that occurs 
after the Increasing Returns Debates of the 1920’s is marked by Lionel Robbins’ (1937:16) definition of 
economics as ”the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between [unlimited?] ends and 
scarce means which have alternative uses. ”
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Self-imposed in elemental space, he spins symmetrically about his own spiritual 
axis until the parallelogram of forces bears down upon him, whereupon he 
follows the line of the resultant. When the force of the impact is spent, he 
comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before. Spiritually, the 
hedonistic man is not a prime mover. He is not the seat of a process of living, 
except in the sense that he is subject to a series of permutations enforced upon 
him by circumstances external and alien to him.
Human beings become no more than Funds of Labor Services which allow the economic
model to achieve an equilibrium between conflicting and competing wants by facilitating
the transformation of matter and energy.
The drawback of such a self-imposed myopia is that many psychological and 
sociological insights investigate the conceptual, and hence self-conscious, dimension of 
human existence.176 There is no doubt that this facet of human interaction will 
continue to evade simple quantification. However, the difficulty of quantifying such 
elements suggests nothing with respect to the significance of their inclusion within a 
theoretical representation of socio-economic interaction. With respect to models of long- 
run socio-economic development, adding an explicit social dimension to economic theory 
would have a significant and immediate impact on economics. For example, there would 
be a greater recognition that economic activity involves conscious choice and thereby a 
more wholehearted attempt to honestly and openly investigate the consumer side of the 
economy. The distinction between consumers’ needs and wants, which were previously 
taken to be exogenous to the socio-economic system, have been recently explored by a 
few theorists (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 1993). Facets of the socio-economic system may 
be found to be co-dependent with individual and social expectations (e.g., Brewer and
176 Note, however, the recent publication and relative success of an intermediate microeconomic text 
(Frank 1991) which includes chapters on psychological and cognitive dimensions.
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Porter 1993; Douglas and Isherwood 1979; Frank et. al. 1993; Lavin 1995). While the 
endogenous technological change literature has already started to delve into 
heterogeneous technology as a driving force of economic development between regions, 
an investigation of heterogeneous social concepts may prove fruitful (e.g., Hacket and 
Lutzenhiser 1991). The next section presents a contemporary concept of socio-economic 
change which models it as a synthetic quality in such a way that it highlights the 
institutional context’s role in shaping individual behavior as well as the individual’s 
construction of the institutional context itself.
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The Institutional Context of Individual Action
The theory of institutional change, which emerged from the works of Thorstein 
Veblen, John R. Commons, John Dewey, and Clarence E. Ayres, provides a framework 
from which to analyze the conceptual dimension of the socio-economic process. Through 
an explicit separation between the ceremonial and instrumental facets of institutions, this 
theory serves as a more detailed exposition of the complementary/divergent circular 
relationship which Myrdal theorized to exist between the conceptual and material 
dimensions of development. This framework has also been used to inform contemporary 
case studies which support these ideas. The following presentation relies heavily on 
Bush’s (1983, 1987) exposition and is meant to give an outline rather than serve as a 
substitute for reading the original works first hand.177 It should be noted that I have 
made minor additions to this theory.
Values and Patterns of Behaviors
To begin this discussion, what is an institution? Bush answers this question by 
saying that society is a set of institutional systems, an institutional system being a set of
177 Bush’s research provides an excellent source from which to explore the theory of institutional change 
for two reasons: (1) It is clear, concise, and well formulated, although expressed in its own particular 
language. (2) It includes J. Fagg Foster’s refinement of the Veblen institution-technology dichotomy into 
a ceremonial-instrumental dichotomy which significantly clarifies and refines the theory (Waller 1982).
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institutions, and an institution being a set of socially prescribed patterns o f correlated 
individual behavior. Therefore, society is a web of interrelated institutional systems 
which consists of patterns of patterns of patterns of individual behaviors. Figure 48 
represents this arrangement in a hierarchical diagram.










This is a compositional hierarchical arrangement in which higher layers of the 
institutional structure are composed of lower level elements. Although all these elements 
may help to shape an individual’s life, society as a whole is most easily influenced by 
institutional systems, less so by institutions, and even less so by individuals. In other
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words, on average, few individuals will have a significant impact on society as an
individual. However, as one moves down this institutional hierarchy, the amount of
influence that individuals have increases. A quote from Veblen (1975[1899]:190,
emphasis added) helps to make this more apparent by defining what an institution is:
... institutions are, in substance, prevalent habits of thought with respect to 
particular relations and particular functions of the individual and of the 
community; and the scheme of life, which is made up of the aggregate of 
institutions in force at a given time or at a given point in the development of any 
society, may, on the psychological side, be broadly characterized as a prevalent 
spiritual attitude or a prevalent theory o f life.
For example, the predominant spiritual attitude of American society could be called
consumerism.m  There will be a host of institutional systems which maintain this
general atmosphere: advertising, strip-mall and home cable television shopping, credit
cards, mass entertainment, and a "work to consume" attitude. The institutions which lie
underneath these institutional systems represent the collections of individuals whose
behaviors actually create socio-economic existence; the host of institutions and
institutional systems define the context within which individuals focus their creative
energies. It is this duality between contextual constraint and compositional expansion
which begs to be explored.
Building up this socio-political dimension (i.e., the spiritual attitude or theory of 
life in Veblen’s terms) will involve three notable characteristics of the individual. First, 
individual behavior that is not random, but rather purposeful and hence volitional. 
Second, the correlation of this behavior through an individual’s underlying values.
171 Jung’s (19S4) exploration of science as a religion is also applicable here.
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Third, a general level of awareness which attempts to validate this value to behavior 
translation. While Bush does not explicitly include this last facet in his discussion, it 
forms a critical link in my analysis. Exploring these three facets more fully, each 
individual unifies the host of behaviors that they call their life through their system of 
values. Within this interdependent pattern, two different behaviors may be correlated 
with one another through a common value or a single behavior may be motivated by two 
different values. The function of awareness is to make the link between values and 
behavior a conscious one which can be reflected on; and a lack of awareness will cause 
this translation to remain unedited. There is an insidious tension within this relationship 
since individuals may not be aware of their lack of awareness and hence they will assume 
that their value-behavior translation is appropriate. This factor will be very important 
later in the discussion.
Individuals with similar behavioral patterns can form institutions which unify 
individuals on the basis of their common behavior.179 For example, assume that 
someone values his physical appearance and health. This might lead him to eat 
organically grown fruits and vegetables in order to avoid chemical preservatives and 
pesticides. In addition, he might adhere to a strict regiment of daily physical exercise 
and spend a large percentage of his income on status goods such as fancy clothing and 
cars. A different person might value the earth’s ecology such that they refuse to 
willingly and knowledgeably do things which degrade it. As a result, they might buy 
organic foods, grow their own vegetables, compost waste, and be conscious of their
179 Note that ‘common behaviors’ is not an analytic concept, but a dialectical one (Georgescu-Roegen 
1971).
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consumption patterns. From Figure 49, one can see that these individual’s behaviors will 
partially overlap.
Figure 49: Value-Behavior Correlation 
VALUE BEHAVIOR
Physical Health and Stamina
Commitment to Sustainable 
Development
It is on the basis of this common behavior that individuals become grouped together to 
form an institution (e.g., a natural foods cooperative founded by someone who values 
worker-owned businesses). Hence, contradictions among the group’s members are to be 
expected. Although it is the common behaviors shared by a diverse set of individuals 
which forms the sufficient condition for the emergence of an institution, it is the 
correlation of underlying values which establish the integrity of such institutions through 
time. In fact, although individuals with different behavior patterns can experience a 
significant bond through shared values, institutions based on predominantly common 
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greater institutional system (e.g., fashion trends) unless the underlying values converge 
to some degree. In a similar way, a factory represents an institution in which the people 
who work there may be motivated by many different values (e.g., to make a living, learn 
a skill, or be with one’s friends). Worker alienation, or conversely active worker 
participation, involves the underlying values motivating individual action. One is 
creative when one’s energies are integrated and engaged, and a firm is successful in the 
long run when its workers are creative.
This host of institutions come together to form the socio-economic process. Within 
each layer of this institutional context, there is an active dynamic process which attempts 
to fit together the different institutional pieces which are in conflict or harmony with one 
another: people become friends, businesses and special interest groups are formed, 
environmentalists clash with industrialists, labor battles management, and pro-life 
proponents kill pro-choice advocates. In the end, however, there remains nothing but 
individual values and behavior.
The Ceremonial/Instrumental Dichotomy
One can demarcate the values which underlie institutions into two categories: 
ceremonial and instrumental. The basis on which this distinction rests is the logic and 
validation process employed in the justification and rationale of individual behavior. 
Ceremonial values motivate and correlate behaviors through criteria based on invidious 
distinctions which "prescribe status, differential privileges, and master-servant
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relationships" and thereby "warrant the exercise of power by one class over another"
(Bush 1987:1079). There is an obvious element of such values involved in questions of
intergenerational equity (e.g., see Norgaard and Howath 1991) and economy-environment
interaction (e.g., see O’Connor 1989). This formative logic of distinguishing self from
other is paired with a validation process in which someone justifies her or his behavior
through sufficient reason, i.e., the values motivating behavior are "accepted on authority
and regarded as absolute" (Bush 1987:1079). They are ends in themselves. All that is
required under sufficient reason is a plausible argument. Bush comments,
The boundaries of the logic are as limitless as the human imagination. A 
particular pattern of behavior may be required ‘because the memory of man does 
not run to the contrary,’ or because ‘it is the will of God,’ or because ‘blacks are 
inherently inferior to whites,’ or because ‘it is consistent with the requirements 
of national security’. (Bush 1987:1083)
This is the distinguishing feature of the ceremonial translation of value to behavior.
Ceremonial values are immune to critical scrutiny. They appeal to tradition and 
ideology for support and therefore represent an end to the process of inquiry in which 
the question "Why?" is asked. Using the terminology of equilibrium economics, one 
could say that the marginal effort required to be aware of and reflect on the value to 
behavior translation with respect to one’s interpersonal relations is higher than the 
marginal gain expected from any refinement of one’s value-behavior matrix that this may 
allow. In this way, ceremonial values represent a level of complacency with respect to 
the current explanation for why things are the way they are. However, since this 
complacency is based on a lack of reflexive awareness, its foundations are mere pillars 
of smoke. Once again, the characteristic quality of the ceremonial dimension of
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institutions resides in the fact that their acceptance is not a contingent hypothesis which 
is tested in one’s life, but rather a wholesale acceptance which serves to define one’s life. 
The key is that one’s life experiences are not used to temper ceremonial values: there is 
no co-dependence, no circularity, but only a linear relationship of dictated ends. To 
simplify the language of this discussion, the validation process for this type of value- 
behavior translation is called ceremonial adequacy and the patterns of behavior bound in 
this way ceremonially warranted.
In dramatic contrast to this, instrumental values motivate and correlate behaviors 
on the basis of their continued efficacy in the problem-solving process; they are, and 
remain, means to an end. The question of "Why?" and "How?" never cease to be asked. 
What is the problem-solving process? It can be thought of as the human endeavor to 
cope with, understand, and possibly transcend the current state of existence.180 
Therefore, the nexus of this problem-solving process is not merely the skills involved 
in manipulating physical tools or financial resources, but includes the whole fund o f 
knowledge, both the arts and sciences, available to the individual for addressing this 
essential problem. Technological innovations can therefore be broadly defined as any 
"creative endeavor" which improves our understanding, and the process of socio­
economic advance involves the efforts of the "entire community, not just some academic 
or scientific elite" (Bush 1987:1088). The logic of this justification process is one of 
instrumental efficiency in which the values are effectively translated through one’s
180 Marshall’s (1990[192Q]:1) definition of economics as the study o f individual and social action 
directed towards the attainment and use o f the material requisites o f well being is a neat subset of this 
broader definition.
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behaviors. Values and behaviors which conflict with the continued success of the 
problem-solving process are discarded and replaced.181 It is this ongoing process of 
problem-solving which provides a never-ending tempering and self-correcting quality to 
society’s instrumentally warranted patterns of behavior. This means that such patterns 
of behavior may be quite stable through time, but their acceptance will always be 
contingent on their efficacy in achieving the stated goals and this efficacy is subject to 
a continual reflexive awareness.
Unlike values, behaviors and institutions can have both ceremonial and instrumental 
motivations simultaneously. For example, Ayres’ (1971:241, as cited in Bush 1987) 
discussion of the "cult of the tub" provides an instance in which the ceremonial 
cleanliness of the upper classes is coupled with the instrumental value of personal and 
public hygiene.182 Whether a behavior ultimately takes on ceremonial, instrumental, 
or hybrid significance is determined by the intention of the individual and the social 
context in which that behavior occurs. Although ceremonial values can combine purely 
instrumental behaviors with ceremonial or dialecdcally mixed behaviors, instrumental 
values can never rationalize purely ceremonial behavior due to the tempering quality of 
the problem-solving experience.
re particular values which then possess the ability to be translated into behaviors. For example, one may 
believe in an 'equality of individual rights’ which is expressed through tolerance and forbearance towards 
certain behaviors (e.g., religious choice and speech) and a lack of tolerance with respect to others (e.g., 
physical violence).
1(2 Huxley’s (1943) discussion of the relationship between Christian ascetic morality and bathing 
practices in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries present us with a historical perspective on the 
varied dynamic balance which can exist between the ceremonial and instrumental values which motivate 
behavior.
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The extent of this endogenous process of self-correction within instrumental 
behaviors will depend on an individual’s "conscious awareness" of their warranted 
patterns of behavioral and the degree to which instrumental efficiency is left open to the 
"surveillance of the community" (Bush 1987:1080). The practical manifestation of this 
individual transparency with respect to values is an openness to challenge and dialogue, 
honest communication, and explicit objectives, all of which are noticeably absent under 
the standards of ceremonial adequacy. However, since this whole process of tempering 
the instrumentally warranted dimension of institutions is dependent on a conscious 
awareness, a lack of awareness would signal an unconscious shift in the employment of 
the instrumental efficiency criteria towards one of ceremonial adequacy, as behaviors 
become ends in themselves rather than conscious means.
This leads to the possibility that behaviors which were once innovative and creative 
may become mechanical and habitual, as society becomes locked-in to a method as an 
end in itself. Although this will not necessarily lead to instrumental inefficiency, it does 
lend itself to the reification of social relations and a possible inertia to future change. 
Individuals will believe that their behaviors are "the source of instrumental efficiency" 
even though they are not (Bush 1987:1085). An individual will rarely, if ever, perceive 
ceremonial behavior as purely ceremonially warranted, but will always impute unto it an 
instrumental dimension. For example, parents may continue treating their grown 
children as children in the spirit of "knowing what is best" for them. Or, racists who 
believe that one race is superior to another will act on the basis of this bubble of self­
created ‘truth.’ This caveat also creates the possibility that whole groups o f people
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possess erroneous concepts of what is and is not instrumental behavior without being 
consciously aware of this possibility. This is perhaps one of the reasons why tolerance 
is such an important facet of social progress.
Ceremonial Encapsulation and Social Progress
This categorization of institutions by way of the ceremonial and instrumental 
motivations which underlie them permits one to speak more clearly of the general 
phenomena of social inertia. Cultures can get locked-in to a certain way of viewing 
themselves in relation to the rest of the world, fields of science can become locked-in to 
particular methodologies, individuals become addicted to certain ways of living, and 
spirituality becomes defined rather than discovered. The ceremonial dimension of society 
is non-dynamic, habit-oriented, attempts to preserve and extend the existing invidious 
distinctions, and will resist both social and material innovations which lead to a lessening 
of such distinctions. In this respect, the ceremonial dimension represents a stabilizing 
relation within society; tradition serves as both the rudder which steers the course and 
the brake which controls the speed of socio-economic evolution.
As a result of this ever present ceremonial dominance, all innovative instrumental 
behavior is required to pass the test of ceremonial adequacy in order to be explicitly 
sanctioned by the community. As Bush (1987:1093) remarks, "technological innovations 
will be permitted only if it is anticipated that they will not disrupt the existing value 
structure of the community." Taken by itself, the idea of ceremonial dominance leads
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to a rather dismal state of affairs. However, this base of knowledge which is sanctioned 
by the community under the auspices of ceremonial adequacy (i.e., an instrumental- 
ceremonial hybrid) is used to thejullest. The use of this knowledge within the problem­
solving process changes behavior and thereby creates new problems for the community. 
An expansive potential, which is endogenous to the problem-solving process as a result 
of the instrumental behaviors which have been warranted, accumulates into a potentially 
eruptive influence within the sanctioned boundaries of permissible behaviors and 
knowledge. This may be strong enough to break down restrictive ceremonial values, and 
thereby give way to instrumental values which permit an even greater degree of 
technological innovation to be absorbed into the social structure. Truly progressive 
institutional change consists of this lessening of the degree of ceremonial dominance. 
Bush (1987:1104) diagrammed this relationship in the following way:
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Boyer and Orlean (1992) used the tools of noncooperative games to formalize the 
difficulties inherent to social transitions in general. In their analysis, a convention is 
defined as a set of behaviors (e.g., A versus B) whose payoff is determined by whether 
one is interacting with other like minded individuals (i.e., U„) or those who act and think 
differently (i.e., U*). The expected utility received for adhering to a particular 
convention (i.e., U*, where i is the other convention) is defined as the proportion of 
individuals adopting convention A (defined as p) times the payoff U„ plus the proportion 
of individuals adopting convention B times the payoff (i.e., E(U J=/?*U „+(/- 
p )* U J. It is assumed that the utility received by an individual adhering to one 
convention when interacting with an individual adhering to the opposing convention is 
zero (i.e., 11^=0 and 11^=0), although this assumption can be relaxed without doing 
injury to the essential insights of the models. It is also assumed that individuals expect 
to encounter all other individuals within the community with equal probability.183
Their analysis of this behavior coordination problem identifies two evolutionary 
stable strategies: the adherence of the entire population to one of the two conventions. 
Between these two stable institutional relations there exists a threshold proportion of the 
population (/?*), determined by the ratio of the utility from one convention (U,*) to the 
sum of the utilities for both conventions (U^-FUy,), above which one convention 
dominates (A) and below which the other comes to dominate (B). This can be 
represented graphically as- follows with the expected payoffs to adhering to a particular
1(3 This assumption is partially relaxed by Boyer and Orleans later in their paper, but the essential 
insights of the model remain the same. One would assume that relaxing this assumption would lead to 
partial segregation on the basis of beliefs.
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convention being determined by the proportion of the population adhering to the same 
convention (Boyer and Orleans 1992:169). For example, with pt of the population 
adhering to A, it is in an individual’s best interest to adopt convention A (i.e., 
E(U’J > E ( U ’J .




One can imagine that this represents the existing ceremonially and instrumentally 
warranted conventions (i.e., A and B respectively). Even when the existing social 
relations provide a lower level of mutual benefit, the dynamic pressure of conformity will 
cause each individual to continue acting in accordance with these existing mores. This 
divergent co-dependence can be represented in a causal diagram as follows.
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The potential for progressive institutional change involves pushing society past this 
threshold proportion. Boyer and Orleans identify four different ways that this could 
happen: (1) A collapse in the payoff that a certain convention gives (e.g., U„-*0 such 
that the value p ' increases). (2) The invasion of a new group of players which changes 
the composition of the population through their open espousal of convention B, such that 
p ‘ increases. This possibility seems to violate the assumption of spatial ambiguity 
between individuals and thereby recognizes the fact that people and conventions possess 
a definite spatio-temporal existence. (3) The presence of a transitional compatibility 
whereby the utility of one convention is not zero when played against its opponent (e.g., 
Uta>0). For example, this would result in an increasing p  as the hybrid utility U* 
approaches Uu (e.g., the collapse of the usury laws which prohibited the lending of 
money at interest in Europe based on moral considerations). (4) A collective action by
328
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the population as a whole which recognizes the advantages of Uy, over U„ and sanctions 
the transition (e.g., political solutions to common resource problems).
As knowledge advances, there will always be an initial attempt to encapsulate the 
innovative instrumental behaviors within the existing ceremonial patterns of the social 
group. New technologies will not be intentionally sanctioned if they disrupt the existing 
value structure of the community, and therefore changes in instrumentally warranted 
conventions which cannot be denied are accompanied by offsetting ceremonially 
warranted conventions such that the underlying ceremonial relations are not significantly 
disturbed. The encapsulation of a limited application of an innovative technology may 
preserve the existing ceremonial relations, while concurrently serving as a potential 
transitional opportunity (i.e., a hybrid behavior) between different socio-economic 
systems. Within this model, ceremonial dominance could be indexed by p \  with a low 
percentage being associated with heavy social inertia and lack of instrumental flexibility.
Bush noted three different types of ceremonial encapsulation: past-binding, future- 
binding, and the "Lysenko" type. Figure 53 (reproduced from Bush 1987:1092) 
illustrates where these three types are found within the possible juxtapositioning of 
feasible and nonfeasible, ceremonial and instrumental behaviors.
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The upper left comer contains the first two forms of ceremonial encapsulation. 
Past-binding ceremonial encapsulation is when the existing traditions of the community 
actively suppress or hinder the absorption and diffusion of technological innovations 
(e.g., Ubl<0). For example, the preindustrial mores which inhibited quick rates of 
technological infusion, the delay in the legislation of workmen’s compensation and child 
labor laws following the industrial revolution, and the current hesitation to adopt 
ecologically sound consumption habits. Past-binding encapsulation frequently occurs 
when social innovations are in direct conflict with the existing institutional structure. 
This allows for few opportunities for transitional behaviors and frequently creates a 
tangible tension which results in either revolutionary change or forceful suppression (see 
Kuran 1989).
The class of future-binding ceremonial encapsulation involves the proactive 
development of technological innovations which strengthen and expand the existing 
control of the vested interests.
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In this case, the introduction of technological innovations into the life process of 
the community is carefully coordinated with the formulation of an appropriate 
mythology and related ceremonial practices that rationalize and enforce the 
legitimacy of the control over the technology by the vested interests that have 
captured it. (Bush 1987:1095)
Many examples of this type of encapsulation have been researched: (1) The ability of the
large chemical, farm machinery, and agribusiness industries to encapsulate technology
at the expense of maintaining a healthy food chain and ecology (Hayden 1984). (2) The
encapsulation of knowledge concerning diet and health by the "American food power
system" (Junker 1982). (3) The study of "corporate hegemony" in which the corporation
becomes the dominant institution within American society (Duggger 1984). (4) Munkirs’
(1985) postulate that the growth of the American economy is determined through
centralized private sector planning which involves the giant financial and industrial
corporations. This later study did not attribute ceremonial dominance to particular
institutions, but rather to a capitalist ideology (e.g., the values of self-interest, profit
seeking, and laissez-faire) which is posited to be so deeply ingrained in American living
that its existence is not consciously perceived. As a result, society’s ability to institute
instrumentally warranted social policies is hampered (e.g., national healthcare and
minimum efficiency standards for automobiles).
The third type of ceremonial encapsulation involves an attempt to claim 
instrumental efficiency for infeasible techniques on the basis of their ceremonial 
adequacy. This type is named the "Lysenko" effect in honor of the Russian scientist who 
believed that genetic change could be achieved through environmental conditioning within 
the lifetime of a given biological organism. This view was also shared by the famous
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taxonomist Linnaeus. However, the difference between the two is that while Linnaeus’, 
ideas fell prey to contradictory empirical observations, those of Lysenko were embraced 
by Stalin as being the biological theory consistent with Marxist-Stalinist ideology. 
Lysenko’s ideas thereby became the official dogma in agronomy and the affiliated 
biological sciences in the Soviet Union for several decades. Anyone familiar with this 
period of Soviet history will need no reminder of the social horrors and the technological 
retrogression this type of ceremonial dominance can produce. Such a shift actively 
moves society away from instrumental efficiency.
In contrast to ceremonial encapsulation which attempts to retain the current 
ceremonial relations, the embodiment of technological innovations implies that new 
instrumental behaviors and values are actually merged into society and its institutions. 
As a result, the ceremonial dominance within society becomes diluted as instrumentally 
warranted behaviors increase in proportion to their ceremonial counterparts. It is this 
idea which forms the basis for Bush’s distinction between regressive and progressive 
institutional change; for a given fund o f knowledge, the displacement of instrumentally 
warranted behaviors by ceremonially warranted ones is regressive while the displacement 
of ceremonially by instrumentally warranted behaviors represents progressive institutional 
change. An evolutionary flavor can be added to his discussion by recognizing that the 
criteria of ceremonial adequacy will continually attempt to grow over the instrumentally 
warranted behaviors that arise: innovations inevitably become tradition in time. Our 
heuristic use of Boyer and Orlean’s graph breaks down at this point since this dynamic 
will cause a continual drift of payoffs from instrumental to ceremonial conventions. In
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order to avoid this continual onslaught of ceremonial inertia and social ossification, 
knowledge must be ‘eternally rediscovered’ through individual experience to remain 
fresh. Note that this shifting between progressive and regressive institutional change is 
not dependent on the level of knowledge, but on the basis by which actions are motivated 
and justified. In fact, a technologically primitive culture could be more progressive by 
this measurement than an advanced one.
What would a completely instrumental society be like? Let’s reconstruct the 
argument: (1) Instrumental values and behaviors are based on their continued efficacy in 
the problem-solving process. (2) The problem-solving process involves an individual’s 
endeavor to cope with and understand the state of human existence. (3) The instrumental 
dimension of institutions and institutional systems is that which contributes to the 
effective continuation and extension of the problem solving process. (4) A purely 
instrumental society is therefore one which encourages and supports an individual’s 
attempts to understand her own existence. Therefore, an instrumental society supports 
the individual just as the atmosphere provides the chemical context within which life 
flourishes. Although there has been a tendency on the part of social scientists to view 
society and institutions as the critical determinants of social utopia, our argument points 
to the conclusion that society can only encourage individuals to discover and build this 
utopia for themselves.
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CONCLUSION
Where do all these ideas lead? When pulled together, what is one left with? This 
dissertation began by introducing the use of circular causal diagramming as a heuristic 
tool with which to explore the evolutionary dimension of economic theory. These tools 
were then used to highlight the distinctly evolutionary relations implicit within the history 
of economic thought and to identify the meaning of the evolutionary concept as 
emphasized by the different theorists explored herein. Adam Smith’s use of a 
complementary circular relation between the division-of-labor and extent-of-the-market 
serves to unambiguously establish the fundamental role of these ideas within economic 
theory. However, it was found that the division-of-labor involves facets of both 
differentiation and integration: the former being a movement towards greater 
individuality, and the latter towards greater dependence on others.
But how are we to theoretically embody this insight into the evolutionary process? 
Marshall’s implicit answer was to introduce different layers of interactive process within 
his economic theory (e.g., the individual, firm, and industry). For example, he 
recognized that people and raw materials could be brought together under the guise of 
a firm which would serve to focus the diverse talents of those involved into a single 
purpose: a collection of individuals who were effectively engaged in meeting their 
material needs as a group. Cooperation between individuals occurs within the context 
of competition between firms. However, this method caused a tangible tension within
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Marshall’s economic theory since he was unable to synthesize the different layers of 
economic cooperation and those of competitive struggle into a unified whole.
This tension came to a head within the economics profession during the 1920’s in 
what has been coined the Increasing Returns debates. An isolated emphasis on the 
complementary facets of the firm led to the question of what prevents a single firm from 
dominating its entire market? However, instead of pursuing Marshall’s implicit 
excursion into a nested hierarchy of socio-economic relations, the profession was engaged 
in a theoretical elaboration around equilibrium themes. Such a logical extrapolation was 
made possible when the apparent gap between the firm and the industry was conceptually 
bridged through the creation of an equilibrium firm, even though the empirical 
connection remained unsubstantiated as a general rule. However, this tactic was 
bolstered through the adoption of a philosophical stance in which the realism of the 
assumptions was not as important as the predictive ability of the final theory, and the 
profession quickly flowed into these mathematical paths of least resistance. A casualty 
of this outcome was the evolutionary paradigm. Rather than attempt to synthesize the 
evolutionary and equilibrium perspectives, these two quite distinct positions were posited 
as mutually exclusive theoretical stances: in this way, the Increasing Returns debates 
represent a bifurcation point within economic theory. It was hoped that an extrapolation 
of a logically consistent axiomatic foundation for economic theory could provide a 
description of the entire structure of economic interaction. This strategy would have 
worked if there had been no synthetic qualities within the aggregation, but it was these 
very qualities which Marshall had identified when he implicitly layered his economic
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theory. Although the profession was attempting to unify economic theory on the basis 
of such axiomatic foundations, Allyn Young resisted these tendencies as he analyzed the 
macroeconomy by expanding the division-of-labor concept originally proposed by Smith. 
Not only was he openly critical of the methodological restrictions that were being levied 
against what he perceived to be facets of the socio-economic process in general, but in 
shifting his theoretical emphasis from the firm to the macroeconomy, he was able to 
effectively develop the evolutionary paradigm by extending the possible layers of 
synthetic qualities to include the macroeconomy as a whole. This exploration of the 
greater socio-economic process was continued by Gunnar Myrdal and Nicholas Kaldor, 
both of whom openly criticized the methodological bias towards equilibrium formulations 
within contemporary economic theory.
As a result, the criticism of equilibrium methodology has been well established and 
the intellectual and emotional task at hand, which a number of people appear to have 
whole heartedly embraced, is to develop a novel theory of socio-economic interaction 
which makes an honest attempt to insert cooperative relations back into economic theory. 
However, these investigations into complementary circular relations have produced some 
amazing insights. We have discovered that complementary circular relations can display 
multiple equilibria, path dependency, and the potential to lock-in to certain patterns of 
development. As a result, the assumption that efficiency is a natural quality of a smooth 
functioning economy has come under scrutiny: inefficiency is a natural process also. But 
even more radical, these ideas can be tied to Myrdal’s exploration of values and ideals 
in general. And this introduces the theoretical possibility that our concepts of socio-
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economic interaction may actually prevent us from achieving our fullest potential. We 
may be limiting ourselves through our static notions of what culture is and the way the 
world is.
These ideas can be found within the theory of institutional change. By 
distinguishing between the ceremonial and instrumental dimensions of society, this theory 
establishes the natural potential of society and institutions to become stagnant. From a 
materialistic perspective, this might manifest in particular ways of doing things which 
cease to be questioned. Such methods will have become ends in themselves rather than 
means to an end. In other words, life becomes defined by certain ways o f being and 
ways o f living which are habitual, mechanical, and lacking in critical reflection. In those 
moments when awareness is present, the process changes; the efficacy of the translation 
of values into behavior comes under scrutiny and ways of being and living which are 
perceived to be in conflict with one’s values are changed. As long as awareness is 
applied to one’s actions and experience, one’s method of living becomes more fully self- 
conscious and truly spontaneous. The difficulty is that one is frequently unaware of 
one’s unawareness.
By exploring the evolutionary perspective in greater philosophical detail, the 
hierarchical nesting of concepts becomes more pronounced. Its roots can be traced to 
our process of perception and the way in which we think. In fact, mental conception is 
a synthetic quality of sensory perception: a synthetic quality which creates a process 
novelty (i.e., self-consciousness). In line with these facts, these limitations manifest 
themselves within the organization of human knowledge as a whole. If one looks at the
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hierarchy of nested qualities, higher level systems have emerged out of lower level 
novelty: life has emerged from matter, mind from life, and self-consciousness from 
mind. The nesting of qualitative change has spiraled into the individual and my intuition 
leads me to believe that the next level of change will emerge within the individual, yet 
it will simultaneously transcend the individual. From this perspective, society becomes 
the lower level structural context for this higher level process which arises through the 
application of awareness.
While it is impossible for us to honestly contend that the world is unambiguously 
the way we perceive it and conceive of it, we do know that our perceptions are 
frequently wrong and that our attempts to conceptually penetrate into the intestinal 
substructure of our experience has yet to create a panacea for society’s ills. Over the 
past two hundred years, the dominance of western society seems to have simply managed 
to move things around the world without addressing the fundamental problems of human 
existence or contributing anything meaningful to human history. Yet, we have created 
the potential for material opulence, a context within which an honest exploration of the 
potentials of human experience can occur. And hopefully, this dissertation has helped 
to elucidate some foundations from which a truly evolutionary theory of socio-economic 
change can emerge. One which doesn’t explicitly deny humanity of its distinctive 
qualities, but attempts to incorporate them into the very fabric of our thoughts concerning 
what we are.
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY
Concept: an abstract representation of experience synthesized from the five senses which 
attempts to understand the spatial behavior of a focal system through time. Has two 
complementary facets: (1) a structural dimension which identifies the qualitative 
elements, and (2) a process dimension which describes the interaction between these 
different structural classes.
Conceptual Hierarchy: a nesting of conceptually discrete theoretical relationships which 
manifest to perception simultaneously. Although this simultaneity is not directly 
observable, it emerges as the spatio-temporal dimension of perception is varied, thus 
creating a nesting of experiential decompositions; a layering of synthetic qualities and 
novel processes which are not amenable to logical aggregation. Ultimately due to 
the subject-object duality of analytic knowledge rather than any ontological rational.
Emergent Quality: see synthetic quality.
Entity: a thing that has real and individual existence relative to a given perspective, in 
reality or in the mind. (16th century)
Epistemoloev: a branch of philosophy concerned with the study of the nature, source, 
limitations, and validity of knowledge. Questions are directed towards ‘how’ and 
‘what’ a knower knows. (19th century)
Form: the particular pattern of qualities that gives something its unique nature or 
character; combination of qualities making something what it is.
Homeorhetic Rate: time period necessary for a system to return to a characteristic quality 
of being after a perturbation (e.g., due to environmental fluctuation). This rate will 
be influenced by a system’s structural composition and internal process of interaction, 
along with its interaction with other systems and its context.
Homeostatis: the tendency to maintain, or the maintenance of, normal internal stability 
in an organism by coordinated responses of the organ systems that automatically 
compensate for environmental changes; any analogous maintenance of stability or 
equilibrium, as within a social group.
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Level: used to acknowledge the perception of synthetic qualities and novel processes 
which are not effectively embodied within logical aggregation of a system’s structural 
elements. The necessity of theoretical levels is due to the process of perception and 
mental conception rather than being a quality of reality per se.
Observer: a generic term for a perceiving self; when used to denote a human being, the 
dimensions of perception are six: taste, touch, smell, sight, and hearing. In addition, 
mental conception can be though of as a form of perception. See subject.
Ontology: a branch of metaphysics which studies the nature of being or existence. The 
question of ‘what is.’ (IS* century)
Path Dependency: when a system’s particular history plays a significant role in the 
determination of its current existence.
Pattern: the quantitative disposition of qualitative parts or elements.
Perception: the sensory awareness of difference or lack thereof (e.g., sight, sound, taste, 
touch, and smell for human beings).
Positivism: the belief that knowledge is strictly limited to observable facts and their 
interrelations and hence, that the sciences provide the only reliable knowledge.
Problem-Solving Process: the human endeavor to cope with, understand, and possibly 
transcend one’s current state of existence.
Process: the dynamic facet of mental conception which represents the interaction of 
structural qualities.
Quality: that which makes something what it is.
Quantity: the exact amount of a particular thing.
Scientific Inquiry: an investigation of experience which seeks to compose a representative 
concept which can be used to effectively navigate one’s environment. Such concepts 
should be communicable to others and empirically testable against one's experience.
Social Science: the field of theoretical science concerned with human interaction. This 
would include the fields of sociology, political science, economics, psychology, 
history, literature, and the arts.
Spatial Dimension of Perception: the structural decomposition of experience into 
dialectically distinct qualities.
340
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Spatio-Temporal: the dimensions of space and time taken as interrelated characteristics 
of sensory experience.
Stable Process: an interactive process which retains its qualitative characteristics in spite 
of perturbations in external or internal variables; basically the consistency of 
structural quality, but is frequently extended to different orders of quantitative 
consistency. A stable process can be conceptualized through the use of stabilizing 
circularities.
Structure: the qualitative elements of a particular decomposition of experience.
Subject: originally denoted one who is under the dominion of a sovereign (14* century), 
but did not take on the meaning of a thinking agent until the 18* century (during the 
Enlightenment era). This etymology demonstrates the implicit semantic primacy of 
object over subject.
Synthetic Quality: a quality or meaning which a pattern displays in and of itself (i.e., 
beyond the qualities of its individual elements). The use of this term, in coordination 
with a language of emergent qualities, serves to explicitly recognize that qualities are 
not inherent, but relative characteristics.
System: a group of parts so combined as to operate in unison and appear as a group; the 
structural facets and interactive relations being used in build a mental concept of a 
particular decomposition of experience.
Systemic Bias: an inclination, partiality, or prejudice which results from the interaction 
of the structural elements of the process under discussion and is therefore a ‘natural’ 
characteristic of the process. Opposed to a non-systemic bias where the inclination, 
partiality, or prejudice is more appropriately affiliated with elements external to the 
process under discussion.
Taxonomic Science: a categorical method of scientific inquiry in which things are 
grouped together by virtue of qualitative similarity. However, the leap to 
categorization on the basis of generalized process is not made.
Temporal Dimension of Perception: the unit of time between cross-sectional observations 
of reality. It is the relations between this dimension of the process of perception and 
a system’s homeorhetic rate which decomposes experience into structural elements 
and interactive process.
Theoretical Science: a method of scientific investigation in which general interactive 
relationships are established from within the categorical structure of taxonomic 
science. Uses the rules of logic to aggregate stable qualities and thereby derive 
predictions about their interactive behavior.
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Thing: that which is conceived, spoken of, or referred to as existing as an individual; a 
distinguishable entity (see entity).
Transitive Chaos: chaos characterizes the quantitative dynamic behavior of a system in 
which small deviations in some parameters lead to large discrepancies in the 
quantitative evolution of the system. Transitive chaos is when a process displays 
periods of chaotic behavior intermittently.
Whole: a system which displays a synthetic quality.
NOTE: Some o f these definitions have emerged within the context o f this essay, but 
most have been taken from Webster’s (1979) and Honer, Hunt, and Okholm (1992).
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APPENDIX B
QUANTITATIVE VERSUS QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
The presentation of dynamic relationships within this dissertation is done 
qualitatively through the use of causal diagramming techniques. The advantage of this 
approach is that the cumbersome mathematical formalities of quantitative solutions are 
avoided while still providing some degree of insight into the stability of the system under 
investigation. For example, the following linear differential equation can be analyzed 
both qualitatively and quantitatively:
— =-ay*b 
di '
The phase diagram corresponding to this equation, Figure Bl, will depend on the value 
of a. If <2 >  0, then phase line A applies. If a<0,  then phase line B applies (b will 
determine the placement of the phase line along the horizontal axis and is freely 
manipulated in this discussion).
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Figure Bl: Phase Diagram of Dynamic Stability and Instability
In reading this diagram, any point above the horizontal axis (dy/dt=0) is associated 
with an increasing y (dy/dt>0) while any point below the horizontal axis is associated 
with a decreasing y (dy/dt<0). These tendencies are represented by the arrowheads 
along the phase lines. If an equilibrium level of y exists, it will occur at a point where 
dy/dt=0, and therefore corresponds to the intersection of the phase line with the 
horizontal axis. In the above diagram, points y, and yb represent equilibrium levels of 
y. However, while yt is a stable equilibrium in the sense that any deviation from yt 
introduces dynamic forces which pull the system back to y„ any deviation from yb will 
engender dynamic forces which push the system away from yb. Point yb is called an 
unstable equilibrium. From this analysis the following conclusions are possible regarding 
the dynamic behavior of this equation:
1) If a>0,.y(t) converges to equilibrium.
2) If a < 0 , y(t) diverges from equilibrium.
These conclusions can also be diagrammed as in Figure B2.
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Figure B2: Time Path of Dynamic Stability and Instability
y(t) y(t)
t
These qualitative conclusions as to the system’s dynamic behavior have not required a 
detailed quantitative solution. Yet these conclusions coincide perfectly with those gleaned 
from the quantitative solution of this equation presented below, while concurrently 
utilizing a much more manageable presentation (see Chiang 1984:494-496).
Since this essay is interested in the interrelations between multiple variables, this 
phase diagramming technique would need to be extended to include more than one 
variable. However, while it is possible to represent the dynamic interdependence 
between two variables with such means, it is not possible to represent more than two 
variables without getting into a three-dimensional representation. As an alternative, one 
can utilize causal loop diagramming to determine the contribution which certain causal 
sequences make to the dynamic behavior of a multivariate system. This method of
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determining a system’s dynamic behavior through a diagrammatic representation of the 
causal relations between the individual elements of the system is explored in the body of 
this dissertation. However, since this technique only utilizes a pocitive or negative sign 
to designate the quality of the causal relation between two variables, only general 
categories of dynamic behavior (e.g., convergence or divergence) can be identified. If 
more detailed information is required, a knowledge of the relative parameter values of 
the coefficients of interrelation between different variables is required in order to discern 
the relative strengths of the composite causal linkages. This points to the fact that causal 
diagramming is only the initial step in successfully modeling a system.
In addition, there are a few caveats that one should be aware of when working with 
causal diagrams. These difficulties center around the definitions frequently used to draw 
conclusions from causal loop diagrams. A positive loop (i.e., one with either zero or an 
even number of negative causal links) is usually defined as one in which an intial change 
in any variable ripples through the loop to induce further self-change in the same 
direction. In contrast, a negative loop (i.e., one with an odd number of negative causal 
links) is defined as one in which any initial change in a variable tends to be counteracted 
by self-change in the opposite direction, thereby tending to stabilize the system around 
some equilibirum value. When using these definitions, one must be careful to clearly 
distinguish between rate-to-level causal links versus information or proportioned ones 
(Richardson 1981). A rate-to-level relation is a causal link between a variable and its 
rate of change, while a proportional connection occurs between two different variables. 
In other words, a rate-to-level relationship involves an accumulation of a conserved flow.
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An example of this type of causal connection is that between births-per-year and 
population, as illustrated in Figure B3.
Figure B3: Rate-to-Level Causal Link
+
Births-per-Year ------------------- ► Population
One might be tempted to qualify this causal relation with a positive sign, thus implying 
that an increase in births-per-year will increase the population. However, this would also 
imply that a decrease in births-per-year will decrease the population. This latter 
statement can only be true if we allow births-per-year to be a net value which could then 
fall below zero (i.e., births-per-year minus deaths-per-year). Even then, the fact remains 
that a decrease in births-per-year does not necessarily mean that the population will 
decline. The problem is that births-per-year is a flow which accumulates as the 
population.
The dilemma that such rate-to-level connections pose for causal loop diagramming 
is that the individual links of the causal loop can no longer be simply "summed-up" in 
order to categorize the dynamic behavior of the loop as self-reinforcing or stabilizing. 
As a result, causal loop diagrams which do not distinguish between rate-to-level links and 
proportional ones may lead to inaecurate predictions of a system’s dynamic behaviors. 
In order to overcome this possible ambiguity, Richardson (1981) has suggested that a 
dashed line be used for proportionate causal links while solid lines be used for rate-to-
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level ones.184 However, since it is rate-to-level links which are of particular interest, 
I have chosen to reverse this recommendation and signify rate-to-level links with a 
dashed line. Figure B4 illustrates the births-per-year and population causal links using 
this convention.
Figure B4: Dashed Line Signifies Rate-to-Level Causal Link
+
Births-per-Year------------------► Population
In addition to this last caveat, one must be wary of hidden stabilizing circularities 
within causal diagrams. For example, this problem will arise when the adjustment 
mechanism which equilibrate two variables (e.g., a desired-value and actual-value) is 
erroneously replaced by a single linear connection such as in Figure B5.
Figure B5: Hidden Stabilizing Circularities
+
Desired-Value ------------------- ► Actual-Value
What one is attempting to communicate here is the idea that the desired-value and actual- 
value of the variable will be equivalent, but that the mechanism by which the system 
achieves this equivalence has been abstracted away from: An increase (decrease) in the
1,4 It is interesting to note that Richardson (1984:108) does not take heed of his own advice.
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desired-value leads to an increase (decrease) in the actual-value. However, whether or 
not a particular change in the desired-value will cause the actual-value to increase, 
decrease, or remain constant will depend on whether the current desired-value is greater 
than, less than, or equal to the actual-value. Although such hidden loops will cause the 
particular dynamic behavior (e.g., the presence or absence of oscillations) to be 
undeterminable through the investigation of the causal diagram, their presense will not 
alter the overall convergent or explosive nature of the causal relations.
Taking these two caveats into consideration, causal diagramming can still serve as 
a useful tool for presenting the dynamic relations between variables and predicting their 
behavior. Since the purpose of the present dissertation is to emphasize the evolutionary 
dimension of economic thought through history, this can be done effectively through 
casual diagrams by highlighting the positive causal circularities within the system. 
Although the analysis is fated to remain conceptual and therefore a bit abstract, I believe 
that it will serve as a fruitful heuristic tool. Since the equilibrium dimension of the 
economy is a well accepted fact, the reader is reminded that when the equilibrium and 
evolutionary facets of the system are brought into an interactive whole, the resulting 
system will be nonlinear.185
183 A concise introduction to the neatly wrapped equilibrium framework of Neoclassical economic
theory can be found in Wolff and Resnick (1987: Chapter 2).
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APPENDIX C
A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF THE DIVISION-OF-LABOR 
AND EXTENT-OF-THE-MARKET RELATIONSHIP
It is possible to formulate a simple model, composed of two linear causal links, 
between productivity and market size that reflects Adam Smith’s division-of-labor and 
extent-of-the-market circularity. Figure C l is a diagramatic representation of the 
STELLA model used in this simulation.1M
Figure C l: STELLA Model of Divison-of-Labor and Extent-of-the-Market Circularity
Productiv ity





Opportunities for Market Expansion
m Although one could use many different computer simulation programs, the STELLA modeling 
platform was chosen for this exercise. The advantage of this choice is that this platform is well developed 
and simple to use. Therefore, people can easily reproduce this model and build their own without a large 
investment of time in learning a programming language. A significant disadvantage of the STELLA 
platform is that the causal relations within the model are not easily arrayed into a heterogeneous web of 
structurally similar systems.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Although the particular dynamic behavior of the model will be dependent on the relative 
quantitative relationships between the variables, such a simple system demonstrates the 
possibility for quite complex and varied behavior (e.g., exponential growth, limit cycles 
and single point equilibriums). This model also provides some insight into the impact 
of social inertia (e.g., within productive and consumer relations) on the dynamic 
adjustment mechanism between the division-of-labor and extent-of-the-market.
In this model, capital and labor accumulation is held constant and all productivity 
advance is assumed to occur through organizational changes. One could imagine an 
economy in which everyone produces all of their needs themselves and has already 
accumulated all of the capital necessary for this production. However, as individuals 
begin to specialize and therefore purchase some of their needs from others, the general 
degree of specialization deepens, the agglomeration of capital utilized within market 
production increases, and the market economy expands (i.e., amount of goods traded 
between individuals rather than produced by one’s self).
The model involves two causal relationships. First of all, a given MARKET SIZE 
(i.e., extent-of-the-market) is used to determine the level of POSSIBLE 
PRODUCTIVITY (i.e., division-of-labor) attainable.187 The rate of change of 
PRODUCTIVITY is determined by the difference between the possible and the actual 
productivity. This gap is closed at a particular rate, i.e., INDUSTRIAL INERTIA, 
which is determined by the responsiveness of the community as a whole to productivity
1(7 Words in all capital letters represent variables within the simulation model. MARKET SIZE is set 
between 0 and 2000, while PRODUCTIVITY ranges between 0 and 20. These values themselves are not 
significant.
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opportunities. For example, if capital and labor specialization occurs instantaneously 
(INDUSTRIAL INERTIA equal to one), then the economy will always fully expand to 
its optimum productive capacity given the size of the market. The inclusion of an inertial 
variable reflects Smith’s interest in the social relations surrounding production.1®8
In the current simulation model, the POSSIBLE PRODUCTIVITY variable is 
represented graphically rather than algebraically.1®9 However, the model could easily 
be converted to an algebraically defined relationship if so desired. Figure C2 is a 
reproduction of the assumed POSSIBLE PRODUCTIVITY relationship, as determined 
by the actual MARKET SIZE, which is used as one initial parameter in the model.
10 Such a notion was also addressed by the other theorists discussed in this dissertation. For example, 
Kaldor referred to the dynamic character of the people in control of production and Marshall spoke of this 
factor with respect to the management of firms.
10 STELLA allows for graphical relationships to be "drawn on the screen" and hence one can easily 
and quickly alter the relationship to explore the dynamic implications of different structural assumptions.
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The parabolic form of this relationship reflects the standard assumption of initial 
increasing returns, followed by decreasing returns in production. As in conventional 
economic theory, this relationship thereby provides a constraint on the growth of the 
economy. A pure increasing returns relationship would result in exponential growth 
which would continue until constrained by the consumer side of the economy.
The second relationship at the core of this model involves the idea that a given 
level of PRODUCTIVITY will determine the POSSIBLE MARKET SIZE. One can 
think of this in two ways: (1) As productivity increases, costs fall and possibly prices. 
If prices do fall, this will subsequently influence the size of a product’s market relative
353
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to other products. (2) In addition, this relationship also represents the creation of income 
whereby the means by which to purchase the given goods within the economy is 
acquired. An increasing income (i.e., increasing market production) allows for more 
market trading regardless of relative prices. Although these details are not explicitly 
included in this model, this latter idea provides a promising inroad to income distribution 
considerations: income changes for different groups within the economy will create 
different effects since their consumption decisions will differ. As a result, these two 
facets of the POSSIBLE MARKET SIZE relationship should not be collapsed into a 
single explanation (e.g., declining real prices).
While the level of PRODUCTTVITY will determine the POSSIBLE MARKET 
SIZE, the rate at which the economy closes the gap between the possible and actual 
MARKET SIZE will be determined by the degree of CONSUMER INERTIA.190 One 
can think of this as the rate at which consumers expand their trading behavior in response 
to higher levels of income (i.e., productivity increases). This relationship is included in 
the simulation as a graphical function under the assumption that the POSSIBLE 
MARKET SIZE expands at a uniform rate relative to the PRODUCTIVITY variable. 
Figure C3 illustrates this relationship.
190 The actual simulation model has a y-intercept of five rather than zero within the POSSIBLE 
MARKET SIZE graph. Since (0,0) is an unstable equilibrium (see Figure C4), the simulation will not 
depart from this point if the intial values for MARKET SIZE and PRODUCTIVITY are zero. Therefore, 
this assumption allows the simulation model to display change without the need for an exogenous shock 
or non-zero initial values. In Smith’s conception of the economy, the initial impetus for economic change 
comes from changes which were occuring in the social relations, which would represent an extension of 
the causal relations within this model.
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Figure C3: POSSIBLE MARKET STZF. Graph






The assumption that declining prices and rising incomes will always elicit an increase in 
consumer desires for the product (e.g., similar to a constant marginal propensity to 
consume) may not be true for individual products, but it may hold greater validity as a 
macroeconomic phenomenon. This linear relationship is chosen for simplicity of 
presentation.191
These two core relationships can be placed in a single graph as shown in Figure 
C4. This graphical juxtapositioning was originally done by Boyer and Petit (1991), but
191 A more complex consumption relationship (e.g., a nonlinear function such as that used for 
PRODUCTIVITY) would have entailed a more detailed analysis without making a meaningful contribution 
to the conclusions.
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is extended here into a computer simulation model which explores the system’s behavior 
under variable parametric relationships.





If the inertial variables are set at unity, the dynamic path of the system can be easily 
traced out within this graph through an iterative process. However, as the inertial 
variables decline in value, these graphic relationships represent the variable component 
within the determination of a variable’s velocity of change.
For the sake of presentation, both the INDUSTRIAL INERTIA and the 
CONSUMER INERTIA rates are initially set equal to one, reflecting an instantaneous
356
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adjustment process within the economy.192 Using the graphical relationships given 
above, the phase diagram in Figure C5 shows the dynamic evolution of the MARKET 
SIZE and PRODUCTIVITY variables.
Figure C5: Phase Diagram with Initialized Parameters




After experiencing an increasing MARKET SIZE and PRODUCTIVITY, the system 
demonstrates a short period of oscillatory behavior but quickly settles into a stable 
equilibrium position.
Leaving the POSSIBLE PRODUCTIVITY graph unchanged, but allowing the slope 
of the POSSIBLE MARKET SIZE graph to vary, this simulation model will manifest 
different dynamic behavior. Figures C6 represents an increasing slope for the
193 The time step of the simulation, using Euler’s iteration method, is set at 0.0625 in order to get the 
most finely detailed dynamic behavior possible.
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POSSIBLE MARKET SIZE graphical relationship. This means that market demand is 
more responsive (i.e., experiences a larger increase) to some given change in 
productivity. As a result of these changes, the system goes from settling into a simple 
equilibrium state to cyclical behavior.
Figure C6: More responsive MARKET ST7F.
20 . 00 '




Figures C5 and C6 represent two generic dynamic behaviors into which the system can 
fall. One could also include exponential growth (e.g., if PRODUCTIVITY experiences 
continual increasing returns and individuals continually desire increased consumption), 
however this possibility has. not been included here.
The implication of parametric shifts in the inertial variables of this system are to 
decrease the rate at which the system adjusts itself to new possibilities. For example,
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a decreased INDUSTRIAL INERTIA variable (e.g., 0.5) will dampen any oscillations 
in the system by decreasing the rate at which the gap between the possible and actual 
PRODUCTIVITY variable is closed. For example, Figure C7 uses the same graphical 
relations as Figure C6, but alters the INDUSTRIAL INERTIA variable (set equal to 0.5).
Figure Cl: Decrease in INDUSTRIAL INERTIA
2 0 .0 0
10 . 00 '
0 . 00 '
o .o o 2000 .00
Market Size
Note that MARKET SIZE reaches a higher peak value than it did in Figure C6, but that 
PRODUCTIVITY peaks at a lower value. This is due to the restriction of the change 
in the PRODUCTIVITY variable relative to the MARKET SIZE variable. When the 
CONSUMER INERTIA variable decreases, the peak in PRODUCTIVITY will increase 
while that for MARKET SIZE decreases.
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The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the use of simulation techniques in 
modeling the systems discussed in the body of this dissertation. A simple simulation 
model such as this can provide a basis by which to build a more detailed analysis of 
economic change which incorporates sectoral division and income distribution 
considerations. However, such a task would require a programming language which 
could more easily accommodate an array of structurally similar but historically different 
systems (e.g., see Costanza and Maxwell 1991).
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APPENDIX D
A HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE EVOLUTION OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
In Bartley (1987), the contention appears that the sensory perception of animals 
may not be coordinated into a unified whole. He cites cognitive research on a frog’s 
visual perceptions which identifies five generic visual perceptions (i.e., windows) which 
elicit different responses from the frog. For example, the frog is responsive to small 
dark objects which pass within its field of vision (e.g., flying insects) and also to sudden 
drops in lighting intensity (e.g., the approach of a predator). Bartley believes that these 
findings suggest that a connection between the different sensory "windows" is not drawn, 
and that the animal acts as if these windows are from mutually exclusive sources. It is 
as if one were to look out from the different windows of a house without the idea that 
all these views are of a unified whole (i.e., an external world). These distinct sensory 
windows and their correlated behavioral responses take on an instinctual flavor involving 
a response to environmental gradients. For example, a plant grows towards light and its 
roots toward water without necessarily having the concepts of light, root, and water.
However, as one moves up the evolutionary ladder, these windows of perception
might entail more complex activities.
A primitive animal might have a hunger space that it uses when hungry, a separate 
thirst space, a separate escape space for escape from each predator, a mate-finding 
space, and so on for each important activity. (Bartley 1987:38)
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As one moves to "higher" animals, not only may the activities become more complex, 
but the hypothesis emerges that these perceptual spaces begin to overlap (ibid., 38). To 
the extent that these previously isolated windows into the world become united, the world 
begins to be seen as an external whole, and the knower becomes a ‘self.' This 
progression can be illustrated with Venn diagrams as follows:
This complementary unification of perceptual spaces may signal the beginning of
self-consciousness (i.e., the perception of a unified self in contrast to an external
environment). A synthetic quality emerges from the pattern of sensual perceptions.
Once the windows of perception are unified, the self is established through its continuity
of existence and its absence within the unified perception of the external environment.
After this initial declaration of "I" as an independent and continuous entity has arisen,
this duality of self and other is projected within the realm of the external world: other
phenomena which display a continuity through time are assumed to have self-existence
also. Georgescu-Roegen ties distinct concepts to the sense of self:
Every arithmomorphic [discretely distinct] concept stands by itself in the same 
specific manner in which every Ego stands by itself perfectly conscious of its 
absolute differentiation from all other Egos. This is, no doubt, the reason why our
Figure Dl: The Condensation of Self-Awareness
Other
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minds crave arithmomorphic concepts, which are as translucent as the feelings of 
one’s own existence. (Georgescu-Roegen 1971:45)
Descartes’ declaration is hereby inverted, "7 am, therefore I think." Furthermore, once
the concept of an animated se lf has emerged, it makes sense that objects would be
imbued with the same internal sense of independence that the observer feels, hence an
inbred tendency for the emergence of an animistic conception of the world. Although
these ideas are relatively new to the Western mind, they were explicitly embodied in the
doctrines of the Yogacara school of Mahayana Buddhism (see Suzuki 1930, 1931;
Sangharakshita 1957).
One should not forget that the emergent quality of self-consciousness arises from 
biological foundations and distinct windows of perception. Therefore, there would still 
be a tendency to react mechanically or behaviorally to particular situations since the 
evolution of a unified self has emerged from a pattern of previously exclusive perception- 
behavior correlations. This is witnessed by the fact that human beings are frequently 
situational animals with strong habitual tendencies. In other words, are your behaviors 
context dependent in a generic way? Are you a "different person" around your family 
or at work than when out with friends? This idea of a fragmented self is a pervasive 
theme within Buddhist thought (e.g., see Sangharakshita 1967,1986) which has also been 
explored by the Russian philosopher P.D. Ouspensky (1974, 1981).
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APPENDIX E
THE STRUCTURE-PROCESS INTERPLAY WITHIN ECONOMICS
Georgescu-Roegen’s (1971: 211-275) discussion of parallel and serial production 
methods is an exemplary example of static increasing returns. He defines a parallel 
technique as one which has a continuity of incomplete goods flowing through the 
production process with partially completed products existing at every stage of 
production. In other words, every piece of the productive infrastructure is continually 
in use. For example, (1) the three machines and three laborers needed to cut the wood 
necessary to build 1000 birdhouses/day, (2) the five laborers with five hammers and a 
stock of nails necessary to assemble 1000 birdhouses/day, and (3) the ten laborers with 
ten brushes and a stock of paint necessary to paint 1000 birdhouses/day are "matched" 
in such a way that the flow of incomplete birdhouses is roughly equivalent through each 
segment of this production process. In this way, the amount of idle time experienced by 
the productive infrastructure is reduced (e.g., both capital and labor). In contrast, a 
series technique puts a host of inputs sequentially through each step of the transformative 
process as a group. For example, imagine a single laborer who owns a saw, hammer, 
brush, nails, paint, and wood; a serial technique would involve multiple boards being 
cut, then assembled, and lastly painted as a group. From such a perspective, the 
movement towards a more parallel technique is one of degree and the serial dimension
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to production is continually lessened rather than absolutely removed since all production 
processes appeal to the natural environment and human beings in the final analysis.
There will always be limits to the feasibility of parallel techniques in production. 
For example, our dependence on sunlight and the photosynthetic growth process of plants 
limits our ability to utilize a parallel techniques in agriculture. In contrast, 
manufacturing allows for a greater degree of parallel processing and therefore a reduction 
of idle funds. In a climate of growing environmental awareness, the process of creating 
raw materials and disposing of consumer or industrial waste is coming under closer 
scrutiny and may begin to impose limits on industrial expansion. These examples draw 
our attention to the fact that one can think of these production processes as involving the 
services of other processes rather than merely transforming things. For example, 
agriculture is ultimately dependent on relatively short ecological cycles of birth and death 
(e.g., photosynthetic process) while manufacturing depends on longer cycles (e.g., 
geological and forest growth). And both rely on the integrity of workers. This fact 
gives insight into the process of static returns: they are limited by the dynamic process 
of their compositional elements.
The concepts of learning by doing (Arrow 1962) and learning by using (Rosenberg 
1982) embody a explicitly dynamic sense of IR relations. The former involves advances 
in producing a given good via new ways of using a given group of tools (i.e., whole as 
parts), garnered through experience and frequently proxied by cumulative output or 
investment. Whereas the latter involves the innovative productive uses for a given 
product (i.e., part as whole). Both learning by doing and learning by using involve the
365
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necessity of time.193 In other words, by using a given variety of tools in different 
ways, learning by using is the process by which one arrives at novel products. To the 
extent that these innovative products are used as tools in production (e.g., computers), 
learning by using creates the context in which learning by doing can unfold. An evolving 
circular relation exists between these two facets of learning, as illustrated in the following 
diagram.
193 Although Arrow did comment that "the very activity of production* gives rise to new problems to 
which 'favorable responses are selected over time,” his ideas concern fixed raw mate rial-* final product 
translations which form the arena for learning. But, he stops short of explicitly saying that experience 
provides the context from which novel products evolve.
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NOVEL PRODUCTION PROCESS 
& EXISTING PRODUCTION PROCESSES 
A
Learning by Doing




Learning by doing accounts for improvements in the production process of a given 
product while learning by using accounts for novel applications of a given product in 
production: the first is structural, the second interactive.
Recall Kondratieffs (1925) distinction between static and dynamic concepts in 
which the former seek an understanding of the interaction of unchanging elements while 
the latter consider the interaction of changing elements. In Georgescu-Roegen’s parallel
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versus series distinction it was the relative quantity of productive inputs rather than the 
inputs themselves that change. However, with the static-dynamic interplay between 
Arrow and Rosenburg’s concepts of learning, it is the functional relationships between 
inputs and the quality of the outputs that changes. It seems to be the case that the 
distinction between static and dynamic facets is merely one of spatio-temporal 
perspective: dynamic returns endogenous to the firm are the static returns of the industry, 
and the dynamic returns of an industry are the static returns of the national or regional 
economy as a whole. Kondratieffs comment that ultimately everything is dynamic seems 
to hold.
Although the leveling of static IR concepts can be found within Marshall’s 
Principles, the hierarchical relations between static and dynamic IR concepts was clearly 
outside the mainstream boundaries of economic inquiry after the IR debates of the 
1920’s. The use of dynamic IR concepts within economic theory was curtailed although 
static notions were still provisionally allowed, presumably since they dealt with 
quantifiable and stable elements. As a result, research tended to focus on the different 
structural levels of the economy (i.e., international, regional, institutional, industry, and 
firm) and thereby tended to identify increasing returns as inherent structural qualities of 
economic institutions. Dynamic IR foundations have been implicitly explored through 
research on static IR concepts (e.g., economic development), and have resulted in 
explicit criticisms of equilibrium methodologies. Since the appropriate mathematical 
tools did not exist for formally modelling these dynamic IR concepts, their exploration
368
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tended to be highly literary and expositions were frequently narrative with a smattering 
of historical statistics used to capture broad historical trends.
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